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
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War is BIG business in Angola



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CONTENTS

SAPEM FEATURES

COMMENT 3

LETTERS 4

COVER STORY

War as Business in Angola 5
Horace Campbell

SOUTH AFRICA IN TRANSITION

Explaining South Africa's Foreign Policy
Some Early Thoughts in the Mandela years 10
Peter Vale

TRC Report

Flawed but Still Valuable 16
Trevor Harris

NEWS BRIEFS 17

MAIN FEATURES

Crisis in the Great Lakes 18
Nzongola NtalajaPreliminary Thoughts on the
Congo Crisis 23
Mahmood Mamdani

ARTS CULTURE AND SPORT

Film Industry in Southern Africa 26
Nyasha MasiwaInterview: Jabu Kanyile 27
Nyasha MasiwaSOUTHERN AFRICAN
ECONOMIST

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Alternative Economic Policy Framework
For Southern Africa 29
Chinyamata ChipetaCross Boarder Large Farm Migrations
The Zambian Case 36
Gilbert B. MudendaAssessing Aid 40
Trevor Harris

The Angolan State has moved from fighting a just war of liberation to fighting wars of good intentions and now that warfare has become such a profitable affair, the generals on both sides are involved in a senseless war. There is a need to build and strengthen people to people contacts at various level who can continue to engage each other when the generals go shopping for more weapons.
See cover story pg. 5

SAPs have not achieved their objectives, especially development and stabilisation objectives. Markets have been liberalised to a large extent. Price adjustments have been colossal. But these have not brought about a commensurate rise in sectoral or total output (GDP) or exports. In low-income countries, significant structural change has not occurred. Per capita GNPs and living standards have declined as life expectancy at birth has fallen. Furthermore, fiscal and monetary policies have not brought about macroeconomic stability as interest rates and exchange rates have become very unstable, inflation rates have accelerated, in part due to economic liberalisation measures and bank financing of budget deficits, and as the current accounts of balances of payments as percentages of GDPs have increased in most of the countries.
See pg 25



It is through the exclusion of issues of sexual violation, which also incorporate the more blatant forms of gendered violence like rape, incest, sexual and physical abuse and marital rape from the core issues which construct democracy as an ideal and a practice, and the definition of democracy as a public matter - outside the domestic/private sphere - which has resulted in the persistence of backward and violent (anti-democratic practices) against women and young females on the one hand, and the positing of a notion of democracy which is partial and manifestly exclusionary on the other.
See pg 49

COVER DESIGN
SAPPHO

SADC Export Directory 42

SADC Inflation 43

SADC Lending Rates

SADC Interest Rates 44
SAPES Data Bank

AFRICA REVIEW

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

White Liberals and Black
Nationalists *strange bed fellows* 45
Archie Mafeje

SOCIAL POLICY

Addressing Rural Poverty
A Failed Strategy in Zimbabwe 49
Annie Barbara Chikwanha Dzenga

GENDER ISSUES

Gender and Democracy in Africa 54
Patricia McFadden

ENVIRONMENT

Refugees, Migration and Environment 58
Owen Sichone

AFRICA REVIEW OF BOOKS

Freedom from Debt 61
Patrick Ncube

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Angola: Beyond Protocols and Elections

It is not enough for the SADC leaders to declare Savimbi a war criminal nor for the United Nations to impose sanctions and freeze Unita's assets. The truth of the matter is that both Unita and the MPLA have mercilessly killed millions of their country's people and destroyed its infrastructure.

The MPLA has used billions of petrodollars and Unita the diamonds revenue in order to prop up this war. Unita has collaborated with the apartheid regime in South Africa and the MPLA American and Western capital despite its then professed socialist agenda. Thus none of the two movements are clean. African leaders and the United Nations must simply accept this hard reality of the Angolan situation, if their prescriptions are to lead to a meaningful political settlement. Since 1975 Angola has become a laboratory for unworkable accords, agreements and protocols. It is like people are either unable or unwilling to think of other solutions.

The Alvor Accord of 1975, the Bicesse Agreement of 1991 and the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 all ended up in failure and resulted in more deaths of innocent civilians and the destruction of property, infrastructure and the environment. The elections, conducted on the basis of a winner-take-all approach, have not taken Angola closer to peace.

In fact this type of electoral regime is now being questioned in the light of the zero-sum-outcome it produces. It is not conducive for the broadening of the democratic space let alone for resolving intense political conflicts. In the light of this reality, our search for peace in the region should be based on the historical experience of the post-colonial state and how it came into being. Scholars in this region, like their rulers, are now more concerned with the present as if the people and issues they are studying have no past and no history. And, of course, superficial and trivial analysis always lead to superficial prescriptions and solutions. Angola has not been spared of this sloppy scholarship.

All the protocols on Angola had one thing in common: hastily patched together arrangements to be followed by equally

ill-organised elections and an ineffective external monitoring whether it was of Portugal itself in the 1970s or the United Nations in the 1990s. The accords or protocols set an unrealistically short period of preparations for elections especially in a country with people who have been displaced internally and across its borders.

Neither the protocols nor the subsequent elections had any long-term vision of the kind of nation and country Angola would become.

The various protocols have therefore been used by the parties to the Angolan conflict as a breathing space and thus bases for the conquest of power and more territory from one and other.

The complex and polarised nature of Angolan politics does not render itself easily to the quick fix type of conflict management that are being imposed on Angola by either the United Nations or fellow African states especially the SADC.

The SADC has now shifted from long-term political resolution of conflicts to a more belligerent and militaristic approaches as the DRC and Lesotho cases aptly demonstrate. Its guiding concern is no longer based on humanitarian considerations but the profit motif - the war economy approach which the USA has been using in the Middle East. These African leaders are shamelessly saying that there are treasures in the Angolan and Congolese jungles that need to be exploited and therefore peace at any cost and any how is necessary. Admittedly there is nothing wrong with the African leaders and their generals pursuing their capitalist ambitions, but this should not be done at the expense of ordinary Africans.

The dismantling of Unita or its incorporation within the so-called Angolan government, sanctions or declaring Savimbi illegitimate or recognising breakaway groups from Unita are not really the solutions.

Such solution has to be radical, realistic and contextually rooted. The question is: what are the institutional and legal frame-work that can sustain real peace

and plural democracy in Angola.

Angola is presently neither a nation nor a state - it is at best a back-broken one. A sense of nationhood and statehood must be constructed by the Angolan people themselves by drawing from their common history, struggle and war. They will certainly need time in order to acquire a true national consciousness.

A unitary and commandist political set-up located in the Luanda enclave and the Malange corridor, which has been the traditional MPLA bastion, seems to be part of the problem. Thus moving the "national" capital to a more "neutral" and centrally located town or city will go a long way towards allaying the fear of other Angolan groups. Most Unita supporters still remember how their comrades were massacred by the MPLA in the Luanda enclave after the collapse of the protocols especially in 1975 and 1992. The same applies to MPLA supporters who were wiped out by Unita under similar circumstances.

What is needed in Angola is an asymmetrical political dispensation which is prepared to sacrifice legal symmetry in the constitution in deference to the realities of history and politics. Such an arrangement cannot be brought about by the present generation of Angolan politicians (and their cronies in the region) who are bent on resolving the conflict by military means.

As the lead article points out: inside the SADC there are elements that want the military to intervene on the side of the Angolan government. The limits of military intervention from the top has been exposed by both the DRC and Lesotho military intervention. These interventions have served to enrich the generals involved. The recent lengthy exposure of the enrichment of Zimbabwe military officers in the Congo should reinforce the call for the limitation of the role of the military and the need for civilian and popular efforts to bring peace.

There is thus a need for a new generation of political class that is capable of disengaging itself from the Cold War mentality that permeates most political analysis, and thus settlement for, Angola.

Political & Economic
MONTHLY

LETTERS

**SOUTH AFRICA AND FRANCE:
A NEW ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA?**

A conference on the changing African policies of France and South Africa took place on 12 and 13 November on the Wits campus, with some fifty participants from France, the United States, South Africa, and other African countries. Among the academic personalities in attendance were Samir Amin, Jean-Francois Bayart, Breyten Breytenbach, Philippe Hugon, Ben Magubane, Edouard Maunick and John Stremlau.

A number of participants (including Breyten Breytenbach and this author) noted that the conference title was somewhat misleading in that it implied a South African identity somehow distinct and separate of the rest of Africa as opposed to South Africa viewing itself as, in Aziz Pahad's words, "an African country whose destiny is inextricably linked with that of the continent" (an on-going, and as yet unresolved, debate in South African policy-making and academic circles), a point further exacerbated by the perceived lack of South African knowledge about Africa north of Limpopo. Expressing the participants' consensus, Sipho Maseko observed that South Africa should avoid taking a leadership role in Africa and rather focus on developing cooperative linkages with other African countries.

Apart from general comments to the effect that their objectives and interest in Africa are now complementary rather than competitive, precious little was said about the form and substance of cooperation between France and South Africa in Africa.

The concept of *African Renaissance* - which in fact, as Rok Ajulu demonstrated, has its roots in earlier forms of African nationalism and socialism, is actually a manifestation of South Africa's quest for an African identity by sections of the Af-

rican/South African intelligentsia. According to Bhekizizwe Peterson, it is high time that the *African Renaissance* be brought its natural constituency, namely the people of South Africa's townships.

Bayart argued that in Africa, war was fast becoming the dominant mode of nation-building and state formation. And he concludes that the definition of citizenship is the most serious issue confronting contemporary Africa. Noting that today, Africa is no longer central to the global system, Samir Amin concludes that while marginalised, the continent is not excluded from that system as such but rather over-exploited by, and subservient to world capitalism. And because what he calls "low-intensity democracy" is unable to deliver development, people withdraw into ethnic or religious forms of identity.

In the final analysis, this conference is timely as it comes in the wake of a drastic review of French African policy and of a more active South African regional and sub-regional policy in a changing global context characterised by the geo-political devaluation of Africa following the end of the Cold War. And while the new French African policy was explained and debated at length, too little was said about how concretely France and South might cooperate in Africa, but also on possible cooperative linkages and ventures between South Africa and the rest of the continent, particularly Francophone West and Central Africa. Indeed, this could be the subject of another conference, which might be convened by an African non-governmental academic institution such as the *African Association of Political Science* or the SAPEs Trust.

Guy Martin
Professor
(University of the Western Cape)

DANGEROUS DEMAGOGUES THREATEN FLEDGLING DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

History repeating itself? Events in the so-called Democratic Republic of the Congo seem to re-affirm this sad view.

In the mid 19th century, Prince Metternich of the Habsburg (Austrian) Empire, against a rising wave of unstoppable nationalism (and liberalism) sought to stem that wave in Europe. He organised a system of unilaterally and arbitrarily intervening in those states (when they were in crisis) so as to safeguard his rule in Austria.

Mugabe has made himself Africa's 20th century Metternich. He has eroded people's power at home to marginal levels and wants the same to be done in Angola, Namibia (see Nujoma's attempts to entrench himself in power lately, forever) and more actively in the

former ZAIRE. His reasons are that he was invited by a "legitimate" yet unelected government.

Now let's examine the authenticity of the invitation. We Zimbabweans didn't know of it and Parliament seems lost also. If it was Kabila who invited them, then they had the option of declining the invitation.

Living under the shadow of Mandela since 1994, Mugabe saw his chance of regaining his blue-eyed boy image (of Southern Africa) and thus raise his international profile as the region's elder statesman. Against ten SADC countries' option for the table, Mugabe (leader of the pugnacious hawkish camp within SADC) air-lifted troops, erroneously previously called "allied SADC forces" but now perhaps rightly called "allied-forces", to defend Kabila and save an inevitable ouster of an ugly dictator (in a space of hours) in what one observer has said is defending one rebel from another.

We still need to know whose were the two planes shot earlier in the "Rumble-In-The-Jungle-Congo-Campaign"

Fooled by the success of the battle for Kinshasa and the Matadi corridor, Mugabe has been so upbeat about his intervention that he has vowed to "liberate" the east and drive out the "invaders".

Mugabe talks of being perplexed by rebels who continue to occupy more land to that they already hold. He chooses to forget that is what Arthur Zingoma pledged at the Vic Falls departure. Earnest Wamba Dia Wamba said congolese got to brace themselves for a war that maybe for weeks, months or years! Mugabe talks of the Congo being subjected to the will of little Rwanda and Uganda in spite of its monstrosity in terms of its geography, its population and its resources! What Mugabe hasn't said is why should monstrous Congo be subjected to the whims and caprices of little Zimbabwe.

We have a duty, to future generations, to say no to the ripping, raping and plundering of our resources by leaders who purport to help legitimate heads of state in danger of coups when in fact they are clandestinely helping unpopular autocrats of pariah states because they happen to be strange-bed-fellows.

By Matshobana Ncube
Nkulumane, Bulawayo.

War Business In Angola

Horace Campbell



ANGOLA

Kuito: after the ordeal of mines, displaced people are forced to live in camps.

© Thierry GASSMANN/ICRC

INTRODUCTION

This year is ten years since the South Africans were defeated at Cuito Cuanavale. Between November 1987 and June 1988 the combined forces of the Angolan army, the Cuban internationalist forces and elements of the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) defeated the apartheid military forces of South Africa and UNITA. In seeking to ensure that African youths in the future were inspired by this military battle that changed the recent history of Africa, there were scholars who embarked on bringing to the world the lessons of the "Military Defeat

of the South Africans in Angola." (*Horace Campbell, 1989*) It was the view that a peoples consciousness is heightened by knowledge of the dignity and determination of their foreparents.. It was necessary that place names and battles at Tchipa, Cuito Cuanavale and Cunene should be common knowledge similar to the way in which the landing in Normandy in 1944 is seen as the turning point in the defeat of the fascism.

The battles of Cuito Cuanavale and the subsequent independence of Namibia in 1990 were episodic events that strongly affected the military posture of the apartheid regime and forced the pace of negotiations in South Africa. However, these military

confrontations did not end the full scale war in Angola. Ten years later, armed force of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were deployed in over 50 percent of Angolan territory and a reserve army of UNITA was stationed in Zambia. The army of the government of Angola was fully mobilized and had undertaken two major military forays into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (in 1997 and 1998) and in Congo Brazzaville. The extensive militarism and warfare in Angola necessitated a deeper understanding of the processes that generated war than the empirical accounts of battles and peace accords. The immense deployment of both the troops

of UNITA and the government of Angola made a mockery of the Lusaka Accords of 1994 where both parties had undertaken to establish a framework for demobilization of troops and the creation of a government of national unity.

The continuing bloodshed in Angola years after the Lusaka Accords (of 1994) and ten years after the peace accords on Namibia forced scholars and thinkers to fully examine the meaning of peace and to attempt to understand the cultural, ideological and military forces that generate warfare.

The attempts since 1991 to end the war in Angola and the unsuccessful efforts at bringing warring parties together have pointed to the necessity of grasping war as a business. This understanding is deepening all over Africa in order to understand the need for a new intellectual and political direction in the search for peace and reconstruction.

Progressive African men and women as well as feminist scholars have made it clear that it is not simply enough to understand the military defeat of South Africa. It is also necessary to understand the ideas and cultural practices that validate violence and war.

The extensive warfare and the political struggles in Angola.

It is now estimated that between 1992 and 1998 the different forces in Angola have spent over US \$6 billion on weapons. Calculations by Human Rights Watch Arms Project in 1994 were that the government of Angola had spent over \$3.5 billion dollars in procuring weapons to prosecute the war. UNITA has spent up to two billion dollars in the pursuit of weapons in lieu of the fight for power by Jonas Savimbi.

Notwithstanding the division in the ranks of UNITA between a clear military wing and those who seek political solutions to the problems of Angola, the war in Angola now rages as a full conventional war destroying humans and the environment in its wake.

The fact that the fighting is most intense around the diamond producing zones of the Lundas and the oil producing regions of Cabinda and Soyo expose the reality that the war is over control of the very extensive mineral resources in Angola. There is no longer the figment by either-side that the fight is for political principles such as sovereignty or popular democracy. It is now a raw struggle over who will control the wealth in order to recycle the wealth for weapons. War is now a business in Angola with the generals of both sides enriching themselves to the point where they have lost the kind of linkages that existed to political bases in the periods before the Bicesse ac-

further eroded when the government moved to recruit the private South African firm Executive Outcomes. Executive Outcomes operated outside of any governmental control, whether in Angola or elsewhere, the military wing of the MPLA operated outside of the control of the party and UNITA operated outside of the control of the elected representatives of UNITA who sat in the Parliament. The political and military leadership of UNITA had become established to the point where all aspiring political leaders sought to operate in the same fashion as Savimbi while denouncing Savimbi.

The internationalization of the Angolan war.

What is meant by operating like Savimbi? Why are there now comparisons between General Joao De Matos and Savimbi?

The government of Angola has internationalized the war in the same way that Savimbi and the South Africans internationalized the whole question of Total war in the eighties. During the period of the South African military occupation of Southern Angola, the MPLA could argue that

it was fighting a just war in so far as UNITA was aligned with the army of apartheid and the cold war warriors in the Pentagon of the USA. The ways in which the war was carried to the civilian areas of the country revealed the way in which the leaders of UNITA had internalized the Total War concept of the South African militarists. This total war was articulated as total strategy and involved:

- (a.) a political strategy,
- (b) an economic strategy
- (c) psychological warfare, and
- (d) a military strategy.

The concept of Total Strategy reinforces the view of this contribution that warfare was not simply direct violence of military confrontations. UNITA continued the war in Angola and carried it to the towns and the villages. This is where women felt the brunt of the war.

Just wars and well intentioned wars.

There have been four main stages in the past thirty seven years.

The continuing bloodshed in Angola years after the Lusaka Accords (of 1994) and ten years after the peace accords on Namibia forced scholars and thinkers to fully examine the meaning of peace and to attempt to understand the cultural, ideological and military forces that generate warfare.

cords.

In the specific case of the MPLA the militarists in the FAA need the war to strengthen their position in the government in the context of the question of the future leadership in the country. There have been reports of the ill health of the President of Angola and the wide gap between the political leadership of the MPLA and the military wing of this wing in FAA. The control over the state apparatus by the military faction is manifest in the extensive network established for the prosecution of the war and the diplomacy to ensure the continuation of war. This section of the MPLA reflects the ill health of the party and the malady of militarism that has overtaken the Angolan society. Whether President Dos Santos is physically healthy or not, his political health has been in question since 1994 when he abdicated his political responsibility in the need to develop political alternatives to the militarists in the party, the bureaucracy and the armed forces.

The political health of the society was

1. The stage of the war against Portugal 1961 to 1975 (Alvor Accords).
2. The 1975-1981 consolidation of the government of Angola in the process of defeating the invasion of South Africa. (UN Resolutions calling for South African withdrawal from Angolan territory.)
3. The period of 1981 to 1988 and the threat against the society as a whole as the country was drawn into the cold war via constructive engagement and linkage. This was the period when the South Africans occupied the Southern provinces of the country. This period ended with the military defeat of the South Africans at Cuito Cuanavale. The war continued between UNITA and the MPLA up to the Bicesse Accords of 1991.
4. The war after the 1992 elections and the take over of two thirds of the municipalities in the country by UNITA.

The Lusaka Accords were signed in 1994 to end the war that killed more persons in the two year period than in the previous wars. The looting and destruction carried out by soldiers of both armies in Huambo exposed the extent to which the MPLA had abandoned its political direction in the period of liberalization. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the leadership of the MPLA became openly bureaucratic and corrupt losing its moral claims as the leaders of the struggle for independence. The corruption and bureaucratic culture of those with influence and power reinforced the powers of the international agencies and organizations.

Lucio Lara, a veteran of the party criticized the government in this way, "Once in the Council of Ministers I heard someone say that we must stop using the phrase, 'The important thing is to solve peoples problems.' I thought maybe he was right, because no one spoke out against him. In my opinion this was when the party began to collapse. The leaders felt they all had the right to be rich. That was the beginning of the destruction of our life. Our people are suffering and no one cares. If you talk to our people, they are all suffering. No one is smiling. But there is no preoccupation with this from the leadership."

Lara was critical of the preoccupation with business and enrichment by the leadership. He declared that the leaders of the country were too busy with business, they had no time to govern. (*Lucia Lara, 1995*) By 1992, the leadership treated the war as a business and did not consider political and

moral ways of seizing the high ground from UNITA. The indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment of both sides exposed the disregard for human life. The government expended its energies on weapons and did not seek to use political measures to isolate UNITA. The 1992 elections had provided an opportunity to move the society away from warfare. The leaders of UNITA had been reassured by the leaders of the Cold war that they would be elevated into power if there were elections. However, the people of Angola intervened and handed a defeat to Savimbi. The mass of the population said that they were not going to reward Savimbi for destroying the country. It was here that the same international forces used the United Nations and its multiple organizations to reward Savimbi by providing the diplomatic and political cover for UNITA to remobilize its military forces that was supposed to have been demobilized in the period before the elections. The United Nations had been too compromised by its support for UNITA and Savimbi that an opportunity was lost in the search for peace. In essence, it can now be argued that the UN has been an accomplice in the militarization of Angola. In this process two major UN figures suffered irreparably, one lost their career on the rock of warfare, the other lost his life. A brief note on the UN and the militarism in Angola is here necessary.

War as Peace in Angola

In a recent book on Somalia, *The Road to Hell*, Michael Maren drew our attention to how the whole question of peace forms part of the military strategy of the national security and military experts in Europe and the USA. The book also opened a window on how the so called humanitarian agencies have a vested interest in war since dislocation and suffering becomes the basis of the survival of these international non governmental organizations. This position is borne out by the nature of the peace and violence that has been witnessed in Angola since 1991.

The various "peace accords" that were signed never ushered in peace in Angola. From the period of the Alvor agreement in 1975 to the Lusaka Accords of 1994, the well being of the Angolan people was never a consideration in the formulation of strategies for peace. In most cases, peace was an effort to create a government of national unity (in practice bringing two armies to-

gether). The peace accord signed between the Angolans and South Africans in 1988 had brought about the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola. It was the decisive trouncing of the South Africans that brought this about despite the re-writing of history to say that the accords came from the negotiating skills of Chester Crocker of the USA. (*Chester Crocker, 1992*). Before these Accords, the South Africans had signed a protocol in 1984 declaring that it would leave Angola, but this protocol was simply designed to give the South African army the time to beef up its militarization of Namibia. It was the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale that laid the basis for the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council leading to the independence of Namibia.

The independence of Namibia did not end the war for power in Angola nor the South African destabilization and destruction of the region of Southern Africa. There were intensified battles in Angola between 1990 and 1991, especially the battles of Luena and Mavinga. The agreement of 1991 was conceptualized in the simple terms of a cease-fire, the confinement of troops to assembly areas, demobilization of the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), the army of the MPLA and the Armed forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA) and the creation of a new army. Elections were to take place after a period of registration and voting for a new government. However, in less than three months after the Bicesse Accords the Soviet Union had disintegrated and the pressures in the West to fully support the United Nations in the peace process to see that demilitarization took place disappeared.

The monitoring system for the peace accords of Bicesse comprised of soldiers from a Joint Political Military Commission. This was a Commission primarily of military men from UNITA and the MPLA. Men and women in Angola who did not have an army behind them had no say in this process. Similarly, non military parties and institutions were not involved on the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) which was responsible for the implementation of the peace. These accords broke down when UNITA lost the elections in 1992. The UNAVEM mission to Angola proved to be an accessory to the renewed war in so far as the numerous meetings that were initiated never seriously affected the massive killings that went on between 1992

to 1994. It was for this reason that one journalist characterized the whole experience of the UN in Angola as that of *Promises and Lies*. (Karl Maier, 1996). The whole nature of this experience has been documented by Margaret Anstee in the Book, *Orphans of the Cold War*. Here Ms. Anstee sought to give her view of the reasons for the failure of the UN. In her case, she escaped with her life. The next UN representative lost his life in a plane crash while shuttling between west African countries that had become rear bases for UNITA's military operations.

Mr. Beye had taken over from Ms. Anstee in 1993 when the whole war had reached the point where hundreds of thousands were dying while the UN dithered. This phase of the war had ended when the FAA had rearmed itself and was about to rout the UNITA forces in Huambo. The Lusaka Protocol of November 1994 formally marked the end of the war of 1992-1994 and in February 1995 the United Nations agreed to continue the "peacekeeping" operation in Angola, United Nations Angola Verification Mission, UNAVEM 111, authorizing a contingent of 7000 personnel. The Lusaka Protocol should have ended the most brutal phase of the war since 1975.

When the Angolans had fought the South Africans there were set battles in conventional warfare with soldiers fighting soldiers. After 1992 most major cities were besieged. Starvation and disease, as well as deaths and injuries from bombing, shelling and land mines meant that the number of lives lost was estimated at over 300,000. There were as many as one thousand persons per day dying during the height of the fighting in 1993. Yet, despite the signing of the Lusaka Accords, there is no real peace in the society.

These peace accords simply meant the continuation of cultural violence and the other overt and not so covert forms of warfare. UNITA remained a mobile military force with an army that could be deployed to fight on the side of the dying Mobutu regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The occupation of the administrative centers of the country by UNITA and the refusal by Savimbi to disarm dictate that more drastic measures were needed than those prescribed by international peace fixers.

The present war in the Congo and in Angola :Well intentioned wars and senseless wars

Neither the MPLA nor UNITA can claim

any moral distinction in the present war.

The Angolan conflict had been internationalized by the 1997 war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo when the MPLA boldly claimed that it was fighting to support those forces fighting against Mobutu. It was here the MPLA could claim part of its liberation rhetoric in so far as the mass of the population remembered the role of Mobutu in destabilizing Angola since 1975. Mobutu supported Savimbi religiously since that time and after the military defeat of the South Africans, Zaire was the rear base for UNITA. Less than three months after the removal of Mobutu, the army of Angola was deployed in a large military operation to remove the government of Pascal Lissouba. The government of Angola declared that it had entered Congo Brazzaville to seal off of Savimbi's supply lines. These intentions were supported by propaganda over the radio and television in Angola calling on the citizens to make sacrifices to oppose Mobutu since the overthrow of Mobutu would lead to the political and military demolition of UNITA. However, UNITA demonstrated that its business venture of fighting has involved long term investment in fighting that The MPLA would need superior political, ideological and military resources to remove the lucrative business of fighting and the diamond trade.

Since the intervention in the Congo Brazzaville by the MPLA the forces of UNITA moved to create rear bases in Zambia. The eastern Moxico region has been more or less taken over by UNITA with the large airport in that region serving as one of the principal resupply air link in this war. The supply lines that had been established for UNITA after the defeat of the South African army at Cuito Cuanavale still enables the corporate/military/security elements within South Africa to provide supplies to UNITA. This ensures the procurement of armaments from the Far East and Central Europe. Conservative Francophobe states such as Togo is one country that is complicit in the senseless war in Angola. It was while on route to this country to persuade the leadership to end support for Savimbi that Mr. Beye lost his life.

In the elaborate business of supplying war material for UNITA, arms manufacturers, insurance brokers, shippers, bankers, telecommunications experts, freight forwarders, truckers and private air transport elements have a stake in the war. These elements are responsible for the supply of

small arms, spare parts, uniforms, field rations, trucks and fuel for the military organization of UNITA while international non governmental organizations and the World Food Program ensures that there is some population in the areas under the military domination of the military business elements.

The Angolan government has not moved to fight in the same way in this region because though UNITA is in this region, the diamonds and oil are in the Lundas and in Soyo and Cabinda. It is from Zambia where the military of UNITA finds its sustenance and there have been comments from humanitarian agencies that the military capacity of UNITA in Zambia is now more substantial than that of the Zambian government.

The war in the Lundas has escalated dramatically since August 1998. In June, the United Nations Security Council had promised sanctions if UNITA had not demobilized its troops and returned control of the administration to the government. Certain elements of the UN were angry over the death of M. Beye. Whether Savimbi had been guilty of planting a bomb on the plane that took his life or not, it was the view of the international community that Savimbi carried the moral responsibility for the death of the UN special representative, in fact a metaphor for the death of the figment of the UN peace mission in Angola. Since the death of Beye, the war escalated by leaps and bounds.

A Senseless War.

By August UNITA moved to reclaim the diamond areas that it had surrendered to the government under the Bicesse accords. The extent of the fighting has not been recorded with any degree of accuracy. The reality is that there is an undeclared war in Angola and an extensive war in the Congo where both sides of the Angolan war are involved. In August the army of Angola moved into the Congo to support the government of Kabila. The Angolan army had moved in under the diplomatic cover of the SADC Organ on Peace Security and Defense. This author was informed that the Angolans who were allies with Uganda and Rwanda in 1996 had been briefed of the rebellion by the Congolese Democratic Movement but were persuaded by a number of factors to change their position and join those fighting with Kabila. The Angolans declared that they became involved because UNITA was fighting with the CDM. UNITA has made many broadcasts to the effect that they are fighting with the CDM. These broadcasts have

been reproduced routinely by the media.

The CDM has issued statements to say categorically that they have no alliances with Savimbi and the military wing of UNITA. The Angolan force came in from Cabinda and there are reports that their air force took part in the bombing of Kalemie. This deployment was intensified in late November as all forces focused on the diamonds of Kasai. UNITA maintained a presence in the Congo, especially in the diamond zones, since Savimbi had perfected the marketing and movement of diamonds for military equipment. In this whole enterprise the experience in warfare and destruction that has been accumulated by Jonas Savimbi becomes an important aspect of this senseless war. The Angolan military joins Kabila with the pretext to stop Savimbi and the very process emboldens the military wing of UNITA at precisely the moment that UNITA as a political force was splintering into military, political and parliamentary factions.

Savimbi and the insatiable appetite for senseless wars.

Jonas Savimbi has had such major impact on the history of Angola in the past forty years that it is difficult to treat any aspect of Angolan recent history without reference to the personality of Savimbi. His single-mindedness in the pursuit of power at all costs has left him largely isolated even within the organization that he created but the legacies of the cold war media blitz accords to Savimbi an importance that allows for the survival of an elaborate financial, military and information system to perpetuate war. The history of Savimbi and UNITA provides an interesting glimpse of how the academy and the media has distorted the history of the liberation process in Africa. Savimbi had endeared himself to the conservative and apartheid elements in his bid for power. He fought under the banner of anti communism and "ethnic authenticity." The limits of this position that he commanded the support of the Ovimbundu people were exposed when he lost the elections in 1992. The electoral process demonstrated that there was no homogenous Ovimbundu constituency. Savimbi lost the elections and his actions exposed the extent to which a political organization came to believe its own disinformation and propaganda that it was fighting for an ethnic majority.

The UN instead of labeling Savimbi a war criminal spent an inordinate amount of

time negotiating with him, "writing to him, waiting on him, telephoning him, meeting him" and generally flattering him as an important leader." This is the opinion of David Birmingham who argued that Savimbi was a skilled master at playing off the world's leaders while sticking to his own fanatical obsessions.

The reality has changed in the international arena since this was written. The dramatic warrant for the arrest of general Pinochet of Chile is a signal that the accounting has begun for those who carried out crimes against humanity during the period of the cold war. In this sense there needs to be vigorous efforts to document the crimes of the military wing of UNITA so that there is complete rejection of Savimbi in Angola, in Africa and internationally.. This rejection would weaken the military wing of the MPLA since this faction of the political leadership in Angola need the bogey of Savimbi to be in business. Peace Activists must emerge within the region to reject the militarist option to problems.

Military intervention by SADC or New popular Initiatives for Peace

Inside of SADC there are elements that want the military to intervene on the side of the Angolan government. The limits of military intervention from the top has been exposed by both the DRC and Lesotho military intervention. These interventions have served to enrich the generals involved. The recent lengthy exposure of the enrichment of Zimbabwe military officers in the Congo should reinforce the call for the limitation of the role of the military and for civilian and popular efforts to bring peace.

The Angolan people have shown considerable resilience in the face of the complete breakdown of the economy. While the militarists operate the destructive business of war, the economy has been affected to the point where the government no longer pretends to deliver basic services such as education, health care and clean running water. The ideas of liberalization and open economy have taken root among the elite to the point where the government no longer feels that it has any responsibility for the welfare of the mass of the people. International non governmental organizations are supposed to provide food while the armies of both sides plant more land mines as military operations expand.

Angolan women have shown that they are the principal force in holding the country together. While the billion dollar busi-

ness of bombs and artillery take the national wealth, the informal sector search for levers to keep the population alive.

It is in this situation where those in Angola and in the region need to create new spaces to mobilize the energies of the people so that the survival techniques developed for the resistance to warfare can be developed for peace from the people. There is a need to build and strengthen people to people contacts at various level who can continue to engage each other when the generals go shopping for more weapons. In 1995 SARIPS organized a conference on the road to peace in Angola. The Secretariat of SADC must of urgent necessity take up this matter and take it to the peoples of Angola and the region out of the hands of joint military commissions and the United Nations.

This type of diplomacy is urgent since the old military intervention model has only rewarded those in the military business. The state as the exclusive war maker and guarantor of peace has run its course in this period. The Angolan state has moved from fighting a just war of liberation to fighting wars of good intentions and now that warfare has become such a profitable affair, the generals on both sides are involved in a senseless war. They will always be able to fight as long as there is a vast pool of unemployed youth available to be mobilized for war. The reconstruction of the economy of Angola must go hand in hand with initiatives for peace. No matter how many billions of dollars are expended on weapons, it is now clear that there can be no simple military solution.

The government of Angola and UNITA have shown diligence in waging war not in making peace.

A comprehensive agenda for peace would have to address both the internal and regional dimensions of the Angolan war and seek wider political settlement of the issues that make the region so vulnerable to armed interventions by warriors who make war a business. There is a need to engage the various political forces Angola and not simply those who sing the songs of the MPLA government. This engagement must be based on the people not the negative mobilization on cheap populism, xenophobia and war that is going on at the moment. The voices of all the people of Angola armed or unarmed must be heard and heard effectively.

This is the beginning of the process of isolating those who are engaged in war as a business.

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Explaining South Africa's Foreign Policy

Some early thoughts on the Mandela years

Peter Vale

Making foreign policy is very difficult especially in these, the late days of the Twentieth Century. The certainties represented by organisation of people into territories called states, have evaporated before our eyes; the lines offered by the division of time into day and night have vanished as markets follow their own twenty-four hour clocks; and the policy options provided by the well-tested tools of negotiation, diplomacy and war have waned as international relationships have become less rooted in politics and more preoccupied first with economics and increasingly with the environment.

To raise these abstractions early in thoughts¹ on the malaise in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy is not to excuse the far too many areas of failure, with some trendy post-modernist whim. My intention, rather, is to talk about the making of policy, in a real, but quickly changing, world. But without locating this real world within a rigorous theoretical framework it will go the way of most writing on South Africa's foreign policy - long on sentiment, short on insight and without a basis to reflect on the knowledge which creates it. Because so, let me add this brief explanation: To think theoretically on an issue is not to obfuscate it; rather it is to situate themes which are fluid within ideas and to know that ideas, not institutions, structure the world. The need to say this is all the more important because of the holding idea that the contemporary period is characterised, more than anything else, by change: this change can be something, everything or nothing - what we finally decide it is (or means) is determined by theory. And yet, for all this theorizing, what commentators do and what they say is profoundly practical.

The hard truth and the great achievements within South Africa must not make

us reluctant to recognise it - is that there have been no real ideas in foreign policy from South Africa's government, these past five years. The much celebrated African Renaissance, the centre-piece of Thabo Mbeki's thinking on the issue remains little more than a shopping list of ideas which would help secure a suitable vocabulary for his presidency. (Vale and Maseko. 1998: 271-287; Moyo. 1998: 9-12) And the idea, recently launched by the Deputy President's office, that the country's foreign policy aimed to develop democracies in Africa because democracies never go to war with each other, is a reworking of the "democratic peace thesis" which alas has been found wanting in Central America and, perhaps, elsewhere. (Sunday Times. Johannesburg 13 September. 1998). This said, I will suggest that both these initiatives are, indeed, integral to the unfolding of South Africa's position on (and in) international relations - a position which draws upon the ideology of globalisation, and a development which reinforces the popular perception that South Africa, certainly over the past five years, has been drawn into the political and economic which, internationally, serve the same ideology.

To achieve its goal these thoughts do three things: after some further introductory ideas which trace some of the ways in which foreign policy in South Africa has been thought upon, it takes a fairly long theoretical detour. This diversion from mainstream thinking draws the work of the late Bill Graf - until his untimely death professor of political science at Guelph University - both closer to Southern Africa and to international relations scholarship. In so doing, I hope to honor his memory, and draw (as he would have wished, I believe) the knowledge sub-text known as Development Studies closer to-

wards another subtext, International Relations. Unless students of foreign policy are prepared to make this move, they will I believe, never come close to understanding the meta-narratives which drive contemporary world affairs. In its third step, the paper tries to make sense of two recent decisions in South Africa's foreign policy - decisions which look, and at all intents and purposes are, polar opposites: these are the much-condemned and initial South African decision not to support the Laurent Kabila government in Kinshasa and the decision (equally condemned) to lead a SADC task-force into Lesotho less than five weeks later. This is not a comprehensive discussion: as I will note, much remains to be written on both these cases; until this appears, the judgment offered here is an interim one. In its final step, the argument makes some brief - some might read them as abrupt and wholly inadequate - closing comments.

Understanding the Story so Far

The fact of South Africa's re-emergence into the international community on May 10th, 1994 was much celebrated; and the directions which its foreign policy might follow was, at the time, the subject of popular commentary and, it needs to be said, some considerable optimism. Looking back over this time, there have been some significant successes - four are worth considering..

South Africa's role in The Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 1995; South Africa's role in the Ottawa Process - the series of procedures which led to the signing of the Landmines Convention; South Africa's Chairmanship of the UN Commission on Human Rights; and the series of meetings between President Nelson Mandela and the Libyan leader, Moammer Gadaffi, which may still lead to the break-

through over the Lockerbie Bombers. (Business Day, Johannesburg 24 October, 1998) With the possible exception of the latter, these accomplishments have not been integral to the mystique and magic (to capture two words) associated with South Africa's return to the international community; indeed, these accomplishments appear to have taken place in spite of the celebration over the new South Africa and the international standing of its President, Nelson Mandela. How has the gap between these high expectations and the rather modest achievements been explained? In the main, quite conventional theoretical framings have been used.

So, for instance, the complications of South Africa's transition, especially the undertakings under the so-called "sunset clauses", have been said to account for the failure of South Africa to develop a coherent and purposeful foreign policy. (Vale, 1995). Other commentators have suggested that the vicissitudes which have been experienced in South Africa's foreign policy, are located in the personality-factor - in particular, the esteemed position occupied by Nelson Mandela, or the limited presence brought to this important aspect of the "new" South Africa by the foreign minister, Alfred Nzo. (South African Yearbook, 1998: 7). Some commentators, following on the lights offered by Graham Allison in the late-1960s, have loosely used ideas around bureaucratic politics to suggest that conflict between different South African ministries has been at the root of South Africa's failure to deliver on foreign policy issues - especially important in this regard are said to be policy tensions between South Africa's ministries of Foreign Affairs, and Trade and Industry. (Landsberg, le Pere & van Nieuwkerk, 1995: 53-57) And some of the blame for setbacks have been laid at the door of the reluctance of South Africa's government to democratise foreign policy-making - the quite obvious failure, for instance, to open the decision-making process towards parliament. (South African Yearbook, 1996: 136-143. South African Yearbook, 1998: 291-306). Then, finally in this list of explanations, some accounts have located deep tension between separate and antagonistic epistemic communities within the country. (Spence, 1996: 118-125; *Mail & Guardian*, 25 August, 1995) Caught within the assumption

of mainstream International Relations scholarship, none of these theories (nor the explanations which they bring) represent Kuhnian-type paradigm shifts in the way in which, for close on five decades, efforts have been made to understand South Africa's international relationships.

In this brief essay I want to use social theory to frame a different approach: my purpose is to locate the malaise and uncertainties in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy within the meta-narratives which have driven international relations in the post-Cold War era. In particular, I will show that ideas around democracy, the market and security have been drawn together in a single ideological and hegemonic project: this, "globalised democracy" (which is what I will call it) sets the limits of South Africa's willingness to operate, and following this, to challenge the set patterns of behaviour in contemporary international relationships.

The theoretical detour

Before doing so, an important clarificatory issue: the inspiration for the ideas which follow are (almost entirely) drawn from a single essay, "Democratization for the Third World" (1996: 37-55), written soon before his untimely death by Bill Graf; the essay also serves as the background against which the interpretation of what follows is chiefly registered.

The elevation of "democracy" as a central motif of both international relations and development, is a commanding discourse in the contemporary world. The "ideological resonance" (ibid: 38) of this discourse lies in the successful conflation of political liberalism and economic liberalism into a residual democracy. It universalizes and absolutizes what, so far, has been a historically and geographically delimited experience [transforming] it into a prescription free from all constraints of time and place...every nation must be, or be seen to be, democratic." (ibid). Although driven by states in the North, this discourse has been triggered by "practitioners from the World Bank and the IMF as well as development ministries and agencies in the West." (ibid: 39). In this way, all other political discourses, specially discourses concerned with change, progress and order in the international arena are rendered meaningless. This is the first issue in which Bill Graf anchors

his argument. The second issue is consequent on the first - the cadence and content of diplomatic and development practice has changed. The importance of the "Third World especially Africa and Latin America, to the West's anti-communist foreign policy has virtually disappeared...[these powers are]...free to align their foreign and aid policies more closely to their economic and ideological interests...Northern aid has become more and more contingent on ideological conformity, economic conscience and the presence of democratic governing forms from the South." (ibid).

The values which underpin this position include "the rule of law, free markets and democracy". (ibid) Unlike its ideological predecessor, the Cold War, this approach to international relationships is overtly buttressed by a "vast democracy production industry" in the South - NGOs and INGOs, development agencies, trade organizations, multinational corporations, state bureaucracies and departments, and a whole panoply of international organizations' (ibid. 39) Amongst other things, the purposes of these institutions is to identify democracy with development - which remains the chief rhetoric goal of governments in the South. This process of identification is achieved, in part, by the belief that market forces must play a role both in constituting democracy in the South and fostering development. Through this, issues of social reform, redistribution or social justice are thought to be unnecessary goals: unimportant (certainly over the short-term) to governments and the democracy-making institutions to which they have lent their support. The cumulative effect is that Southern elites have been relatively untouched by the debates around democracy and development - certainly these elites seem more political and economically secure than they appeared to be during the Cold War and apartheid.

The status quo personality of change (to coin an oxymoron) in South Africa, I suggest, is what delivered the country from the blood-bath which had been confidently predicted, but paradoxically, it is the very hesitation to address the central issue of contemporary South Africa, the maldistribution of wealth, is what gives the country its sense of permanent transition. In this situation the promise of (what

I have here called) globalised democracy has provided - as it has elsewhere, incidentally - a powerful ideological tool to pursue the traditional African ideal of nation-building. This (a parallel) to the way in which the democracy-as-ideology is used by Bill Graf; it, nevertheless, returning us to a theme we have already considered "democratization nowadays has become what development and modernization were two decades ago" a hegemonic discourse allowing the North to define the South in its own image, a discourse rendered all the more effective for the seeming lack of alternatives, with the difference that then, both communism and capitalism vied for ownership of these terms, while today they are the exclusive preserve of the latter, which can now set its own definitions and terms of discourse. Both democratization now and development/modernization then, however, start from the same assumption, namely that the North is and has the answer to the problem of development while the South has and is the problem." (ibid: 41)

Democracy, ideology and foreign policy

The power of this ideology and the discourse which underpins it has had a profound effect on foreign policy and its making - the Latin American experience powerfully illustrates the point. Briefly drawing Latin America closer to Southern Africa for these comparative purposes, enables us to insert neo-realism as integral to the processes of globalised democracy. Two visions of the goals of foreign policy have vied for contention in Latin America. One was inspired by the memory of Simon Bolivar and the latter's quest for "a unified body of all former Spanish colonies linked by culture, language, and history. Its modern manifestation envisions an economically and politically integrated Latin America that is united without, and sometimes against, U.S. hegemony" (Hey. 1998: 108) The second vision is "born (in) the Monroe Doctrine and embodied in the Pan-American ideal and] calls for an Americas dominated by the United States but free from the influence of countries outside the Western Hemisphere". (ibid) Faced with the

emergence and the power of liberal democratic discourse, some scholars argue, that the "US vision is more prominent". (ibid: 109) Although the same tussle, the soul of Southern Africa (to intentionally invoke the emotional term) can be identified in Southern Africa, I want to suggest that in the Mandela years, (to use the phrase again) the US vision is more prominent.

The engulfing of South Africa within the discourses of globalised democracy occurred, it now seems clear, at about the time of the on-set of negotiations over the country's future. For one thing, the country prior location in the global economic system meant that South Africa was always thought to be the platform for launching ideas on forms of social organisation - certainly in the region, but probably in Africa, too. Then, the powerful construc-

Although South Africa's is Africa's richest economy, it remains primarily an extractive enterprise. In a world in which productivity rates are crucial indicators, South Africa's productivity is low and its wages high. And the country's level of expertise is low and possibly falling, due to levels of emigration.

tion of debates and positions around the future of the economy in South Africa was deeply influenced by the take-off theories which were espoused, first, and then popularized within the country by the power of capital. In the late-1960s and early-1970s, an intense debate on the future of the country focused on the relationship between capitalism and apartheid. At the centre of this exchange was the so-called O'Dowd thesis (in effect home-grown adaptation of Rostowian economics) which held that apartheid would eventually be brought down by the simple functional logic of the market - as the contradiction between the free market and the racist limitations on this market grew, the former would replace the latter". (O'Meara. 1983: 424.) Although in its raw form, this idea was viewed with some suspicion by old-style Nationalist politicians who remained

wedded to the national social origins of their party², by the early-1980s however an alliance had developed between the business community and the then government: for instance, the two were united in the effort to "reform" the country by the introduction of limited changes to the constitution.

Institutionalization of the idea of globalised democracy within the country took further. Sponsored by the business community, organisations like the Free Market Foundation flooded both the public and policy discourse with the "reasonableness" of the solutions which they were said to offer. Like similar developments elsewhere - the founding of the Heritage Foundation in the USA is an excellent comparative example, the free-market message highlighted the naturalness of the market both as a tool for understanding and

managing political conflict. Its solutions were appealing, when set against the obvious obduracy of the state to reform itself (not to mention its levels of taxation to maintain its security!) and the violence which, according to state propaganda, the liberation movement were held to represent. As the 1980s ripened, the "solutions" to be offered by the market

became more attractive to South Africa's domestic elites and the ruling National Party appeared willing to jettisoning its apartheid baggage.

It was a short step from here to accepting the idea which would come to be known as globalisation - both as a means to interpret a world and, as now, an ideology. The path to this was smoothed by a rash of scenario-building which was in the late-1980s, also sponsored by the business community. (See Hein Marais. 1998) The message was as deceptively simple: the cost of maintaining the state's sovereignty for the purposes of maintaining privilege of a minority was too high; it was made at the sacrifice of high rates of growth. At a moment which was later to be described by Francis Fukayama as "the end of history", political liberalism would bring an end to conflict including South Africa's!

Despite their rhetoric, South Africa's liberation movements faced the same "end of history" reasoning, and their search for solutions were harder to find. The ideological strait-jacketing of structural Marxism offered a frame which amplified an idea that control of the state was the path both to power and development. Within and without the country, a multiplicity of simple, simplistic and even simple-minded slogans³ reinforced the notion that the struggle for South Africa was a struggle for the sovereignty of a state which could, with a legitimate government, satisfy the needs of all its people. As the power of the "end of history" thesis took hold however, this particular understanding became less and less settled: the ANC in particular was vulnerable to buffeting by the power of global forces. A broad alliance, it had always been susceptible to the rich diversity of impulses which lay beneath a veneer of unity. This veneer was certainly extended - even over-extended - by its bifurcation: an external exiled wing which required ideological conformity as it both fought the war of national liberation and the diplomatic campaign to isolate the country; and the internally-based United Democratic Front (UDF). For all its lip-service to the rituals of struggle, the latter was more catholic, bent on incorporating new and divergent impulses, including concerns over the direction of global economic thinking, into an ever-broadening agenda which aimed, above all else, to end apartheid.

Faced with increasingly untenable immediate positions, over which they had less and less control, the protagonists in the struggle for South Africa were attracted by the prospects for negotiations which would move both from an unhappy past to a future which promised to be more manageable. This analysis suggests that without the compelling discourses offered by what was increasingly to be called globalisation, South Africa's transition - often called a "miracle" - could not have been achieved.

Closer scrutiny however reveals that things were less miraculous than deal-driven.⁴ And central to the exercise was a convergence around the "rationality" of the market, on the one hand, and on the other the idea that, for all the challenge of globalisation, the control dimensions offered by the idea of sovereignty issues were not really negotiable. The latter have been carried by Robert Thornton's "administra-

tive practices", while South Africa's new government has adopted economic policies which have become the envy of many. Put differently in order to advance the narrative, the "reasonableness" of the market solution and the continuity of a narrow understanding of sovereignty has permitted more continuities than change in South Africa, notwithstanding that the rhetoric upon which apartheid's ending was premised, promised far more.

This closes one moment in the history of the meta-narrative but some important footnotes need to be added. On coming to power South Africa's new government announced a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This boldly proclaimed itself as "an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework...(seeking)...to mobilise all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist future."⁵ Less than eighteen months later, this ambitious neo-Keynesian project had been replaced by a programme called GEAR (named for the "Growth, Employment and Redistribution" strategy). Its game plan aimed to cut government expenditure within the Maasdricht targets, to promote growth to 6 per cent per annum thus setting the stage for international investment which in turn will require a more malleable labour market. (Marais. 1997). Driven by the "neutrality and rationality of the market", to do otherwise the media insisted was "to reinvent the political wheel". (*The Cape Times* 5 August, 1997) The programme was endorsed by the highest voices in the land and carried forward by Thabo Mbeki the man designated by Nelson Mandela as the country's next President.

The financial press are scarcely able to contain their joy at this development in a liberation movement which, less than a decade earlier, was committed to rigorous socialist policies as the answer both to South Africa's racial divide and to create economic justice. (see Marais. 1997). However convergent the rhetoric around this strategy, the structural problems of the South African economy remain. Three of these are listed to illustrate the point. Although South Africa's is Africa's richest economy, it remains primarily an extractive enterprise. In a world in which productivity rates are crucial indicators, South Africa's productivity is low and its wages high. And the country's level of

expertise is low and possibly falling, due to levels of emigration.

More careful analysis reveals, that the neo-liberal economic solutions which have been chosen for South Africa's future juggle the single idea of redistribution through growth in an economy which continues to display the symptoms of "white wealth and black poverty" which marked the country's unhappy past. One way through this dilemma, is the promotion of a new black middle-class (*Sunday Independent* 3 August, 1997) under the belief that "democratic nations thrive on an economically secure and politically involved bourgeoisie." (*The Economist* London 15 March, 1997) This is to be achieved by the promotion of affirmative action as a major instrument of policy action, both within and without government, and has included the direct economic empowerment of blacks by the racial redistribution of stock-market wealth. Its outcomes are not clear, and a multiplicity of possibilities understandably follow⁶: these may well be the most crucial trade-offs in the country's history. Empowering a middle-class may be at the risk of delivery to those who are, once again, excluded from the economy. And this exclusion may, in part, explain South Africa's spiraling crime wave which in turn touches on the prospects for foreign investment.⁷

Making foreign policy in the new South Africa

There is a direct link between the emerging power of the market discourse and South Africa's "new" foreign policy. To understand this, it is important to back-track to five years into the transition. The emergence in 1992/93 of a strong and focused group on a post-apartheid foreign policy promised, it seems fair to suggest, a new approach to foreign policy. The group included activists and academics - most loosely associated with the ANC; their main brief was to table a number of ideas which could be used as platform for the ANC in the coming election. While the main product of their work was a discussion paper on "Foreign Policy in a new Democratic South Africa" (undated) - again, in very loose terms, the group was involved in organising at least one conference on the diplomatic service (*The Changing World and Professional Diplomacy*. 1993) and at least one diplomatic training course. (USAID/South Africa. 1994)

This work was done within spirit of some celebration: naively, perhaps, the

group believed that the time was opportune to change in important ways, the cadence and the discourses which has nurtured South Africa's foreign policy over a fifty year period. In the main, there was a belief that some kind of a new beginning could be made and, certainly in Southern Africa, there was the space to develop new sets of understandings between South Africa and its neighbours. Looking back (and in confessional mode), the group underestimated the power of established patterns of thinking about South Africa's international relations and ingrained understandings of regional relations in Southern Africa.

These were reinforced during the formal transition when a sub-committee of The Transitional Executive Committee, exclusively devoted its attention to the country's foreign policy. The script which determined work of this committee - which provided a bridge between the old South Africa and the new - was determined by South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, the ministry which had set the course of apartheid's foreign policy. It seems fair to say that they had, by this time, recognised that change was inevitable and had, as the 1980s ended, been caught with the idea of "the new diplomacy" - a notion that diplomacy would in the future be exclusively determined by trade issues. (Evans XXX) But the TEC Sub-Council faced other constraints - it tended to accept the inevitability that no substantial changes were probably, even possibly, in the making of the country's foreign policy; moreover, there is no hard evidence that the work of this group was marked by serious critique, or the urgency of a new vision for South Africa's foreign policy.

This, the confirmation of ritual over the possibility of change, was folded into the triumphalism associated with the ending of apartheid and the birth of a new South Africa. The embeddedness of the sense and naturalness accorded, for instance, to the market, to good governance and the progress associated with the democracy become integral to the position which the new South Africa was destined to play in international relations: certainly, the early period was marked by hectic celebrations as the country joined regional groupings, like the reconstituted SADC, rejoined others (the United Nations and the Commonwealth, for instance) and where critics were enjoined from raising

objections to policy directions in the name of the quickly emerging homogenizing discourse of the 'rainbow nation'. Perhaps the most disturbing trait - initially hidden in both triumph and celebration was the continuation of the country's military as integral to its political culture: a development which, if it needed it, was applauded by the United States.⁸

The power of these continuities were confirmed by the flourishing of think-tanks associated with promoting the idea that South Africa's place in the new world order (to intentionally appropriate the ideologically-loaded term coined by George Bush) would be guaranteed by a foreign policy which would, in the main, be characterised by adherence to the forces of the market, multi-party democracy and strong militaries. The knowledge produced by the business-supported South African Institute of International Affairs reinforced the ideological power of markets -- particularly sustaining the natural progress represented by the globalisation process. Although it also veered towards manufacturing a more acceptable, but no less violent, discourse over security, the Institute of Security Studies (sometime called the Institute for Defence Politics) which had been founded by former officers in the (old) South African Defence Force, succeeded in applying securitization techniques to each and every issue in South Africa and its foreign policy -- the cumulative effect was that few issues in regional and foreign policy were not touched with the idea of security. In the region this was acutely felt in important, but sensitive, policy areas like migration, drugs, water, the environment: to name only four.

The DRC and Lesotho

These ideas over the nature of the transition, the power of holding discourses and the growing influence of centres for the production of knowledge provide a platform which suggests that South Africa's "new" foreign policy rests on a conjecture of three embedded discourses -- each of which is prefaced by neo - neo-liberal politics, neo-liberal economics and neo-liberal thinking on security. Faced with this, and the lack of imagination during the transition, the country's search for "responsible global citizenship" - the hope of all South Africa's people; which the ANC captured in 1993 discussion paper on foreign policy (Foreign Policy in a

new Democratic South Africa) - has been to mimic (when necessary) the efforts by others, primarily the United States, to manage rather than understand the nature of international change in the late-20th Century.⁹

No issue demonstrates the limitations of this particular approach more readily than South Africa's intervention, under the guise of SADC's commitment to democracy, in Lesotho in September, 1998. Viewed from one perspective, it was a textbook US-style intervention¹⁰. First meet insurrection (or in the Gulf War case, invasion) with aggression to establish something called "democratic order". Second, seek authorization from a multilateral organization - the US sought United Nations approval for its intervention in the Gulf War; South Africa's intervention of Lesotho was supported by SADC. As a primary strategic objective secure your own investments - US oil fields in the Gulf, the Katsi Dam on the Highlands Water Scheme. And, finally, stonewall forever the possibility of criticism by casting the action as victory for progress, or as South Africa's President was reported as saying shortly after the action - those who opposed the intervention were ill-informed. (*Business Day* (Johannesburg) 25 September, 1998)

But, if the case over Lesotho is as clear-cut, as this has suggested, what accounts for the failure of South Africa to support the intervention of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August, 1998? The patterning for South Africa's position on the crisis in the DRC is to be found in Nelson Mandela's statement to the SADC Heads of State meeting in Malawi in 1998 (*Finance Week*, July 24-30, 1997): positioning this speech at the centre of a new interpretation of the region, Chris Landsberg and Claude Kabembe, called this the "Mandela Doctrine". (Landsberg and Kabembe, 1998) South Africa's position on the issue was clearly driven by an understanding that some members of SADC were derelict in their attention to issues of Human Rights and that their commitment to democratic pluralism was wavering or wanting. Interventions of this kind are, to be quite frank, unknown in SADC - the thesis underpinning the idea was, however, to set the tone for South Africa's Chairmanship of the organisation - a process which would reaffirm the country's commitment to its role as a force for

democracy within Africa - especially in Southern Africa, its perceived bailiwick. With this commitment as the lodestar of its leadership of SADC, the decision not to support Laurent Kabila, as he faced the rebellion against his power a year later, was as obvious as it seemed principled from South Africa's point of view. Perhaps more than any other leader in a backsliding (from a democratic point of view) region, Kabila's new "Democratic" Republic of Congo displayed what might be described as a democratic deficit.

More to the point on the pluralism which underpins, I believe, globalised democracy, there was little or no hope that the Congolese leader would embrace the multipartyism which has been central to the ideology of democracy in the United States and elsewhere, too. The decision on Lesotho - of which much remains to be written - was based on the opposite belief: the prospects for multipartyism in that country appeared (certainly prior to South Africa's intervention) quite good; the central obstacle to this immediate goal as many observers have pointed out, was the type of electoral system. The present "first-past-the-post" system excludes the possibility that opposition politicians can be included in the political system: the frustrations felt by this are exacerbated, to be sure, by two issues: the fact that employment prospects are limited in the country and, it has been argued that in traditional Sotho society decisions are reached by consensus and its building.

While on the coal-face of decision-making, it remains to be explained why it was that South Africa changed its mind (during the Non-Aligned Movement Conference) to finally support the so-called SADC-allies over their intervention in the DRC. Here, too, much remains to be written: my preliminary explanation lies not so much in the idea that South Africa's President was faced with overwhelming evidence on the fragility (and undemocratic personality) of the rebel opposition in the DRC - a theme which was much favoured in the conference in Harare for which this paper was prepared. No, my explanation is more prosaic - faced with overwhelming hostility from those countries which ought to have been closest to him (and of which he held the regional chair) at the NAM meeting, and on the eve of assuming the three-year Presidency of NAM, South Africa's president (as he has done before) simply changed his mind! In so

doing, and as some participants at the Harare meeting suggested - he brought his own, and the country's position, in line with that favoured by his deputy, Thabo Mbeki.

What's next?

Much like Reagan Doctrine with its proclamation of the rights of intervention against Marxist/Leninist government in the 1970s, which "licensed" apartheid South Africa to destabilize its neighbours, the globalized democracy position which has jelled around what many (again loosely) call the "Washington Consensus", has allowed relatively-powerful countries like South Africa, to take foreign policy risks as long as these fall within emerging rituals of international behaviour. But while this ideological approach to foreign policy-making might make sense in the realist theoretical framings so readily used by Washington - it makes little sense in southern Africa. And, as did so many times in the 1980s, "poor, yet generous Lesotho" (Naidoo, 1992) and its people, have been compelled to pay price with blood.

For all the political fiction represented by international relations and the rituals, people have been crossing the Caledon for centuries - for all its nominal separateness, there is no real difference between Lesotho and South Africa. South Africa and Lesotho share the same mountains, and speak the same language - as the region's original inhabitants, the San, put it, they drink from the same river, or as Ruth put it in the Old Testament, our people are their people; their people, our people.

But, and this is the very hinge upon which the mounting tragedy of South Africa's foreign and regional policy turns the country's practice of interacting with Lesotho has been based on a theory of sovereignty which respects, more than any other thing, the right of Lesotho's people to make their own decisions. In violating the border between the two countries, as South Africa did in September, the country has defiled the moral high ground which it has held since May, 1994:

The challenge for South Africa's foreign policy is not consistency, as some analysts have enthusiastically tried to suggest. The challenge is the value that South Africa's friends and neighbours can attach to its word and the promise which the victory over apartheid promised. On South Africa's recent performance, many in southern Africa - but elsewhere, too - must be wondering whether they can trust South

Africa or whether, like the proverbial American gringo in Latin America, it will always be on the prowl.

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¹Paper based on speaking-notes presented at the "Conference of Experts, Officials and interested Parties from Eastern and Southern Africa on THE CRISIS IN THE DRC held in Harare between 25th-26th September, 1998. Salim Patel of the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape commented on the text.

²Aletta Norval (1996) records a 1991 speech by Professor Jan Lombard, the then President of the Free Market Foundation:

...we all know that the crucial battle for the minds of the South African people has begun in earnest...In the leading international institution of the Afrikaner people, the *Federasie van Afrikanse Kultuurverenigings*, the idea of the free market economy as a political philosophy was thoroughly thrashed out as a principal theme of the annual congress less than a year ago...the battle lines will be drawn between the political philosophy of the free market economy, on the one hand, and the political philosophy of social collectivism on the other...ibid., p. 225.

³The idea of Nationalisation continued in liberation rhetoric until well into the 1990s. More popular slogans - "No Education before Liberation" and "One Settler; One Bullet" - represented another mood of the country's politics.

⁴One of the most percent observers of South Africa, Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert in an Address to the Pretoria Press Club in August 1995, called South Africa a "deal-driven" society.

⁵*The Reconstruction and Development Programme. A policy framework.* Johannesburg, African National Congress, 1994., p. 1

⁶These were interestingly caught on the letter's page of *Newsweek* (Europe), 24 February, 1997. One letter angrily complained that not enough was being done for blacks; a second insisted that crime was responsible for South Africa's economic woes; and the third, from the public affairs officer of the country's richest corporation, complained that their efforts at empowerment had been ignored in the original *Newsweek* story.

⁷On this there is an increasing literature; on the impact internationally, there seems no better example than the glaring headline in the *International Herald Tribune* (The Hague) February 15-16, 1997. "Rape Shadows South Africa. Children Are Victims of Nation's Collapse into Crime".

⁸Let his single example carry a point which conflates international approval of change in South Africa with the continuities represented by the country's military power: Princeton N. Lyman, former US Ambassador to South Africa, opened his piece on "South Africa's Promise" which was published in the American journal, *Foreign Policy* (Number 102), with this paragraph: On May 10, 1994, something happened that few people, even those most committed to the struggle against apartheid, every thought could, Nelson Mandela, flanked by outgoing president F.W. de Klerk and the top generals of the South African Defense Force, too the oath as president of South Africa. Tens of thousands of South Africans, mostly black, but of all races, cheered. At that moment, airplanes of the South African Air Force flew overhead, the colours of the new flag streaming behind. There was an initial moment of apprehension as the planes came in sight. Then the crowd broke into cheers. One black man in the crowd turned to his neighbor and said, "They're ours now". (Lyman, 1996: 105)

⁹The distinction between understanding and managing the world is an increasingly important one in contemporary international relations. It follows upon a tradition established by Karl Marx, carried by, Max Horkheimer and most recent highlighted by Robert Cox. (Hettne, 1995: 31-45)

¹⁰These ideas are drawn from my contribution to *Report*, Johannesburg, 27 September, 1998

TRC REPORT: Flawed but still valuable

Trevor Harris

The first coherent memory of my childhood is of "window-gazing" with my parents, on a Sunday afternoon, at department stores in Berea Road in Durban. Each time we had to walk past an ice-cream parlour where a white couple would bring their six elegantly groomed black French poodles for a treat. They were allowed into the premises. If I wanted an ice-cream, my father had to purchase it from a tiny window in a side alley. I was four years old at the time, but the memory is as vivid as if it were yesterday.

That was South Africa in the 1960s.

Ever since Nohle Mohapi, widow of slain Black Consciousness activist, Mapetla Mohapi began giving evidence before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on 15 April 1996, South Africa, and indeed the world was given a harrowing insight into the brutality of the apartheid regime.

The 3,500-page, five volumes report of the TRC is a damning indictment of human rights abuses, of systematic murder, torture, death and destruction.

But, what we have here is a partial truth. It detaches the political ideology that motivated apartheid from the society that perpetrated it and from the economy.

What I want to argue here is that by focusing on the particular instances, the TRC loses sight of the global.

In perpetuating its particular version of the truth about apartheid, the TRC thus reduces the reality of apartheid to an individualised human rights issue, and therefore the liberation struggle from one of decolonisation to one of democratisation.

When the West protested the evils of apartheid, it was from the perspective of its violations of human rights - the Sharpeville massacre, the 1976 Soweto uprising, Mandela's incarceration - not the dispossession, alienation and dehumanisation of its citizenry.

For Africa, the motivation was vastly different. Apartheid was not particularly vile form of government but zenith, the perfected form of a process of conquest and colonisation perpetrated against all Africa.

It is out of this that the, essentially South African driven concept, of an African Renaissance is born.

The TRC report, by accepting instead the Western conception of what the strug-

gle against apartheid was about thus narrows the understanding of the first concept of its mission - the "Truth".

In so doing, the TRC report fails in the second part of its mandate - of facilitating reconciliation.

This is however, precisely the perspective that Tutu takes in his foreword to the report: "Reconciliation is not about being cosy; it is not about pretending that things were other than they were. Reconciliation based on falsehood, on not facing up to reality, is not true reconciliation and will not last. We believe we have provided enough truth about our past for there to be a consensus about it. There is consensus that atrocious things were done on all sides. We know that the State used its considerable resources to wage a war against some of its citizens. We know that torture and deception and murder and death squads came to be the order of the day. We know that the liberation movements were not paragons of virtue and were often responsible for egging people on to behave in ways that were uncontrollable..."

It is from this "human rights violations" perspective that he can then go on to say: "We should accept that truth has emerged even though it has initially alienated people from one another. The truth can, and often is, divisive. We have been amazed at some of the almost breath taking examples of reconciliation that have happened through the Commission."

Tutu goes on to say "I want to make a heartfelt plea to my white fellow South Africans. On the whole we have been exhilarated by the magnanimity of those who should by rights be consumed by bitterness and a lust for revenge; who instead have time and again shown an astonishing magnanimity and willingness to forgive. It is not easy to forgive, but we have seen it happen. And some of those who have done so are white victims. Nevertheless, the bulk of the victims have been black and I have been saddened by what has appeared to be a mean-spiritedness in some of the leadership in the white community. They should be saying: "How fortunate we are that these people do not want to treat us as we treated them. How fortunate that things have remained much the same for us except for the loss of some political power"."

There has to be a deeper and broader social reconciliation, one that acknowledges the dimension of apartheid, but goes beyond that to include an understanding and a coming to terms with how the group areas, forced removals, pass laws, racial stratification, inequitable access to education, social services, land and the economy all served to alienate, brutalise and dehumanise all South Africans.

For all its limitations and failures, the TRC process and the report itself, still represent an important contribution to the post-apartheid discourse in South Africa.

A Dutch visitor to the TRC is reported to have said that the Commission had to fail because the task set for it was impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, she observed even in failure, what had been achieved would be a success beyond rational expectation.

Tutu makes the point that while similar commissions in other countries have been in camera, this one occurred "in the full glare of publicity." As such it is an important reservoir of information for scholars and researchers as they seek to shed more light on that country's history, and to map out its future course.

Said Tutu: "It is not and cannot be the whole story; but it provides a perspective on the truth about a past that is more extensive and more complex than any one commission could, in two-and-a-half years, have hoped to capture.

"Others will inevitably critique this perspective - as indeed they must. We hope that many South Africans and friends of South Africa will become engaged in the process of helping our nation to come to terms with its past and, in so doing, reach out to a new future."

As a result of the Commission, we now know that the apartheid government of yesteryear had a secret chemical and biological weapons programme targeting the fertility of black women. We have had new light shed into the murder of activists, we have had the exhumation of some activists who were secretly abducted and killed. We know who carried out several bombings, and we have heard, from some of the perpetrators, of instructions from the highest echelons of power to commit atrocities. These are gains, and they do help South Africa chart its way forward.

News in Brief

SOUTH AFRICA

AIDS to hurt South Africa more than rest of Africa

JOHANNESBURG - South Africa, suffering one of the world's fastest spreading HIV epidemics, will feel more pain from the disease than the rest of the continent because its economy is more developed, the United Nations said recently.

"It is precisely because South Africa has a relatively sophisticated economic system that its economic performance is so vulnerable to the effects of the epidemic," said a joint report issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the U.N.'s programme on HIV/AIDS.

"The more skilled and experienced the population experiencing HIV infection, the greater the impact will be both sectorally and at the micro-economic level."

The report said the effects were likely to be greater and more observable in South Africa than other African countries, partly because of the greater availability and range of public services and government's determination to extend these.

Projections suggest almost a quarter of South Africa's population will be infected by 2010, slashing life expectancy to 48 years from the 68.2 years anticipated without the epidemic.

Around three million South Africans are currently infected with the human immunodeficiency virus of a sub-Saharan total of 22.5 million, which is 95 percent of total infections worldwide. Almost 1,600 people are infected daily in South Africa on average.

ZIMBABWE

Foreign Direct Investment

HARARE - Africa trailed other developing regions in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) last year with flows to the continent amounting to about US\$4.7 billion, according to the World Investment Report 1998.

The report, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), said the 1997 FDI figure was almost the same as in 1996 but was twice as high as at the beginning of the decade.

Nonetheless they (figures) remain low, representing only 3 percent in total FDI flows into developing countries which is comparable to those of a single Asian developing economy - Malaysia," the report said.

The report defines FDI as an investment

involving management control of an enterprise in one country by an enterprise resident in another country.

Traditionally, the report said, features that made a country a desirable destination for FDI have been favourable investment regime, market size, natural resources, market growth prospects and labour market conditions.

Seven African countries namely Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tunisia and Uganda could be considered success stories performing above the average for all developing countries.

These countries, the World Investment Report said, had all made progress towards political stability, worked to improve their policy framework for FDI and were doing better than the rest of Africa in terms of privatisation.

LONDON

World Oil Slump

LONDON - World oil markets broke records in November as slumping crude prices forced benchmark Brent to mark historic lows and took light crude in New York to levels not seen for 12 years.

IPE Brent crashed to \$10.08 a barrel at one stage, the lowest price ever recorded on the International Petroleum Exchange, before a mild bounce brought Brent back from the brink to close 66 cents down at \$10.48 a barrel.

"A most just punishment," one London floor trader called the savaging.

Adjusted for inflation, prices are now at 25 - year lows.

New York selling, which had triggered the precipitous fall in London, took the front month contract under \$11.

Mild shortcovering there too scooped the contract back from calamity to \$11.23 a barrel - but still over 60 cents lower on the day.

Dealers said the price slump in New York was largely in reaction to OPEC's failure to take any price - supportive measures in Vienna.

Bitter rivalries between members - most notably Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Iran have divided the once powerful cartel, analysts said.

UNITED STATES

Steel Industry Protectionism

WASHINGTON - U.S. steel makers and their congressional allies have called on the Clinton administration and Congress to punish Japanese, Russian and other foreign pro-

ducers accused of flooding the U.S. market with cheap steel.

If President Bill Clinton refused to clamp down in the coming months, Congress must be prepared to step in with sanctions and other legislation to protect U.S. production and jobs against unfairly priced imports, steel company executives, workers and lawmakers told a Senate panel.

Bethlehem Steel Corp. and Weirton Steel Corp. said they stood ready to file new anti-dumping cases against steel - producing countries, on top of complaints filed in September against Russia, Japan and Brazil.

With the economies of Asia and Russia in crises, imports of steel have flooded the U.S. market. For the first nine months of 1998, imports of steel mill products from Russia have increased 37 percent over the same period last year, while imports from Japan have surged by 147 percent.

The surge in imports and falling prices have taken a toll on U.S. steel makers. As many as 5,000 steel workers nationwide have been laid off since September, and some analysts estimate that 10,000 more could lose their jobs before the year ends.

ADELAIDE

Biotech Ethical Debate

ADELAIDE - Scientists and biotechnology companies pursuing genetic research should promote full and open debate on their work or risk public backlash which could halt their studies, a leading bioethicist said recently.

Senior Australian judge Michael Kirby told Reuters the debate on the cloning of human cells, sparked by the cloning of Dolly the sheep in Scotland in 1996, highlighted the risks when science outstrips debate on ethics.

"Unless there is a proper, thorough explanation to the community of the scientific arguments for cloning, the natural response of a community ignorant of the potential benefits is to simply say 'this is unnatural - we should ban it', he said.

Kirby is a member of the bioethics committees of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the Human Genome Project, and international effort to map and sequence all human genes.

Public fears sparked by the cloning of Dolly were heightened this month with the cloning in the United States of an adult human cell.

Scientists at the Massachusetts - based biotech company Advanced Cell Technology said they had fused human cells into cow eggs to grow stem cells for tissue transplants, not to grow an embryo that would essentially be a human clone.

The Crises in the Great Lakes Region

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Only a year ago, hopes were raised across the continent, that the second independence, and resurrection, of the Congo was going to allow this region to play a major role in the African renaissance. Having taken a dim view of the organizational capacity of the Congolese leadership involved, I was among the skeptics on this point, on the ground that the whole process was based on a purely militaristic strategy of liberation subordinated to an externally determined dynamic.

This dynamic, whether it is based on the global interests of major world powers, the expansionist aims of external actors seeking economic and commercial advantage, or the security interests of neighbouring states, is a function of the size, the strategic location and the resource endowment of the Congo. Thus, throughout its history as a modern state, this country has been subject to external interests and meddling consistent with its strategic importance geographically and economically, as well as its potential role as a regional power in Africa. The present crisis cannot be properly understood without reference to this fundamental reality.

The Strategic and Economic Importance of the Congo

The first two major factors of the Congo's strategic importance are its size and geographical location in Africa. A vast territory of 2,345,406 square kilometers (905,562 sq. mls.), the country shares borders with nine other states in Central, East and Southern Africa: Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. The third largest country in Africa, Congo consists of two time zones, and a jet aircraft takes over two hours to overfly it in any direction.

Economically, the Congo has enormous wealth in natural resources. During the early phase of colonial penetration, a Belgian prospector was so awed by the wide range of mineral resources that he was led to conclude that the Congo was a "geological scandal". The real scandal, however, is that the country's wealth has

not been used to benefit the vast majority of its inhabitants. During the colonial period, this wealth was extracted basically to spur the economic development of Belgium. Since independence, it has been used mostly to enrich the state bourgeoisie that emerged during the Mobutu regime, together with their foreign associates, Lebanese for the most part. In both periods, the strategic minerals were targeted for use by the United States and its Western Allies. According to the experts, the most important strategic materials needed for the 21st century are found in three countries of the world: China, Russia and the Congo, particularly in the two Kivu provinces in the Great Lakes Region. Therein lies the deeper significance of the present crisis.

Known primarily as a minerals producing economy, the country has such an ecological diversity that it is also rich in non-mineral resources. Approximately one third of the total area is made up of the tropical rain forest, in a country that is nearly twice the size of South Africa, three times the size of Nigeria, five times the size of France, and over 80 times the size of little Belgium, its former colonial power. The whole area is dominated by the Congo River basin, and includes seven great and medium lakes, plus hundreds of rivers and small lakes. Lake Tanganyika, which the country shares with Burundi and Tanzania, is the fifth largest lake in the world. As for the Congo River itself, which gave the country its name, it is one of the five longest rivers in the world and the first with respect to hydroelectric potential. Part of this potential has already been harnessed through the Inga Dam to provide electricity to the Congo and some of its neighbours, including Zambia and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa. This hydroelectric complex has the potential of lighting up the whole continent of Africa, from Cairo to Cape Town.

With 12 months of rainfall in much of the rainforest and plenty of rain in the two savana zones on each side of the Equator, the Congo can also feed the entire continent. Today, it is estimated that less than

3 percent of its arable land is under cultivation. It is this basic aspect of a bountiful natural resource endowment that explains why massive starvation has not occurred, in spite of all the violent crises and the collapse of the formal economy. A major consequence of this collapse is that this country of over 40 million people is today exporting a large number of highly skilled people to other countries in Africa and abroad. South Africa alone is said to have over 350 Congolese medical doctors.

It is this strategic and economic importance of the country that underlines the Congo's centrality to the African revolution and the African renaissance. Frantz Fanon once remarked that if Africa as a whole were a revolver, the Congo would be its trigger. Those who did not wish to see our country play this emancipatory role with respect to the liberation of Africa did their best to destabilize the country and to place it under the control of reactionary elements like Moise Tshombe and Mobutu Sese Seko. G Mennen Williams, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, wrote in an August 1965 article in African Report that since whoever controls the Congo is likely to have enormous influence over the whole continent in Africa, it was in Uncle Sam's interest to make sure that the country's rulers were America's friends. Jacques Foccart, the *eminence grise* of Gaullist African policy and the virtual proconsul of Francophone Africa until his death last year, has this to say in his memoirs about French involvement in the Congo:

"You asked me what was France's interest. On this matter, there is no ambiguity. Congo-Leopoldville, Zaire today, is the largest country in Francophone Africa. It has considerable natural resources. It has the means of being a regional power. The long-term interest of France and its African allies is evident."

What is evident to Congolese patriots is that France, like other Western powers, does not wish to see the Congo become a regional power. For Paris, this

may threaten French hegemony in a region in which it has considerable interest in the resource rich countries of Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and the CAR. Until the demise of the apartheid system, this was also the position of its backers here and abroad. For the West and its colonial-settler allies in South Africa, a Congo in disarray under the Mobutu kleptocracy was preferable to a strong and well organized state under the control of patriotic and Pan-African elements. For the latter would have played a critical role in the liberation of Southern Africa. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the support of the Katanga secession by Belgium, France, Britain and white settlers from the Congo to South Africa, and Mobutu's involvement in Angola's wars on the side of reactionary forces, were all part of this strategy.

The long-standing interest of major Western countries in the Congo thus relates primarily to the strategic importance of the country geographically and economically. For Washington, the catalyst for this interest was the strategic value of Congo's uranium, with which the United States manufactured the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, the world's ever first atomic weapons. As a result, the U.S. found for itself a vital national interest in the then Belgian Congo, as well as a wider Western stake in preventing the Soviet Union and its allies from gaining influence in post-independence Congo.

Today, although the policy emphasis has shifted from the first against communism to coping with transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics-trafficking and humanitarian disasters, the strategic goal of privileged access to critically needed resources and strong influence over the governments controlling that access remains unchanged. This is what both the United States and France are pursuing in the Great Lakes Region, in a historical context in which the people of Africa are clamoring for regimes that show greater respect for human rights, including those to live in freedom, to earn a decent livelihood and to ensure a better future for their children. What is ironic in this instance is that so-called new breed leaders and champions of the African renaissance in this region happen to work in close partnership with U.S. imperialism.

The Historical Context: The Legacy of Authoritarianism

Popular aspirations for freedom and development in the face of authoritarian regimes and exclusionist policies constitute

the backdrop to the present conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Although the major arena of the politics of exclusion is the zero-sum game, or life and death struggle, between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, the Congo could not escape being a party to the conflict because of the numerous historical ties between the three countries. These include the fact that there are ethnic Tutsi and Hutu who are Congolese citizens, a common experience of Belgian colonialism from World War I to 1960, and post colonial political alliances between Mobutu and Rwandan leaders. Given the fact that the war is being fought in the Congo, my talk is going to deal principally with the Congolese aspects of the conflict, while references will be made as needed to the situation in Rwanda.

The legacy of authoritarianism in the Congo today can be traced back to the Leopoldian system, under which the country was run as a private possession of Leopold II, King of the Belgians, from 1885 to 1908. Through the judicious use of intrigue and money, Leopold succeeded in wresting this vast country from an intense rivalry between the major imperial powers of Europe, namely, Great Britain, Germany and France. In 1885, the country entered colonial history as a theoretically independent state, the Congo Free State (CFS), but one under the personal rule of the Belgian monarch who, for all intents and purposes, treated it like a going concern. The critical question for him, as for any capitalist entrepreneur, was whether or not it was a profitable undertaking.

To make it profitable, the King hired an international cast of adventurers and mercenaries led by Henry Morton Stanley to plunder the country of its resources. CFS agents used so much terror and violence to extract wealth through quasi-slave labour that they committed crimes against humanity. According to the best demographic analyses now available, the human toll of the repression, together with the diseases associated with European penetration like syphilis, amounted to the death of nearly 10 million people.

Christian missionaries like the Rev. William Sheppard, an African-American Presbyterian from Virginia, and humanitarian organizations such as Edmond Morel's Congo Reform Association (CRA), launched an international human rights campaign against the Leopoldian system. With celebrities like the African-American leader Booker T Washington and the writer Mark Twain leading the American branch of the CRA, the U.S.

government was compelled to join Britain and other major powers in obtaining King Leopold's ouster as Congo's ruler and the transformation of the presumably independent state into a Belgian colony. Belgium inherited not only a country but also a legacy. Given the economic motives of the colonial system, Belgian colonialism did not, and could not, free itself from the legacy of the Free State. The basic features of economic exploitation, political repression and cultural oppression remained essentially the same, albeit less brutal.

Whatever efforts the Belgians deployed in attempting to make the Congo a "model colony", where "natives have happy smiles", resistance to colonial rule remained a reality, particularly in those areas where prophetic religious movements and peasant opposition to colonial economic exploitation were strongest. This was the case in Lower Congo, the central region of the pre-colonial Kongo Kingdom, now split between Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa.

In 1921, a Baptist catechist and palm oil company worker in Kinshasa began a prophetic ministry that went on to influence the course of events leading to independence nearly 40 years later. The man was Simon Kimbangu, founder of what his sons and followers would later call the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (*Eglise de Jesus Christ sur la Terre par le Prophete Simon Kimbangu, EJCSK*). According to Kimbangu's own testimony, God had appeared to him in a vision and asked him to leave his work for the white man, fight against sorcery and other negative customs, and lead his people to liberation from white rule.

Back in his village, which he renamed "Nkamba-Jerusalem", Kimbangu started his ministry with this radical message, in addition to performing miracles and speaking in strange tongues. As a result, thousands of workers abandoned their jobs in government agencies, private companies and white households, to see and hear the new prophet at Nkamba-Jerusalem talk about racial pride, liberation, self-reliance and all other familiar themes associated with the concept of the African renaissance. As one would expect, the colonial trinity of the state, the Catholic Church and major private companies reacted quickly and vigorously. Kimbangu was arrested, tried and condemned to death for treason. By royal decree, the sentence was reduced to life imprisonment, which the prophet served at the infamous Kasapa

Prison at Lubumbashi until his death in 1951. In as much as we admire President Nelson Mandela for having endured with courage 27 years of detention, we Congolese are proud of the fact that the martyr of our struggle for freedom spent three more years in jail than Madiba. And I am not aware of any other political prisoner anywhere in the world who has broken Kimbangu's record of 30 years in prison.

I have spent so much time on Kimbangu to underline the point that the idea of an African renaissance is not a new one. There is some evidence that Kimbangu was influenced by what he learned in Kinshasa from a small circle of people with a reading knowledge of English about articles in Marcus Garvey's paper, *The Negro World*. The "Back-to-Africa" idea caught the imagination of people like Kimbangu, who held popular notions of *mputu* or the white world (Europe and America) as the place where African people like the Bakongo go when they die. Now the people who had been taken from Africa as slaves had become powerful relatives who were about to return home to help free their people from white rule. For Kimbangu and his followers, the realization of the Pan-Africanist ideal of "Africa for the Africans" was God's will, indeed.

One of the little known facts of Belgian colonial rule in Africa is its extensive record of crimes against humanity committed against the followers of Prophet Kimbangu between 1921 and 1959, when Belgian authorities ended the persecution of Kimbanguists and granted legal recognition of their church, which became a member of the Geneva-based World Council of Churches in 1969. Until 1959, thousands of Kimbanguists languished in relegation camps, built in the remotest areas of the country. Ironically, these detention centers served as relay stations for spreading the messianic message of liberation to all political prisoners and to other people with whom the faithful came into contact.

In 1956, a popular movement for democracy was born with the launching of the struggle for independence. This was a great national awakening, with people from all walks of life ready to shed fear to manifest their permanent aspiration for freedom and their desire for a better life materially and a more secure future for their children. In Central Africa, this struggle was inspired by the fight against racism and oppression in South Africa and in the African diaspora of North America and the Caribbean, home of the intellec-

tual pioneers of Pan-Africanism (H. Sylvester Williams, W.E.B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey). A major leader of the struggle in the Belgian Congo was Joseph Kasa-Vubu, a Kongo intellectual who was perceived by many of his people as the successor to the Prophet Kimbangu.

As part of the self-determination drive of the postwar era in Asia and Africa, the 1950s were greatly marked by a reawakening of the African spirit through intellectual movements such as *Negritude*, whose leading thinkers were Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Aime Cesaire of Martinique, and radical political movements at the national, regional and international levels. The last level refers to the Bandung process, which gave rise to the non-aligned movement. In the Belgian Congo, these radical currents of reclaiming history as both independent actor and authentic story teller were best reflected in the political life and thought of Patrice Lumumba, the leader who best incarnated the aspirations of an entire nation as the standard bearer of genuine independence, economic development and Pan-African unity.

Unfortunately, Lumumba remained in power for less than three months. Right after independence, the Congo was plunged into a major crisis, following the mutiny of the former colonial army and the secession of Katanga, its richest province. The Congo Crisis, as it was known, lasted four years and involved up to then the largest deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces. Two major world figures also lost their lives during the crisis: Lumumba, the Congo's independence leader and first elected Prime Minister, and Dag Hammarskjold, then UN Secretary-General. The first was assassinated on orders from U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower as part of the anticommunist crusade of the Cold War, while the second died in a plane crash on a mission to find a solution to the Katanga secession.

The main beneficiary of the Congo Crisis and the man the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and policymakers identified as the strongman needed to rule the Congo was none other than Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. A former sergeant in the colonial army, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army in July 1960 by Prime Minister Lumumba. Having betrayed his mentor and served his foreign masters well, Mobutu finally took over as head of state in a military coup d'état in 1965. He soon became the Congo's new king, the successor to Leopold II as the rightful owner of the country and

its abundant resources.

The sense of ownership was so strong that Mobutu saw fit to change the country's name, unilaterally, from "Congo" to "Zaire" on 27 October 1971. This came as part of his policy of *authenticity*, the recourse to African traditional wisdom and values, whose external manifestations were the dropping of European names and clothing for authentically African substitutes. A version of the African renaissance in its insistence on cultural pride, self-reliance and reciprocity in international relations, the recourse to authenticity gained followers in a few countries, particularly in Chad and Togo. In Mobutu's Zaire, a marked discordance did exist between the high-sounding principles of African authenticity and the brutal realities of a neocolonial autocracy.

In 32 years of absolute power, Mobutu and his henchmen, chief among whom were Bisengimana Rwema in the 1970s and Leon Kengo wa Dondo in the 1980s and between 1994 and 1997, ruined the country by destroying its economic and social fabric and making it the laughing stock of the whole world. Mobutu put an end to the democratic experiment of the first five years of Congo's existence as an independent state. His dictatorship was backed by military force and a party-state system from which he recruited his cronies and retainers internally, and by the United States, France and Belgium, externally. When they were needed, the three external powers intervened militarily to save the dictator from armed insurgents seeking to overthrow him. In 1996-97, when that support did not materialize, Mobutu could no longer hang on to power. He was forced to flee the country. And he died in exile less than four months later, in September 1997.

Before Mobutu's demise, a movement of multiparty democracy had arisen under the leadership of Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba in 1980, to help pull the country out of the unending political and economic crisis in which the dictator had plunged it. By 1991, the leaders of the democracy movement had rejected Mobutu's plans to set up a constitutional conference and insisted on the holding of a Sovereign National Conference. Following the example set earlier that year in Benin, national conferences had become popular in Africa as democratic forums of all the relevant social forces of a nation designed to take stock of what has gone wrong in the past and to chart a new course for the future.

National conferences were conceived

as a combination of a truth and reconciliation commission and a constitutional commission to serve as both a forum for a national catharsis in the African tradition of conflict resolution through the *palaver*, and a modern rule of law mechanism for setting into motion a successful transition to democracy. They were also seen to be all the more critical in countries like Congo-Kinshasa, which lacked the minimum infrastructure for free and fair elections. The conference, whose decisions are meant to be binding on all parties or groups, was therefore the most appropriate forum from which a transitional government could emerge to prepare the way for multiparty elections and progress towards democracy.

In the Congo, the Sovereign National Conference (*Conférence Nationale Souveraine, CNS*) took place from 7 August 1991 and 6 December 1992 in Kinshasa. For progressive forces, it was the most appropriate arena for the transfer of power between the forces of the status quo and those of change, from the agents of external powers to nationalist leaders committed to seeing the country recover its full sovereignty, which constitutes the *sine qua non* of raising the standard of living of the popular masses. Unfortunately, Mobutu's resistance to change and monumental errors by opposition combined to make the conference fail with respect to one of its primary missions, namely, the establishment of an orderly and non-violent transition to democracy. At the same time, the CNS has left a legacy of freedom, popular resistance to illegitimate authority, commitment to political openness, diversity and the rule of law.

The Fall of Mobutu and Kabila's Rise to Power

The failure of the democratic transition in the Congo was part of a violent backlash of authoritarian regimes against the democracy movement in a number of African countries, including Rwanda and Burundi. In the Rwanda case, the late President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, had been in power since 1973. During 20 years of personal rule, he steadfastly refused to allow Tutsi victims of the 1959 pogrom and subsequent violence, who were in exile in neighbouring countries, to return home. Under the leadership of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi diaspora in Uganda launched a military campaign to overthrow the Habyarimana regime in October 1990. France, Belgium and Mobutu's Zaire came to the dictator's rescue and prevented a RPF victory.

Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), negotiations over two years between Habyarimana's government and the RPF to end the civil war led to the signing of the Arusha accords in 1993. These included the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993, a cease-fire agreement, and six Protocols on the rule of law, power sharing, repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons, integration of armed forces and other issues. In spite of having signed these accords, President Habyarimana did his best to undermine them, and this played into the hands of Hutu extremists bent on exterminating the Tutsi.

The shooting down of Habyarimana's plane on 6 April 1994 gave these extremists the occasion they needed to unleash their genocidal machine against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. With nearly a million people killed, the genocide ended in July after the RPF military victory and seizure of power in Kigali. France's supposedly humanitarian *Operation Turquoise* (June-August 1994) saved the Hutu genocide machine, which was made up of the defeated *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and the *Interahamwe* militia, by helping them to escape with virtually all their weapons into the UNHCR refugee camps in the Congo. There, they were able to regroup to stage repeated raids into Rwanda against the RPF regime. It was precisely the Rwandan initiative to destroy the Hutu refugee camps and, consequently, the military bases of the ex-FAR and the Hutu extremist militia in the Congo, that helped propel Laurent-Desire Kabila to power in Kinshasa.

According to his interview with the *Washington Post* (9 July 1997) and with Ugandan Professor Mahmood Mamdani (*Mail and Guardian*, 8 August 1997), General Paul Kagame, the Rwandan strongman, stated in no uncertain terms that the seven month war leading to Mobutu's overthrow was planned in Kigali and led by Rwandan military officers. This is not surprising, since Mr Kabila had no credible autonomous organization and no coherent social project or political programme. He was recalled from his business ventures by the coalition of states led by Rwanda and Uganda with the aim of ending the Mobutu dictatorship, to provide a Congolese facade for what was actually an external military intervention. Much is made of the role of Congolese Tutsi known as *Banyamulenge*. If it is true that their rebellion against expulsion orders by Kivu provincial authorities did play a critical role in the outbreak of the

war, they represent such a tiny minority that by themselves, they are incapable of sustaining a major military operation across our vast country.

I applauded and continue to defend the role that Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Eritrea and others played in removing Mobutu from power. The fact that Mobutu's own army hardly fought to keep its master in power is a clear demonstration of how discredited the regime had become in the eyes of the people. However, in asserting their Pan-African right of intervention to help free the Congolese people from oppression, the external coalition made a serious error. This consisted in handpicking Kabila as the leader to replace Mobutu. A national leader, as Nelson Mandela declared in 1990 when he got out of jail, is chosen at a national conference. He or she should not be chosen by foreign governments or be self-proclaimed. What needed to be done was to convene a roundtable of Congolese patriots and democrats so they could choose the leader and a broad-based government of national unity.

Having no solid political base in the country, Kabila established personal rule based on nepotism, cronyism and hero worship, and characterized by incompetence and general lack of political direction. Instead of a national leader cut off from the people and relying primarily on a small circle of associates chosen on the basis of family, ethnic or clientelist ties. Moreover, he sought to turn the clock backwards politically, by denying the significance and legacy of the Sovereign National Conference, banning political activity and jailing opposition leaders, and attempting to close the space of democratic freedom and civil liberties that the people of the Congo had dearly won against the decadent Mobutu dictatorship.

The Current War in the Congo

The current war is a function of two principal factors. The first is the national security interests that Rwanda and Uganda have with respect to the northeastern region of the Congo, interests that led the two countries to support the war of liberation against the Mobutu regime in 1996-97. The second is the failure of the Kabila regime to meet the people's expectations that his rule will be radically different from the Mobutu dictatorship.

Having led the military operations against the old regime, Rwandan military officers and many of their soldiers remained in the Congo to help Kabila secure his rule. For over a year, President

Kabila kept a Rwandan officer, Commander James Kabarehe, as chief of staff of the national army, the *Forces of Armées Congolaises* (FAC). With Rwandan nationals and Congolese Tutsi with close ties to the Rwandan leadership occupying high level positions in the DRC, Rwanda authorities could be assured that their interests were being protected. As for Uganda, joint patrols by its army and Congolese troops on the Congo side of the border helped to strengthen its attempt to stop infiltration by armed militias based in the DRC.

This arrangement came apart as both Rwanda and Uganda became dissatisfied with mounting incursions by rebels operating from the Congo, and with what they perceived as lack of concern for their security by President Kabila. If it is true that these two countries, like Burundi and Angola, have legitimate security interests along their borders with the Congo, they cannot place all the blame for continued insecurity on Kabila. After all, what prevented Commander Kabarehe and the other Rwandan commanders in the FAC from working with Rwanda to ensure the latter's security? As for Uganda, which actually had troops inside the DRC, is Kabila to blame for the Ugandan army's failure to stop rebel infiltrations?

These questions suggest that the security issue as narrowly defined with respect to rebel infiltrations does not in itself explain the determination of Kabila's former allies to dump him. His erratic style of leadership, the animosity towards him by the United States, the major external partner of both Kampala and Kigali, and his own desire to play the nationalistic card to win popular support at home, must have played a role. There is evidence that a palace coup was attempted against Kabila, and this resulted in an irretrievable breakup of the 1996 alliance. President Kabila's decision on 27 July 1998 to send all Rwandan officers and troops home triggered the flight from Kinshasa of virtually all Congolese Tutsi senior officials. On the 2nd of August, less than a week later, a rebellion aimed at ousting him from power with the support of both Rwanda and Uganda, was launched.

The rebels' declared grievances against Kabila are shared by many segments of the Congolese population. However, their sponsorship by Rwanda and Uganda and the fact that close collaborators of former President Mobutu are found in their ranks, have diminished their political credibility, in spite of the fact that they are led by such highly respected intellectuals as Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba and Jacques

Depelchin. If they do win the war militarily, they will find it difficult to govern basically hostile population, which perceives them as agents of foreign powers. In spite of their good intentions, they will have a lot of difficulty freeing themselves from their cumbersome Rwandan military allies.

The widening of the war with the intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and others on the side of Kabila regime has created a situation that may degenerate into larger regional war in Central Africa. The longer it continues, the more suffering it will inflict on innocent civilians, who are daily subject to gross violations of human rights, including crimes against humanity. This is particularly the case with respect to incitement to ethnic hatred and genocide against the Tutsi by Congolese officials.

Conclusion

There is no military solution to the current war in the Congo. Given their evident limitations in capacity, all the parties to the conflict cannot sustain a long and costly war. Even Angola, the militarily strongest of all the belligerents, cannot afford to stretch its resources too thin by embarking on an all-out conquest of the territories lost by the Kabila regime in the eastern region of the country. A political solution is needed, and this is possible only after genuine negotiations towards a cease-fire.

So far, efforts to obtain a cease-fire have failed because of the contested status of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), the rebel alliance and Rwanda's denial of its involvement in the war. Not only does the RCD have to be included as a genuinely Congolese party to the conflict, but Rwanda must also acknowledge its own involvement in it. Without these two realities being acknowledged by all concerned, negotiations towards a cease-fire are doomed to failure. Why should the RCD accept to stop fighting if it is not a party to the negotiations? And how can Rwanda withdraw troops that supposedly are not on Congolese territory?

Once a cease-fire is achieved, it must be followed by the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the deployment of a small African or international force to monitor the peace accords. However, the establishment of a durable peace in the Congo can come only through a lasting political solution to the internal and external challenges facing the country. Internally, there is a need for a more inclusive government, and one that will reconcile the revolutionary legacy of the AFDL destitution of the

Mobutu regime with the democratic legacy of the Sovereign National Conference. National reconciliation and the transition from personal rule to the rule of law must be accompanied by ending impunity, introducing transparency in public finances, creating a truly national army to replace paramilitary and militia forces, and strengthening state institutions to enhance their capacity for national reconstruction and economic development. This process must include the protection of the space of democratic freedom and civil liberties gained since 1990. Without freedom, reconstruction and development, any talk of an African renaissance is meaningless.

Externally, the DRC must strengthen its capacity to police its borders so as to take into account the legitimate security interests of its neighbours. Rebels from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola should not be allowed to use Congolese soil for armed raids into the respective countries. The best safeguards for these countries' security interests is the presence of an inclusive government in Kinshasa, backed up by a modest but well trained professional army whose members are drawn from all over the national territory. The test of the neighbours' commitment to Pan-Africanism and the African renaissance will be the degree to which they put African interests ahead of their commitments to external partners.

Finally, an all-parties conference is needed as the most appropriate forum for resolving the crisis of transition in the Congo. This involves the adoption of a legal and institutional framework of transition. Such a framework should include a provisional constitution, defining the length of the transition, its priority tasks, and the institutions that will carry them out; a minimum government programme of action for the transitional period; and a national unity government to implement this programme and help other transitional institutions fulfill their tasks.

I appeal to all of you and through you, to South African government, to give strong support to this idea of an all-parties conference as an indispensable step for resolving the present crisis in the Congo.

¹ Jacques Foccart and Philippe Gaillard, *Foccart parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard*, vol. 1 (Payard/Jeune Afrique, Paris, 1995), p.310. My own translation.

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Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis

Mahmood Mamdani

It is widely believed that the root problem of the African state is the artificial nature of its boundaries; were not these boundaries, after all, first arbitrarily drawn up at the Berlin Conference of 1885-86 and then imposed from the outside? I would like to begin by putting forward two suggestions for your consideration. One, all boundaries are more or less artificial. Two, an understanding of how power is organised is likely to prove a more illuminating starting point than the nature of boundaries, if we want to understand the crisis of the state.

Citizenship and the Congolese State

There is a thesis now common in Africanist political science: that the state is collapsing in more and more African countries. The Congo is often held up as an example of this. The key problem with this thesis is that it proceeds by making analogies. In the process, it overlooks what is different about the state in Africa. Its starting point is not the state in Africa, particularly the type of state created under colonialism, but the assumption that the African state is an attempt to reproduce the modern state in Europe. Hence the conclusion, that the attempt to imitate the original has failed. The difference is understood as evidence of a failure, and is then theorised as a collapse.

The state in Africa is a product of a radically different history of conquest. Alien power faced the problem of legitimacy. In response, the British reformed their mode of rule, first equatorial Africa in the early part of this century. They called it 'indirect rule'. The French followed suit in the 1920s, when they shifted from 'assimilation' to 'association' as the basis of colonial rule in the African colonies. Belgium effected a similar shift in its African colonies in the 1930s.

It is this reform which begins to explain what is different about the state in Africa. Indirect rule reorganised colonial power as two distinct authorities, each ruling through a different legal regime, one civic and the other ethnic. The basis of civic power was the central state, which expressed its will through civil law. In contrast, the local state was organised as a Native Authority, overseeing the implementation of a customary law. Civil law claimed to speak the univer-

sal language of rights, but the regime of rights was applied only to the population of metropolitan origin, described as racially distinct. Natives were portrayed as creatures of habit, rather than being capable of a rational exercise of freedom. It was said that they needed to be ruled through a different regime, one that would enforce custom. This, however, did not lead to the creation of a single customary law and a single customary regime ruling all natives. Instead, the colonial power claimed that each ethnic group had its own distinctive custom; so it created a different set of customary laws for each ethnic group, and established a separate Native Authority to enforce each set of laws. The final result was a Janus-faced power, with two faces. Like civic power, native power too was a colonial creation. The difference, however, was that while civic power was racialized, the Native Authority was ethnicized.

This form of the state underwent a reform after independence. The reform process varied from one country to another, but one could discern the more radical from the more conservative current. The Congolese reform followed the more conservative variant: while civic power was de-racialized, the Native Authority remained ethnicized. In fact, with the withdrawal of the Belgian *cercle* commander at independence, one could say that the ethnic aspect of the Native Authority got further entrenched.

When Africanists speak of the collapse of the state, they are speaking of the collapse of civic power, not that of the Native Authority. The point is that what holds Congo together is not as much the civic power in Kinshasa and Kisangani, and so on, but the hundreds of Native Authorities that control the bulk of the population in the name of enforcing 'custom'. For Southern Africans, the Congo is better thought of as a giant federation of Bantustans, a reformed colonial state.

Citizenship and the Banyamulenge Question

This bifurcated state has become the basis of a bifurcated citizenship. The colonial state enforced a dual political identity. It made a distinction in law between those indigenous and those not. It went further and drew a racial distinction among the in-

digenous. It thus imposed a racialized civic identity on the former and an ethnicized native identity on the latter. The post-colonial state de-racialized the civic identity; civic citizenship stopped recognising any difference based on race or place of origin. But it continued to reproduce the native identity as ethnic. The result has been a double, or bifurcated, citizenship: one civic, the other ethnic. Civic citizenship is a consequence of membership of the central state; it is specified in the constitution, and is the basis of rights. These are mainly individual rights, in the political and civil realm. In contrast, ethnic citizenship is a consequence of membership in the Native Authority; it is the source of a different category of rights, mainly social and economic. Further, these rights are not accessed individually but by virtue of membership of an ethnic community. The key socio-economic right, it is worth mentioning here, is the right to use land as a source of livelihood. Herein lies the material basis of ethnic belonging, particularly for the ethnic poor.

The political consequence of this bifurcated citizenship is that while everyone is a civic citizen, a citizen of the state called Congo, not everyone has an ethnic citizenship. Since civic citizenship has been de-racialized, everyone - whether indigenous or not -- is a citizen of Congo. But only those indigenous have a Native Authority and, as a consequence, an ethnic citizenship. Because they do not have a Native Authority of their own, immigrants considered non-indigenous are excluded from ethnic citizenship. The immediate practical consequence of this is that non-indigenous citizens are denied 'customary' access to land since they do not have their own Native Authority.

The Native Authority in Congo is three-tiered. It is the chief of the second tier who controls access to land. The Banyamulenge in Kivu Province have their own chief at the first tier, but they are treated as ethnic strangers at the second tier. The 1981 law accepted the Banyamulenge as civic citizens, but not as ethnic citizens with the right to their own Native Authority. It is worth noting that the Banyamulenge identity - as that of other immigrants from Rwanda, like the Banyamasasi and the Banyaruchuru - is territorial, not ethnic: the *Banya*-Mulenge refers to those of the place called Mulenge.

This group identity is, in turn, like a geological deposit, layered, with each layer signifying a different history. Starting from those who were there when the borders of colonial Congo were first demarcated, the identity Banyamulenge includes every wave of immigrants to Mulenge, including those who came in the wake of the genocide of 1994. They are all Banyamulenge. The irony of a common identification for all Rwandese-speaking persons resident in a single place, regardless of when they got there, is that the depth of claim of those longest resident is obscured by the shallowness of the claim of the latest wave of immigrants. It is common to hear civil society organisations in Kivu Province complain thus: you can't tell who is who and when they got here; they all claim to be Banyamulenge, even those who got here only yesterday. The consequence is that, in native eyes, Banyamulenge becomes a collective identification of those non-indigenous.

This question is not unique to Congo. It is a dilemma that arises where ever there are substantial numbers of immigrants and where the state inherited from colonialism makes a structural distinction between two kinds of citizens: those indigenous, and those not.

One can see this in the case of Uganda, historically another neighbour of Rwanda with a substantial number of Kinyarwanda-speaking immigrants. It is the state oppression of all Banyarwanda - whether they were born in Uganda or not, and whether they were civic citizens or not - by the Obote II government that led to Banyarwanda youth joining the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni. It is estimated that as many as 4,000 of the roughly 16,000 NRA guerrillas who marched into Kampala in January, 1986, were Banyarwanda.

Ironically, the Banyarwanda question became a major social - and political - question in Uganda as individuals of Rwandese origin occupied prominent state positions under the NRA. The social question was connected to land and became a major public issue when Banyarwanda squatters laid a claim to land, and utilised their majority status in the county to press it home as a democratic demand. Ranchers countered by questioning whether a non-indigenous group can have land rights as do natives. As the land question was translated into a nationality question (specially, the Banyarwanda question), national attention focused on the prominent position of individuals of Rwandese origin in the hierarchy of the NRA and that of the state. The social question triggered a political crisis. This was in the late 80s. The important point to understand, for our purposes, is that the key impetus behind the decision of the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front)

to cross the border from Uganda into Rwanda in 1990 was not a political crisis in Rwanda, but one in Uganda.

How is one to come to terms with the conflict between those the Native Authority identifies as ethnically indigenous and thus with a claim to customary rights, and those it brands as ethnically non-indigenous and thus lacking in any such customary claim? We can identify two different solutions from recent developments in the region. The first solution is to create a separate Native Authority for those branded as non-indigenous, such as the Banyamulenge in Kivu Province. This was the solution promoted by the Rwandese army in Congo, after Kabila came to power. But it was also a solution that was very unpopular in Congo, especially amongst those living in Kivu. From their point of view, this solution meant that the land over which the Native Authority would be created would be the land that would be appropriated by the Banyamulenge. Not surprisingly, the solution advanced by the Rwandese army exacerbated ethnic tension in Kivu Province.

An alternative to changing the boundaries of existing Native Authorities to create a new Native Authority, is to reform the very nature of power organised as the Native Authority in the local state. This was the solution arrived at in practice by the NRA during its guerilla war in the Luwero Triangle. It was also the solution endorsed as policy by Uganda's National Commission of Inquiry into Local Government System, set up in 1986. This solution was to democratise the local state by dismantling the system of chiefship, by turning the chief into an administrative officer supervised by an executive committee elected by a village assembly of all adults resident in the village, whether indigenous or not. It thus re-defined the basis of customary rights from ethnicity to locality (territoriality). While this was a better solution than multiplying the number of Native Authorities - and thus multiplying the problem itself - it did not do away with the problem. As subsequent developments showed, it would not hold without a political alliance of working people, of both those indigenous and those non-indigenous, cementing the fissure the conquest state had introduced into the local population. As this alliance began to erode toward the late 80s, the Ugandan solution also began to unravel.

The lesson of the Uganda experience is that the reform of the state, and therefore of citizenship laws, will not be an automatic consequence of elections and majority rule. It will require a combination

of an enlightened leadership with an organisational capacity and will to undertake a protracted education of the population, both those indigenous (the majority) and those not (the minority). This lesson is confirmed by the Congolese experience. For it is worth bearing in mind that while the Mobutu-sponsored 1981 law granted civic citizenship to the Banyamulenge, the National Conference of democratic forces in Congo opposed this law when it convened a decade later, in 1991.

Kivu Province and its Link with Rwanda
Kivu province is where losers in Rwanda traditionally end up; and it is in Kivu that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda. That, at least, is how conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu has it. This, no doubt, introduces a double tension in Kivu, both internal and external, the former within Kivu society and the latter between Kivu and the power in Rwanda. It is also a tension that has tended to grow in intensity as the refugee and exile population has grown in size. No wonder Kivu found it difficult to contain this pressure in the aftermath of the Genocide of 1994. Then, over a million Rwandese refugees streamed into Kivu, both north and south, and set themselves up in camps. The *Intrahamwe*, who continued to be supplied militarily by the French, controlled the camps - while international NGOs, mostly American-funded, fed them.

The insertion of a million plus refugees in camps that were armed and resourced from the outside had a devastating effect on civilian life in Kivu. It led to the dollarization of the economy, and to militarization of ordinary life. The *Intrahamwe* roamed the countryside, often collaborating with the Congolese army. In response many of the Native Authorities created their own militia. These are the *Mai Mai*. The anatomy of political life in Kivu began to take on a resemblance to that in Rwanda. As in Rwanda, where every political party had come to have its own militia by the Genocide of 1994, so in Kivu every Native Authority began to acquire its own militia in the post-Genocide period.

The *Mai Mai* joined the First Rebellion in Congo, the rebellion against Mobutu, but opposed the rebellion when it came to power. Why? They joined it when the rebellion targeted the *Intrahamwe* and the allied Congolese state army. And they opposed it when they saw the rebellion turn into the spearhead of a Rwandese-installed government. On the one hand, the Rwandese army began to resemble an army of occupation, its commander even being formally appointed the commander of the Congolese National Army. On the other, this same army began to actively support the demand by Banyamulenge that they be given a separate

MAIN FEATURES

Native Authority in South Kivu.

Militarization spread two tendencies in Kivu and in Congo, as it had in Rwanda. First, the link forged between militarization and genocidal tendencies inside Rwanda spread across its borders. The First Rebellion led to an indiscriminate slaughter of Intra-hamwe and of unarmed Hutu refugees. Those responsible for that slaughter were part of the forces that opposed a UN Inquiry into the matter. They remain a part of the military forces of the Second Rebellion. The Second Rebellion, in turn, evoked from the Kabila government an invitation to the general population in Kivu to slaughter indiscriminately not only invading forces from Rwanda, but also the Banyamulenge in the rebellion, and even any ordinary Tutsi civilian. We need to keep in mind that genocidal tendencies are present on both sides of the conflict, that of the government and that of the rebellion.

Secondly, the militarization of politics has reduced all credible politics to armed politics. The result is to marginalize all civil society-based politics. Once again, this tendency has become consolidated in Rwanda. Beginning with a marginalization of the Hutu opposition autonomous of both Hutu Power and the RPF, the tendency of state politics in Rwanda has been to demonise *all* politics autonomous of the RPF - regardless of its political character - as 'genocidaire'. It is a tendency strong in both the Kabila government in Congo, and in a section of the political leadership of the Second Rebellion. The tendency to reduce all credible politics to armed politics is also present on both sides, that of the government and of the rebels.

The Second Rebellion

We must begin by rejecting two tendencies, one which paints the rebellion as entirely a home grown affair, and the other which would make us believe that it is wholly a foreign invasion. The Rebellion is characterized by both internal and external factors. I shall begin with the *internal factor*.

It is clear that the political organ of the Rebellion - the Rally for Congolese Democracy or the CDM - is a hastily put together affair. As such, it lacks cohesion. We can identify at least three distinct and even opposed tendencies in it. The first is that identified with its Chairperson, Wamba-dia-Wamba. The second is identified with the Banyamulenge group, closely allied to Rwanda. And the third is identified with the ex-Mobutists. In this coalition, the balance of forces is clearly in favour of those with military forces, being the pro-Rwanda Banyamulenge group and the ex-Mobutists. These also represent the core of the militarist tendency in the Rebellion.

Let me illustrate my point with two examples. In a recent CNN Report on the war, the military commander in Goma stated - in the presence of Wamba-dia-Wamba - that he and his military colleagues would act against Wamba's political group if they became dissatisfied with their rule. In a recent interview with *De Standard* in Belgium, Wamba explained that the political wing lagged behind the military system because it was formed after the military operation. He added that he hoped that those in favour of political liberation of the people would eventually gain advantage in the movement. Such honesty and transparency is rare to come by in politics. Wamba-dia-Wamba is a fine scholar and a person of great integrity. While he is formally the political leader of the Rebellion, I suggest we will make better sense of both the Rebellion and the tendency identified with Wamba if we understand it as opposed to the dominant political tendency in the Rebellion.

The fact is that both the Rebellion and the Government are internally contradictory. The dominant tendency in both is characterised by a militarised form of politics. The question we need to ask is: How to demilitarise politics? As a starting point, I suggest it requires making politics more inclusive, particularly by reorganising the legitimacy of unarmed opposition. To recognise the political limits of both the government and the rebellion is to recognise the political opposition to Mobutu that gelled as the Sovereign National Conference in 1990-91. Comprising over 400 civic and over a hundred political groups, this opposition thrived in the period from 1990 to 1996. It was neither a part of the First Rebellion (Kabila) nor of the Second Rebellion (anti-Kabila). It is this unarmed opposition, particularly the democratic sector within it, that will be key to de-militarising Congolese politics by making it more inclusive.

We can now turn to the *external factor* in the Rebellion. There is need to oppose the external invasion without denying the existence of an internal opposition. It is worth noting that all regimes in the region - and this includes, in particular, Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Angola - have a habit of insisting that their internal problems are generated by external involvement. Of all, however, Congo falls in a special category. For, unlike all others, Congo is the object of direct foreign invasion, not just indirect foreign interference. By this, I am referring to the invasion that began with the entry of Ugandan and Rwandese forces, which was then countered with forces from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and others. The foreign invasion seems to

have given Kabila a second lease of life. If you want an analogy, think of how Hitler's invasion transformed Stalin into a national hero. Increasingly isolated at home by late 1997, it is clear that Kabila now enjoys growing popularity as he wears the mantle of national independence.

The result is that internal reform is more difficult today than it was before the foreign invasion. This is why the first precondition to internal reform is that all foreign forces leave the Congo. And yet, we know that foreign forces are unlikely to leave Congo without the acceptance of a broad agenda of internal political reform. Such an agenda will need both international credibility and international support. To marshal both that credibility and that support, any agenda for internal reform will need to recognise the legitimacy of all internal political forces, whether in or out of government, whether armed or not.

Conclusion

Foreign invasion cannot give us democracy as a turnkey project. This was true of Uganda in 1979. It was true of Congo in 1997, and it remains true of Congo in 1998. A lot of problems ascribed to Kabila would have been faced by any government put in power by foreign forces. It is better to face up to this fact, no matter how things turn out in the present conflict in Congo. Even if our friend Wamba-dia-Wamba should turn out to be the head of the next government, or another person of equal integrity and democratic persuasion, this single political fact will not go away.

The irony of the Congo crisis is that the government claims to stand for the national question, while the rebellion highlights the democratic question. Our dilemma, and that of Wamba-dia-Wamba, is that any political force which hopes to realise its democratic aspirations will first have to establish its nationalist credentials.

The lesson of Congo is that Africa needs to re-assert and strengthen two principles. The first is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of militarism and the associated tendency to export revolution. This means making a clear distinction between the right of peoples to negotiate and to re-define sovereignty, and the obligation of states to respect existing definitions of sovereignty. The second is to oppose militarism in politics, as a first step to democratisation. It is my view that this two-fold commitment can provide us the basis for dealing with deeper issues that the Congo crisis has brought to surface, being those of citizenship and state reform.

Professor Mahmood Mamdani, Centre for African Studies University of Cape Town
(Text of talk delivered at the workshop on Congo, SAPES Trust, Harare, 23 September 1998)

The film industry in Southern Africa

Nyasha Masiwa

The Southern African International Film and Television Market (SITHENGI) was held in Cape Town from the 16th to 20th of November 1998. SITHENGI is three years old now. The aim of the Film and TV Market initiative is to promote audio-visual trade, between the countries of Southern Africa, between Southern African and the rest of Africa and between Africa and the rest of the world.

Nyasha Masiwa of SAPEM spoke to two independent film makers, Joel Phiri of ICE Films and Simon Bright of ZIMEDIA, who attended the market.



What were your impressions of this year's Southern African International Film and Television Market?

Joel Phiri

It was a much bigger market with more impact this year. There have been a lot of changes in South Africa with the South Africans getting their act together, and money being invested. This has seen the establishment of Prime Media Pictures, capitalised at 8 billion rands and other media organisations investing in film production and distribution. This means South Africans are going to have the resources to support the industry.

South Africa also enjoys the legacy of possessing the technical capacity and the facilities. There has to be change in the region otherwise there is going to be great disparity. The government of South Africa has supported the film industry by investing millions of dollars through the Film Foundation of South Africa. South Africa has also enjoyed viable television support and commercial investment.

Simon Bright

It is a genuine market place where you can meet significant African players, producers and broadcasters who are otherwise inaccessible. However, some international players are much less interested in practice and come out of curiosity.

Phiri

The market provides a foundation for future success in Africa. It provides the opportunity to make pre-sales of films to be produced, opening the way for accessing funding from overseas.

Bright

At the market I managed to sign a contract with MNET to provide significant input into a six part fiction series entitled "Ma Africa". I also managed to sell "Tides of Gold" to the South African Broadcasting Corporation. The documentary looks at trade that linked South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe from the 8th to the 18th century. Those links extended as far as China, Venice and Persia. The program provides a fascinating and timely account of the trading capabilities that existed a thousand years ago in the region as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) tries to build a Southern African common market.

Phiri

The market provided me with an opportunity to introduce my new company ICE Films and make new contacts for a new project I am working on with Farai Sevenzo. We also did a lot of distribution stuff which will see a lot of African films being released in the cinema circuits in the region. We also got a lot of

continued on page 28

Interview with Jabu Khanyile

Nyasha Masiwa

The 41 year old prolific South African musician Jabu Khanyile was in Harare recently for two shows in Zimbabwe's capital city and second largest city Bulawayo.

In between the shows Khanyile was interviewed by SAPEM's Nyasha Masiwa.

How do you classify your music?

My music can be classified as Afro-Jazz and is known as such all over the world.

What is the message in your music?

The message in my music is that of Africanism. It is to promote African culture, tradition and the respect for identity and to spread the word of peace on the continent. It is a message for the Africans.

What has been your inspiration?

My inspiration is my people and my land and nature. Each place I go to I get an inspiration. Although we have the same life it also differs. For instance, the music in South Africa is not the same as the music in Zimbabwe. The kind of life the people are living in Zimbabwe inspires me.

How do you see the music industry in the Southern African region in particular and Africa as a whole?

In South Africa there is a big industry that is well facilitated in terms of equipment. The media is also very big. We get everything that Europe has and as a result our youth are very much motivated by western music. This tends to kill our culture. I have a lot of respect for countries like Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe in terms of how they promote their own music. This shows respect for culture and the love for their countries. That is what I want South Africa to be like. Not all of us are promoting our own music. You have the likes of Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, Mahlatini, Black Mambazo and Bayete that have kept the culture and the good heritage of the people. This serves to motivate people to retain their identity.

Why did you choose the music career?

I have been a musician since 1974. I did not choose to become a musician. It was rather a calling. I often say I was sent to spread the message of African Culture i.e. Africanism. When I started it was like a hobby, but then later it haunted me and then I took it as my life. Since then I have not looked back.

Which other countries besides Zimbabwe have you toured?

In Africa I have been to Kenya, Senegal, Liberia, Burundi, Abijan and Namibia. I have just returned from a tour in the United States and I have also been to Europe.



As an artist what do you think needs to be done to put the music industry in Africa on the same footing as in Europe and America?

The best way is to get all governments to work to promote music in Africa, as African music and to portray African culture with music. In the U.S.A. and Europe they will tell you that they will never promote others. They never play you on radio. They only play one hour of African music in a week. In the U.S.A. we survive through live shows.

What can you say has been achieved by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in promoting African music?

continued on page 28

The film industry in Southern Africa

continued from page 26

interest from Canal France International to buy African films. We are looking at dubbing French films into English and vice-versa.

The new project that we are looking at is a film entitled "PAGOMO" which is based on the liberation struggle focusing on children's involvement in wars. It is about how they experience death and the responsibilities that they have to take up. This is a universal theme for instance when you look at Kosovo, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Zimbabwe and other countries during the liberation wars.

How do you see the role of co-productions in developing the region's film industry?

Phiri

The way forward is co-productions. To do it alone is impossible. The base should come from the region. We are trying to involve local broadcasters for instance for our proposed film "PAGOMO" we are negotiating with the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and possibly the SABC to be involved. We plan to shoot it, on digital beta and then transfer it onto 35 millimetre film.

Bright

The market formed the basis to establishing viable co-productions. One of the barriers in Africa is the problem of communi-

cation. As such if altogether are in one place, possibilities exist.

What is the way forward?

Phiri

There is need for formal structures. Governments should set up cooperation agreements, for instance South Africa and Zimbabwe. If South Africans get organised in the absence of a cooperation agreement, Zimbabweans will not be able to access the South African market. For long term viability there is need for political will on the national and regional basis. Formal agreements between countries are of essence.

Bright

Independent producers from Zimbabwe have proved their potential in Africa and internationally. What's lacking is the institutional agreements from governments and the SADC. We are asking for protocols and agreements which can facilitate our work, not money. The SADC sector for Culture and Information is not taking the initiative. SADC has done nothing to promote the industry.

Culture as an industry can make money. South Africa and Barkina Faso are realising their cultural wealth. It also has to be realised that films can be effective ambassadors for our countries. For instance the Ministry of Information in Zimbabwe has requested for our film "FLAME" a film on the role of women in the liberation struggle to be exhibited at the Commonwealth Film Festival in Malaysia.

The Cape Town market among other things was graced by the presence of American actor, Wesley Snipes, who came to promote his latest film "Blade".

Interview with Jabu Kanyile

continued from page 27

The SADC has done a good job, through organising music festivals. Governments in the region should promote festivals and continental tours. In Abijan they have a music showcase every year. This also happens in France and in Miami. Music showcases would feed the media. It is also important that radio stations play more of African music. In South Africa, for instance, there is Khaya radio which allocates 20% to South African music, 20% to kwaito i.e. youth music and 40% to European and American. There is also radio Zulu concentrating on Zulu music. If governments could put foot on it and monitor the radio stations, that would be a good way of exposing people to African music. In the 1960s in South Africa the government controlled radio played ethnic music, allocating a day a week to the different ethnic groupings. This gave you a full day of African music. Today it is different, we have 24 hours of Rhythm and Blues and Kwaito. There should be cultural exchange. It must not be one sided.

What awards have you won in your music career?

I have won the KORA award, which is the best artist in Southern Africa between 1995 and 1996, and I also won the FNB South African Music Awards, best artist in South Africa, best producer and best song of the year. "Malowe" and "Mukayalo" won the best video and best song awards respectively.

I was also nominated for the "Mother Africa" Awards in the US for the year 1996-1997. These did not materialise because the record company was not keen. This award was Stevie Wonder's idea in a bid to assist the minorities.

How do you view the post apartheid society as compared to the apartheid era in terms of the development of music?

The old days were very tough in terms of restrictive laws and the media. The transition has done a lot for us. We can now travel and promote African Culture. In terms of life I can say little by little we will get there. A palace was not built in one day.

Can you tell us the meaning of some of the songs that you have written?

The song "Malowe" is about the beauty of Africa, "Mukayalo" is about unifying Africans, 'Imbombela' is about South African culture and the struggle in the continent. We struggle the same way. "Shosholozo" is a song that was composed by our forefathers during the slavery days. "Umathamula" is a song embracing our ancestors and our God. I call it the "Sneeze" that healed the African continent. After South Africa got its freedom the whole continent was now one. All we have to do is to get together and put our heads together to build our home, the continent of Africa.

What message do you have for the readers in the new year?

Africans should hold on to their culture, respect their identity and keep on respecting their religion. A tree with no roots is like a man with no culture. Respect the ancestors. Africans must hold on to their own things, our countries and continent and make it as beautiful as one can. One day God will bless us. With patience and perseverance we will get what we want.

African people must know that I love them with all the good and bad. Apart from being African I am proud of them. I take my fans as my family. I have never disappointed them. They feed me. Its because of the love that I have for them that I sing.

Jabu is happily married with six children, four boys and 2 girls. He does not drink nor smoke. He loves nature and likes to go to the rural areas and being with his children. Jabu also enjoys watching soccer and boxing. He grew up in Soweto. Like Paul in the Bible, Jabu has had a calling in music.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN Economist

REGIONAL COOPERATION

CONTENTS

REGIONAL COOPERATION

- Alternative Economic Policy Framework
For Southern Africa 29
Chinyamata Chipeta

- Cross Boarder Large Farm Migrations
The Zambian Case 36
Gilbert B. Mudenda

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

- Assessing Aid 40
Trevor Harris

- SADC Export Directory 42

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

- SADC Inflation 43

- SADC Lending Rates

- SADC Interest Rates 44
SAPES Data Bank

Alternative Economic Policy Framework for Southern Africa

Chinyamata Chipeta

From time to time most economies face the problem that the amount of resources that they would like to use are greater than the amount that they have themselves. Assuming that we have an economy with a public sector and a private sector, the excess expenditure or deficit can occur in either of these two sectors, or in both. Since some domestic demand is normally satisfied through imports of goods and services, the excess expenditure will also be reflected in a deficit on the balance of payments. The country's expenditure exceeds its receipts of foreign exchange. The sum of the domestic deficits of the public and private sectors equals the external deficit.

A country may live beyond its current income or means for a while, using up its savings and foreign exchange reserves to finance excess internal and external demand. But once domestic savings and foreign exchange reserves decline to low levels or get exhausted, the country cannot continue living beyond its current income without borrowing and hence incurring debt. Borrowing to finance excess demand has at least two drawbacks. First, all debt gives rise to future debt service obligations. In the case of foreign debt, debt service payments also use up scarce foreign exchange resources. Secondly, domestic debt can undermine price stability if it is incurred through money creation.

Since a country cannot live beyond its current means indefinitely, it must sooner or later adjust the level and/or composition of aggregate demand and/or supply in order to reduce or eliminate internal and external financial imbalances (deficits) in its economy. Short-term adjustment is

called stabilisation. It is usually through the implementation of neo Keynesian fiscal (revenue increasing and expenditure reducing) policies and monetary (credit restraining) measures. In the past, before the advent of structural adjustment programme, a country implementing a stabilisation programme could even use such non-price or non-market-based (physical) policies as ceilings on domestic credit expansion, restraint on foreign borrowing, restriction on imports and on allocation of foreign exchange.

In many developing countries, stabilisation programmes either failed to restore financial balances or, if they succeeded, the restoration of financial balances was temporary. On account of structural and institutional factors, financial imbalances would occur again. For these countries, it was thought that adjustment should aim at removing structural and institutional constraints within the framework of a longer term programme, particularly with a view to increasing aggregate supply, accompanied by stabilisation measures.

Initially, structural adjustment programmes aimed at reducing budget and balance of payments deficits. But as time went by they became the vehicles for promoting economic growth, increasing employment, reducing poverty, improving food security, reducing inequality in the distribution of income and for achieving other development objectives. In conjunction with short-term stabilisation programmes, they also became the vehicles for reducing inflation.

To attain the above economic objectives, the Governments of Lesotho, Ma-

lawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have, within the framework of various structural adjustment programmes, pursued policies aimed at diversifying the export base; encouraging efficient import substitution; improving the financial performance of the public sector; strengthening economic planning and monitoring capability; promoting exports; expanding the role of the private sector in the economy; improving the policy environment for the manufacturing sector; increasing efficiency of land use and protecting the environment; deepening financial markets; improving allocative efficiency of public expenditure; improving public expenditure control; restructuring the civil service to improve efficiency and control the growth of civil service wages and salaries, among others. Informally, other Southern African countries have pursued similar policies.

The measures put down above are part of a broader range of economic reforms. These reforms are referred to as structural adjustment programmes in certain quarters. But the term structural adjustment programmes is not entirely correct for, as I shall explain later, the relevant reforms focus on prices and markets rather than on core structural problems of the economy. Apart from addressing market inefficiency, they also address certain aspects of institutional inefficiency in the parastatal sector and in the civil service. Critical aspects of this inefficiency have so far not been addressed, however.

Alternative Conceptual Frameworks

Neoclassical, neostructuralist, new institutional and other schools of economic thought differ in their explanations of the causes of financial imbalances and how to reduce them. Neoclassical economics is the economics of capitalist market economies characterised by consumer sovereignty. This species of economics is a theory of price and efficient allocation of resources under the assumptions that the consumer aims at maximising utility and the firm at maximising profit. Under free markets or perfectly competitive markets, characterised by homogeneous products, many sellers and buyers (because there is no restriction on entry and exit) who know about the prices ruling in the markets and the quality of the products, prices are determined by market demand and supply and not by individual buyers and sellers. These market prices are equilibrium prices in that they equate demand and supply. If there is a change in demand or supply, price will change until equality between

demand and supply is restored. Thus, there can be no imbalance in freely functioning markets.

According to this theory which underpins World Bank and International Monetary Fund thinking, deficits in developing countries are caused by imperfections (caused by private or official interference) that prevent supply from rising in response to an increase in demand and price in both internal and external markets. Supply will respond positively only if market imperfections are removed. This logic is the foundation of market-oriented stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes.

The neoclassical counterrevolution, through which neoclassical theory was propagated, is the 1980s phenomenon of resurgence of neoclassical free-market orientation toward development problems and policies. This phenomenon owes its rise to the political ascendancy of conservative governments in the United States, Canada, Britain and West Germany. In these and other developed nations, the counter revolution favoured supply-side macro-economics, rational expectations theories and privatisation of public corporations. In developing countries, it advocated freer markets and the dismantling of public ownership, state planning and government regulation of economic activities. This policy or ideological orientation found its way to developing countries through decisions of World Bank and IMF executive boards on which neoclassists have controlling votes.

The ideal type of a structural adjustment programme recommended by the World Bank and the IMF is one where all forms of selective intervention in the market are removed and free market driven allocation of resources is restored, exposing activities to domestic and international competition. Above all, reform of the incentive system by "getting prices right" is crucial to all other adjustment measures. In this connection, the liberal economics school believes that this should be applied to all economies regardless of their level of development, since by definition all markets are efficient or at least more efficient than governments. Furthermore, reforms should be carried out quickly and across the board since there is no justification for continuing to select activities for more gradual liberalisation (World Bank, 1994).

The anti-thesis of neoclassical theory is neostructuralist theory which states that essentially markets are not free or perfect; hence, an increase in demand or price is not necessarily followed by an increase in

supply as would happen in a free market. Since market imperfections are inherent in real world conditions, neo-structuralists say that development policy must contend with them and governments must regulate and control markets.

Unlike neoclassical economists who attribute the economic crisis in Africa to distortions created by government interventions, neostructuralists look upon the structure of the economy as the underlying cause; in particular, dependence on production and export of primary commodities that have low price and income elasticities of demand and on imports of manufactured goods which are not produced at home - a condition that makes it difficult to increase export receipts, reduce import demand and improve the balance of payments (UNECA, 1991).

Among other structural features of the African economy that contribute to the crisis identified by UNECA are distinct and deeply rooted types of social differentiations relating to family, clan, ethnicity, gender, and region which constrain social mobilisation for development, efficient and objective economic management, and the proper functioning of national institutions.

What both neoclassical and neostructuralist theories do not consider is the class structure of society and the influence of class interests on the causes of economic problems, the formulation of corrective measures, the implementation of those measures and their impact. In most economic research work, it is important to investigate the extent to which the gamut of domestic and foreign class interests militates against the formulation of policies that would promote economic development, growth and equity.

Keynesian economics was developed by the late Lord John Maynard Keynes in the early 1930s to explain the cause of economic depression and hence the unemployment of that period. This species of economics states that unemployment is caused by insufficient aggregate demand and that it can be eliminated by, for example, government expenditure that would raise aggregate demand and activate idle and/or under utilised resources and thus create jobs. Alternatively, private expenditure can be stimulated through monetary (interest rate or credit) policy or fiscal (tax) policy to achieve the same end. Keynesian economics also advocated the use of monetary, fiscal and even physical policies to deflate an economy and reduce the rate of inflation.

Institutional economics is a school of thought which flourished in the 1920s in

the United States of America. Economists who subscribe to institutional economics criticise orthodox (neoclassical and neo Keynesian) economists for relying on theoretical and mathematical models which not only distort and oversimplify even strictly economic phenomena, but, more important, ignore their non-economic, institutional environment. The political and social structure of a country may block or distort the normal economic processes. Institutionalists believe that there is a need for economists to recognise the relevance of other disciplines; e.g., sociology, politics, law, to the solution of economic problems.

Although developing countries are turning to free market policies to spur economic growth, many of them are finding that these policies are not successful. According to the new institutional economics, one of the reasons for this failure is that often the market economic reforms have been implemented without corresponding changes in social and political institutions. The famous economic historian Douglas North has, for example, underscored the critical role that the rule of law and equitable enforcement of legislation play in effecting lasting economic systems and building democratic institutions.

Motives for SAPs

From the standpoint of lending institutions, the purpose of lending which accompanies SAPs is said to be to promote development and hence help the poor. According to a recent publication on this subject, this is nothing other than an illusion that hides the real aims, terms and conditions of these lending institutions (Caufield, 1996). According to this publication, the aims are (a) to enrich private bankers, who benefit from lending directly to the bank and co-financing World Bank projects; (b) to force open markets for exporters, consultants and contractors of rich countries through World Bank loans and projects; and (c) to promote the geopolitical interests of G7 shareholders (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada). The implications of these motives is that the creditor institutions lend to developing countries even if no net benefit will accrue to them as a result of the credits; the projects can be prepared in a hurry without due regard

to feasibility and viability; and information relating to appraisal, monitoring and evaluation can be falsified to make the project pass when it should not.

Another thesis that has been advanced is that SAPs were conceived as tools for turning socialist-oriented developing economies into capitalist ones or for entrenching capitalist rules of behaviour in those that were already capitalist.

Although donors would like developing countries to follow a capitalist path of development, it must be noted that the relative merits of capitalism are few, while its relative disadvantages are many compared to a socialist economy. One advantage of capitalism is that the price mechanism which allocates resources there works automatically: nobody is personally charged with seeing how the allocation of resources in the economy is conducted. Secondly, in a capitalist economy, consumers and

especially if he can stop other firms from entering the industry. In this situation, the monopolist can take advantage of increased demand by charging higher prices. Consumers pay more without getting more. Resources are not moving where they are in demand.

← Inequality in incomes, which can result from inequality in the distribution of assets; the payment to labour of wages that are less than the value of its marginal product under imperfect competition, and differences in spending power between the rich and the poor with the former using their bigger spending power to attract resources into the production of luxury goods at the expense of necessities desired by the poor.

← Economic instability which periodically occurs in a capitalist economy because the market does not always properly coordinate the decisions of investors, consumers, banks, etc.

← Divergence between private benefit which accrues to a private citizen (businessman or consumer) and social benefit (external economy) which accrues to the community; and between private cost which is borne by the businessman and social cost (external diseconomy) which is borne by the community. Examples of private benefit are prevention of malaria through spraying a water pond with a chemical by a family, and the digging of a trench by a farmer which reduces the risk of crop damage

from floods. If other families benefit from the spraying, there is an external economy. And if other farmers benefit from the flood prevention, again there is an external economy. The former is an external economy of consumption, while the latter is an external economy of production. Both exceed private benefits. An example of private cost is the opportunity cost of producing a chemical in a factory. If the process of manufacturing the chemical causes air pollution which undermines the health of the people living near the factory, there is an external diseconomy which is not reflected in the firm's costs of production. The external diseconomy exceeds private cost. And an example of an external diseconomy of consumption is littering of streets by people who consume ice-cream. In the presence of external economies, con-

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producers are free to buy and produce, respectively, what they like. Consumers aim at maximising satisfaction, while producers aim at maximising profit. Thirdly, producers have an incentive (profit) to innovate, to bring in new products or methods of production. In contrast, in a socialist economy the task of allocating resources through a planning agency may (in a large economy) be too complex to be done well. The planning may be inefficient, either actually making wrong decisions or taking decisions in an inflexible, slow and bureaucratic manner.

The defects of a capitalist economy are more serious. These defects include:

← Monopoly, where there is only one supplier of a product. Under monopoly increased demand for the product may not be followed by increased supply. The monopolist can restrict supply,

sumption and production are less than optimal in a capitalist economy. While in the presence of external diseconomies, consumption and production exceed optimum levels. Consumers and producers on their own do nothing to correct these causes of economic inefficiency.

- ← Consumer ignorance of what prices are being charged by all sellers in the markets and of the quality of the products that they are buying, especially of products that are technically complex. This is due to both inadequate information and persuasive advertising. The result of ignorance is that consumers do not necessarily buy from efficient firms that produce at low costs and so charge low prices. They may buy from inefficient firms.

Beside these defects of a capitalist economy, there are a number of other reasons why development of a poor country cannot be left to market forces and requires a large degree of planning and state intervention. The first is that in a developing country there is just not enough private enterprise to promote development - not enough people with the entrepreneurial ability, or with the capital to invest, or with the required technical skills, or willing to tackle the special risks of establishing new businesses in new and unknown fields. In these circumstances, it is recommended that state enterprises should do what is not done for lack of private enterprise and take the lead so that private businessmen can be encouraged to follow.

The second is that new projects are often complementary. Large projects are linked to one another and each helps the others to be efficient. For example, a bauxite mine may pay off if a smelter to process the bauxite is sited near the mine. Then the smelter may require the expansion of hydro-electric generating capacity. To make use of the electricity generated, it may be necessary to set up other industries running on electricity. This can only be done through deliberate planning.

Thirdly, there is need to take a long term view. A country might wish to set up new industries. Left to itself, private enterprise would do little. Often businessmen are reluctant to undertake new projects. The government must therefore start new projects itself, knowing that when pioneer enterprises have been set up in the new industry, then private enterprise will follow.

Fourthly, capitalism may produce efficient allocation of resources in a given system, but it may not be efficient in produc-

ing an entirely new structure. When demand for existing products changes, or when new products are introduced, only marginal changes in the composition of output occur. What is required in development, however, is a drastic change in the structure of the economy from, say, a semi-subsistence economy to a more complex one. Such a change cannot be left to market forces to achieve, but need planning. These are additional arguments in favour of, not necessarily doing away with private enterprise, but at least supplementing it with government intervention and public enterprise through planned direction of an economy.

In the past, it was argued that because developing countries were poor, planning there was difficult. These countries lacked trained administrators, and administration tended to be inefficient. It was concluded that because of this, it was better to rely on the price mechanism as much as possible. This argument is no longer plausible as a lot of progress has been made in managing administrations with highly trained manpower.

The main aims of borrowing countries are to enter into reform programmes with the Bretton Woods Institutions so as to qualify for debt rescheduling or to gain access to their credit resources. But since entering into reform programmes with their institutions is a sign that the borrowing countries will pursue prudent management of their economies, the programmes also open access to credit resources of other lending institutions (public and private), as well as to the aid resources of bilateral donors. These resources are required to support budgets and balances of payments. Genuine commitment to reforms is lacking. Some actions are taken, not out of desire to restructure the economy, but to ensure the flow of credit and aid.

Economic Growth

All Southern African countries, except Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia, experienced lower rates of growth of GDP during 1990-95 than during 1980-90. Furthermore, in all low-income countries, per capita GNP was lower in 1996 than it was in 1980. Neo-Keynesians explain this in terms of the lower rates of gross domestic investment in those countries during the early 1990s compared to the 1980s. Those countries that experienced higher rates of growth in the early 1990s had higher rates of investment as well. In Zimbabwe, however, a higher average rate of investment did not translate into a higher average rate of growth, underscoring the

fact that investment is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition, for economic growth. Another Neo-Keynesian explanation is a lower or negative rate of growth of exports during 1990-95 compared to 1980-90 in Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Neo-structuralists explain lower rates of growth and lower per capita GNPs in terms of:

- ← Disintegration of basic physical, market and social infrastructure. Roads, ports, railways, posts and telecommunications, financial, health, education, power and water services are both qualitatively and quantitatively worse than they were in 1980.
- ← For low-income countries, external debt has become an unmanageable problem, a strong barrier to sustained economic growth and development, and a source of weakness as creditors use it as a leverage on their policies and programmes.
- ← In Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, past wars have caused major disruptions economically, socially and politically which will take many years to heal.
- ← Environmental degradation, especially desertification and loss of valuable top soil, forests and grass which has now reached high levels in several countries and as a result of which large tracks of land have become desolate and unsuitable for cultivation of crops or rearing of livestock.
- ← A continuous loss of export market shares accompanied by steady increases in import dependence including in commodities that Southern Africa can produce.
- ← Rising overall dependence on trade by Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
- ← Recurring droughts and floods. The former make crops fail and may lead to loss of animal life. The latter destroy crops, animals and other properties.
- ← The adoption of floating exchange rate regimes which has resulted in large currency depreciations. Floating exchange rate regimes have subjected exchange rates in the sub-region to speculative attacks and further currency depreciation. No country has large amounts of foreign exchange required to sustain a stable exchange rate. The consequent instability in exchange rates has created new risks and uncertainties that discourage investment and trade.

← The liberalisation of capital flows and foreign exchange markets which has facilitated capital flight, thereby resulting in misallocation of foreign exchange reserves.

New institutionalists explain lower rates of economic growth in terms of deteriorating social and political conditions, including robbery, corruption, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, lack of rule of law, inequitable enforcement of legislation and outright disregard for laws, regulations and established procedures. Furthermore, they explain lower rates of growth in terms of lack of basic human rights, individual freedom and lack of democratic participation. Where these conditions prevail, resources are misallocated or wasted; people feel alienated, repressed, disillusioned, and unwilling to devote their energies to development (UNECA, 1991).

In terms of class structure of society, the dominant social classes in low-income countries are the political-bureaucratic elites and the bourgeoisie. These classes have increased their control over the commanding heights of their economies. They are using their influence to direct both public and private resources to projects that are promoting their class interests rather than the development objectives of the countries. They are also using their influence to manipulate economic policies so that they can serve narrow class interests.

Sectoral Growth and Transformation

SAPs have sought to promote the agricultural sector by liberalising it through reducing the role of parastatals in favour of private competition in marketing; a reduction of explicit export taxes on agricultural products; and through liberalising producer prices internally. Supporting macroeconomic policies have stressed the control of inflation so as to shift the rural urban terms of trade in favour of agriculture; and exchange rate liberalisation to remove the implicit tax on agricultural exports.

The growth of the agricultural sector under SAPs has been either stagnant or negative. Exports which are dominated by agriculture have not risen. Food security remains precarious both at the household level and at the national level. While the performance of agriculture cannot be attributed solely to SAPs (thus ignoring weather and the terms of trade), the fact that agriculture has not done well under SAPs suggests that SAP policies have failed to arrest the impact of other factors

on the sector.

SAPs have addressed the price constraint, but not such non-price constraints as infrastructure and risk. Nor have they addressed such structural characteristics of agriculture as a large non-monetary and non-tradable smallholder sector, and a system of land tenure that is dominated by social norms and customs rather than by the profit motive (African Development Bank, 1995). In this situation, improving rural infrastructure and feeder roads; expanding research and extension; and provision of better health and education services are required.

As is the case with agriculture, value added in industry grew more rapidly during the pre-liberalisation period than afterwards. The unsatisfactory rate of growth of manufacturing industries is due to a number of factors that have included high costs of imported inputs induced by devaluations, foreign exchange shortages, inadequate industrial development policies, relatively small size of the domestic market, low base of human capital for industry and weak institutional support for industrial training and technological activity.

On industry, economic reforms take a neoliberal view that markets are efficient and government intervention in resource allocation is distorting and inefficient. Markets may prove to be inefficient, but this is believed to be less costly than government inefficiency. And, on technology, the following assumptions are made: access to technology is such that there is no need for further efforts; there are no learning costs; there is no need to make adaptations; and there is no need to create information networks or to co-ordinate investment decisions across activities. As a consequence, the design of industrial reform does not take into account differences in capabilities, institutions and markets; the need for technological upgrading and to provide opportunities for competitive activities to develop.

The technological capability analysis of industrialisation suggests that industrial development is influenced by how well firms manage technological development. In this regard, protection is necessary to induce entry into activities with difficult learning processes. Newly Industrialized Economies of East and South-East Asia used a variety of state interventions to promote industrial development. These included active industrial policies and sound macroeconomic management. Domestic resources were channelled to selected infant industries, with the encouragement to

export upon approaching competitiveness. A wide range of technological support services were provided by the state. The adoption of interventions to protect the learning process so as to facilitate industrial deepening was a key feature of their policies (African Development Bank, 1995).

The Balance of Payments

The current account deficit of the balance of payments as percentage of GDP worsened during SAPs in most of the Southern African countries. The policy of currency devaluation and depreciation, so central to balance of payments corrective measures, has not succeeded because the necessary conditions have not been fulfilled. First, devaluation-induced inflation has eroded the very relative price advantage which currency adjustment was designed to achieve. Increases in input costs have led to an increase in product prices, thereby undermining competitiveness. While the decline in real incomes following inflation has reduced incentives to produce and export. In the case of Malawi, the elasticity of domestic inflation with respect to currency devaluation was recently estimated at 1.00, for Mauritius at 1.04, Democratic Republic of Congo at 0.72, Zambia at 0.95 and Zimbabwe at 0.85 and with respect to foreign import prices at 0.57 for Malawi, 0.70 for Mauritius, 2.20 for Democratic Republic of Congo, 0.67 for Zambia and 0.62 for Zimbabwe (African Development Bank, 1995). The high import content of production and consumption accounts for this.

Apart from the erosion of the relative price advantage of currency adjustment, the small increase in the domestic price of exports following a currency adjustment (the so-called pass-through) does not offer much incentive. The value of the pass-through for Malawi was estimated at only 0.14 and for Mauritius at 0.25 (African Development Bank, 1995).

The Marshall-Lerner condition is not satisfied either. Price and income elasticities of demand for Malawi's exports were estimated at only -0.18 and 0.4, respectively, meaning that a price change will bring about a less than proportionate change in demand. So too an income change. Price elasticity of export supply was estimated at 1.08. This unitary elasticity of export supply implies that price and quantity exported change by the same proportion, leaving revenue unchanged. Even if a devaluation might have a positive impact on the volume of exports in the short run, such a remedy is inappropriate as a long-run solution. Furthermore,

it is hazardous as it tends to concentrate more on expanding the exports of a few existing agricultural products which gave rise to the structural weakness of the balance of payments in the first place.

Just as the response of exports to price changes is low, so is the response of the total output of goods and services (real GDP) to currency depreciation. All Southern African countries, except Seychelles, experienced varying degrees of currency depreciation between 1980 and 1994. The largest was in Angola whose currency depreciated 1,990.1 fold, seconded by the Democratic Republic of Congo (1,194.1 fold). Mozambique and Zambia also experienced relatively large currency depreciations. The smallest was in Mauritius whose currency depreciated 2.3 fold. However, the volume of goods and services increased only 1.3 fold in Mozambique and 1.1 fold in Zambia, an indication of low supply (production) response. In all other countries, production of goods and services lagged behind the rate of currency depreciation except in Seychelles. In Angola total output actually declined in real terms between 1980 and 1994.

By increasing the amount of domestic resources required to service foreign debt, currency devaluations and depreciations have contributed to rising payments abroad and hence to rising external deficits. And because of competitive currency devaluations, regional economies have not improved their competitiveness.

The view is also held that it is inappropriate to make price manipulation the prime driving force in the reform process because, on the supply side, price factors explain only a small proportion of the change in export supply; and, on the demand side, they explain only a small proportion of the growth of export market shares in international trade. Emphasis must be placed on non-price factors. For the supply of exports, these factors are institutions, infrastructure, inputs, information and innovations (Streeten, 1987). For the demand for exports, they are the act of selling and marketing, including marketing arrangements; the export-excellence of the product, including packaging, quality, preservation and delivery time for agricultural exports; and design, ease of maintenance, reliability, delivery-time and after-sale services for manufactured goods.

Since 1970, Africa has lost its world market share in cocoa, coffee, cotton, rubber and timber to Asia and in copper and iron ore to Latin America. But little of that loss is explained by changes in relative prices. In other words, price competitive-

ness explains an insignificant proportion of the change in market shares. Côte d'Ivoire increased its cocoa market share despite an overvalued exchange rate. Kenya did the same for coffee. So too Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon for natural rubber. And Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali for cotton.

Budget Deficits, Money Supply and Inflation

High rates of inflation in a number of countries have been caused by rapid expansion in the money supply, itself a reflection of relatively large overall budget deficits. But there have been other factors at work. Although it is blasphemy in some lending institutions to associate inflation with currency devaluation or depreciation, it is a fact that the latter has, by leading to an increase in the prices of imported consumer, capital and intermediate goods, contributed to high rates of inflation in the sub-region. The other causes have been shortages of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials caused by droughts or floods and taxes on imported and domestically produced goods.

Structuralists explain inflation in terms of the relative inelasticity of supply of foodstuffs as a result of which food supply tends to lag behind demand generated by increases in incomes in the non-agricultural sector. While imports of foodstuffs may relieve domestic shortages, there is a foreign exchange constraint which prevents the importation of adequate quantities of foodstuffs to prevent prices from rising. Should this happen, workers demand an increase in their wages which, if granted, results in a further increase in demand and a further rise in food prices.

The structural characteristics of fiscal systems is important as well. Tax systems have low inflation elasticities so that when the general level of prices rises, the real value of tax revenue falls. This is because taxes are fixed in money terms or adjust slowly to inflation. In addition, the long collection lags mean that taxes are worth less by the time that they are collected. Expenditures, on the other hand, tend to be fixed in real terms so that when prices rise, the money value of expenditures is raised proportionately. The consequence is that when prices begin to rise, the fiscal deficit tends to widen in real terms.

New institutionalists contend that the neo-Keynesian view that inflation is caused by budget deficits is not helpful because it does not explain what is behind budget deficits in the first place. They see many institutional problems standing in the way of sound economic management.

Without attempting to be exhaustive, one of the main problems is lack of appreciation of the need for prudent management and macroeconomic stability. Narrow sectional interests matter more than national goals in economic decision-making. The other key problems are lack of an independent bureaucracy, free from political pressure; inequality in the distribution of the benefits of economic growth which has created special interest groups that protect their interests at the expense of the majority; the lack of honest, highly motivated public servants - sustained by merit based recruitment and promotion, competitive real earnings, and generous rewards to those who do well; the absence of democratic structures within the public sector for consultation and decision-making in the area of economic policy; lack of respect for laws, rules and regulations; the absence of formal councils for overall consultation and exchange of information and views between government on the one hand, and labour, farmers, businessmen and other interest groups, on the other hand; and mismanagement and misallocation of human, capital and revenue resources in the public sector.

Conclusions

SAPs have not achieved their objectives, especially development and stabilisation objectives. Markets have been liberalised to a large extent. Price adjustments have been colossal. But these have not brought about a commensurate rise in sectoral or total output (GDP) or exports. In low-income countries, significant structural change has not occurred. Per capita GNPs and living standards have declined as life expectancy at birth has fallen. Furthermore, fiscal and monetary policies have not brought about macroeconomic stability as interest rates and exchange rates have become very unstable, inflation rates have accelerated, in part due to economic liberalisation measures and bank financing of budget deficits, and as the current accounts of balances of payments as percentages of GDPs have increased in most of the countries.

Thus, both SAPs and accompanying neo-Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies have failed in Southern Africa. The failure of SAPs is a failure of the neo-classical framework; while the failure of fiscal and monetary policies is a failure of the neo-Keynesian framework.

If there is any useful lesson to learn from all this, it is that prices and markets are not the economic problems, or, at least,

not the main economic problems in Southern Africa; and, therefore, that liberalising markets and adjusting prices are, in themselves, neither necessary nor sufficient for solving those problems.

Structural factors which have been put down in the body of this paper explain the low response of the sub-regional economies to market liberalisation and price adjustments. The low response of output and exports is at the heart of the economic crisis. For unless output and exports can expand substantially, there is no way that real incomes can be maintained or improved. In turn, low output and export response is due to low technological capability of most Southern African economies, reflected in low levels of skills and the use of unimproved techniques of production. It is also due to the following factors that should be addressed: environmental degradation, external debt burdens, uncertainty and risk and misallocation of foreign exchange resources.

The emphasis on liberalising prices and markets means that important links are missing from the reform programmes. In manufacturing industry, for example, the missing links include protection to induce entry into activities with difficult learning processes and provision of technological support services. While in agriculture, they include development of appropriate technologies (e.g. seeds, agroforestry, farmyard manure) that are technically, socially and economically acceptable and environmentally friendly.

As regards financial sector development, the missing links are measures for improving the operations of semi-formal or micro-finance institutions, and for improving risk management among commercial banks and other formal financial institutions. Also missing are measures for establishing independence of central banks; and for improving deposit and credit linkages between the formal, semi-formal and informal sub-sectors of the financial system.

With respect to the promotion of exports, the focus should be on non-price factors (institutions, inputs, information and innovations; and marketing arrangements, packaging, quality, preservation, delivery time, design, ease of maintenance, reliability and after sale services) and not on floating exchange rate regimes, currency devaluations or depreciations, other price adjustments, and liberalisation of capital flows and foreign exchange markets.

If included in reform programmes, these missing links would address the

structural weaknesses of the sub-regional economies. Liberalising prices and markets cannot work unless these structural issues are also addressed. Structural reforms are both necessary and sufficient for economic development.

Institutional factors which have been stated in this article, especially the institutional motives of creditors and debtors, and weak administrative set-ups, explain unsatisfactory economic management and hence failure to promote economic stability in Southern Africa.

Towards improving economic management, it is recommended that Southern African countries should adhere to:

1. Genuine commitment from the highest to the lowest levels of authority to sound economic management and development.
2. Manning of key committees, ministries and posts with political and bureaucratic cadres that are trained in the relevant fields.
3. Insulation of policy making from pressure from special interest groups.
4. Development of an honest, highly motivated and capable public service - sustained by merit based recruitment and promotion, competitive real earnings and other rewards to those who do well.
5. Adequate representation of all ministries and other relevant public sector institutions in economic policy decision-making bodies.
6. Establishment of joint councils, one for each sector of the economy, for overall consultation and exchange of information and views. Membership on these councils should represent government, estate agriculture, smallholder agriculture, the business community, labour, consumers, the church, etc.
7. Legal and other steps to ensure that only independent commissions are responsible for recruitment and promotion in the public sector, except where the constitution specifies otherwise.
8. Implementation of flexible and swift responses to economic instability and other economic problems.
9. Willingness to change economic strategies and policies that are not helpful to the majority of the people of the country.
10. Stern punishment for those who flout laws, rules and regulations in the public sector.
11. Improvement in the allocation of human and financial resources in the public sector.

Since neither the World Bank/IMF nor

bilateral donors are ideologically neutral and hence willing to do away with liberalising prices and markets in structural adjustment programmes, it is recommended that the African Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission, which are, should play a greater role in the design of the relevant programmes. It is also recommended that concrete steps should be taken towards the establishment of an African Monetary Fund. These institutions should permit selective government interventions in markets and let public enterprises set up new industries, whenever necessary. Furthermore, the structural and institutional measures which have been proposed here should form the core of conditionality attached to assistance granted in support of reform programmes conceived within a structuralist-institutionalist economic framework.

If there is another useful lesson that can be learnt from the experience with SAPs, it is that these programmes should be sequenced in such a way that price and market liberalisation should be preceded by restructuring of the real economy where goods and services are produced; and that market-based measures for stabilising the economy should be preceded by appropriate institutional reforms. Before effective institutions have been put in place, stabilisation of the economy should be achieved largely through physical measures. Where it is too late to follow the sequencing proposed here, reform programmes should merely give priority to restructuring of the economy and improving the institutional framework.

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Cross-border Large Farmer Migrations: *The Zambian Case*

Gilbert Mudenda

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing concern among Zambians that their country is being taken over by foreigners. And that these foreigners are being aided by government officials and politicians who are paid to protect the welfare of the Zambian Nation and its people. The new breed of colonisers are not the old colonial masters; they are not the citizens of the remaining superpower; but South African Whites who, not many years ago, were our adversaries.

Given the current state of the Zambian economy, it is natural for a people to look for comfortable explanations to a vexing problem. And some of the sentiments given above hold some grain of truth. Yes, the white South Africans are a visible community in the Zambia. It is also true to say that our current leadership seems to believe that without the South African Investors, Zambia stands no chance for economic development.

However, what we are witnessing, at the moment is not beginnings of the Second Great Trek, as some Zambians seem to believe. For most South Africans, Zambia may be a nice country to visit but not to raise a family. To a few, both corporate and individual, Zambia is merely the country to come to and make money. It is only in this sense that Zambia is a land of opportunity. Poignantly, such opportunities, however, are largely reserved for the foreign investor and not for Zambian businessman.

ANOTHER INVASION FROM THE SOUTH

The history of pre-colonial Zambia has been characterised as a series of migra-

tions beginning with the advent of the Bantu Speaking Peoples (BSP) at the turn of the first millennium. Before that, most parts of the country now known as Zambia was inhabited by the San peoples who were pushed into the wetter, drier or inaccessible parts of the country.

The second wave of migrations began during the fifteenth Century. This was characterised by the advent of kingdom seekers mainly from Katanga. The third wave of migration was mainly by refugees from the South. These were the Kololo and the Ngoni. The fourth wave was characterised by more powerful forces: slave raiders, traders, missionaries, and colonisers.

The imposition of colonial rule did not put to an end the migration of people into Zambia. For example, after the end of the Anglo-Boer War, many Afrikaner families moved to Zambia. Their descendants form a large part of the commercial farmers in Zambia. Other subsequent migrations include:

- Zimbabweans farmers who came during the Federal Period;
- Malawians who came to work on the mines and in the Colonial Civil Service;
- White ex-servicemen who came to settle after the end of the Second World War;
- West Indian and West African technicians and professionals who came to provide skilled manpower immediately after independence; and
- Angolans, Mozambicans, Namibians and South Africans who came to seek refuge in Zambia during the wars of liberation.

The process of migration has not yet

come to an end. There are now Rwandese, Congolese and Angolans in Zambia. However, the most welcome guests of the Zambian government are the South African investors.

THE MANY FACES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVESTOR

It is possible to classify our new investors into five broad categories. There is the entrepreneur, the employee, the corporate investor, the natural resource raider, and the economic warrior. Each category has its distinctive characteristics, implications and effects on the health of the Zambian economy.

THE ENTREPRENEUR

They are entrepreneurs in the sense that they are able to identify a service that they can provide to the Zambian market. These entrepreneurs are largely artisans and technicians. They provide security services, drill boreholes, assemble cold-rooms, clean factory and hospital floors. Their advantage over Zambians is the uniform of colour. Consequently, their suppliers trust them with credit facilities and their customers prefer to deal with them rather than with their local competitors.

This group cannot be viewed as settlers. They are transitory group and look forward to going back home once they have made enough money to set themselves up back home.

THE EMPLOYEE

After the entrepreneur, there is a growing number of South Africans who work in Zambia as employees of the corporate investor. Being South African in a South African owned company provides this

group the opportunity to occupy management positions. Members of this group are neither settlers nor investors. They, in effect, constitute a more transitory group.

What this means, is that Zambians are foregoing jobs. In the past, the work-permit regulation used to be instrument for correcting this abuse. But since the advent of the new culture, it seems that the government is embarrassed to insist on a justification for importing expatriate labour.

THE CORPORATE INVESTOR

The South African Corporate Investor has been around since the development of the mining industry in Zambia. With privatisation, new corporate players came in when it became evident that they were easy pickings to be made in Zambia.

The Zambian government aided and abetted the entry of new corporate investors such as Shoprite, Jets and many others. It is not known how much money came into the country through this process. The indications are that very little investment came in. It would also be interesting to know how much money Foodcoop paid for the former Zamhort. Konkola Mine went for what seemed, at the time, to be for less than the price of a shaft: not to mention the price of the water pumping system, which is the lifeline of a mine such as Konkola.

The corporate investors cannot be said to be settlers. They are settlers of a different kind. Their domicile remains South Africa. They can even employ a few Zambians as Managing Directors as long as such person provide the necessary political connections. The danger with this arrangement is that the Zambian investment profile for such companies will always conform to the global strategy of the parent company.

THE NATURAL RESOURCE RAIDER

The natural resource raider is another group of South African investor, which, to me epitomises the seamy side of foreign investment. This is the type of investor that personifies all what is rotten in our demands, as a country, for foreign investment at whatever cost.

This category of 'investor' comprises

those who are capitalising on the country's inability to value its natural capital. The natural resource raider is the impoverished South African farmer out to get cheap land. He is the prospector picking up gold nuggets whose value is unknown to the local population. He is the timber poacher making a quick buck while the authorities are taking their time debating on whether to grant him a timber concession or not. He is the safari operator in Lower Zambezi who capitalises on the country's inability to value its wildlife resource and which prohibits its people to enter the tourism sector.

Why is it the case that a South African can come into this country and acquire 60,000 hectares of land when our national laws restrict Zambians to a mere 250 hectares? Why is it that a South African can poach timber in Western Province while Zambians who want to get into the timber business are not allowed to do so by Zambian authorities? Why is it that South Africans can establish lodges in our National Parks and other scenic resorts in the country while potential Zambian investors are denied consideration?

The natural resource raider is an investor to the extent that he is able to bring in the minimum capital to set up the most rudimentary operation and does not add value, locally, to the resource he is exploiting. The natural resource raider is an expert in transfer pricing. In my book, the natural resource raider is neither a serious investor nor a settler. Those that pretend to settle only do so while the resource lasts.

THE ECONOMIC WARRIOR

The economic warrior is the South African investor who knows the weaknesses of the Zambian political and economic system. He is the commercial equivalent of guerilla soldier. This sort of South African investor is less visible. His investment is an office in the least accessible part of town. He will have a fax machine and will also invest in cultivating relations with those arms of government that order goods from South Africa in bulk.

The economic warrior is the unsung hero of South African export business.

He is the beneficiary of the anti-sanctions busting machinery.

Many respectable and well-established companies have gone under because they have succumbed to the logic that it does not pay to produce in Zambia. What pays is to import from a cheap neighbour. The demise of companies like Dunlop Zambia, Reckitt and Coleman, Colgate Palmolive demonstrates the effectiveness of the economic warrior. The edible oils sector maybe the next victim. Our Food Reserve Agency is another target of economic warrior. The economic warrior group is not a settler group. They may use elements of the Old Settler faction only to the extent that these know the economic terrain as well as the fact that this element constitutes the key personnel in the victim companies.

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

When contrasted to the colonial state, the post-colonial state is very weak vis-a-vis the support it gives to its dominant class. The colonial state was not apologetic when it came to protecting the interest of the large mining corporations as well as those of the settler community. Its policies and natural resource laws were tailored to promote the interest of the mining companies and the settler community. The post-colonial state maintained these policies and laws. In some cases the post-colonial made amendments to natural resource laws and the trade regime which buttressed the position of foreign interests.

However, the willingness of the Zambian State to succumb to the machinations of the natural resource raider as well as the economic warriors could not have happened if we, as a country, did not have a whole legion of fifth columnists in our midst. These include: the state bureaucracy, the politicians, and individual Zambians. Together, they have combined to form a coterie responsible for evolving and supporting a national philosophy that prefers a foreign investor to a local investor. In their book, the local is seen as a nuisance: he has neither money nor good business ideas.'

THE STATE BUREAUCRACY

The **Zambian State** bureaucracy has completely abandoned its responsibility as the chief administrator of the country. All major policy documents are written in Washington and merely printed and bound in Zambia by the Government Printer to give them a local touch. All major policy reforms are at the behest of donors. Senior government officials spend more time attending workshops and seminars or out of the country attending consultative meetings than being in their offices. When not attending seminars and workshops, they are employed as consultants by donors to write their department's contribution to the many donor initiated reform programmes.

More poignantly, the involvement of local professionals, in their capacities as high-ranking government officials or consultants, does ensure that the messages coming out of these documents do not reflect a **Zambian** input, but rather, "His Master's Voice". This is the reason why most policy reform documents have nothing to do with **Zambian** realities. They are completely out of tune to the life experiences of the **Zambian** people.

The worst crime being committed by these government officials is the deadly mixture of arrogance, laziness and ignorance. They are lazy in the sense that they are not willing to read and consult other professionals and practitioners. This is the reason why, very often, they design programmes that can not be implemented. For example, in cases where donors provide money to support local business, that money is not disbursed because the government officials design procedures that do not make sense from both the perspective of banks and that of prospective borrowers. Ignorance of how the real world functions combined with official arrogance and spiced with a good measure of laziness produces an unwholesome cocktail for economic disaster.

THE POLITICIAN

The politicians constitute another group of **Zambians** who do not serve the **Zambians**. Their mandate, if at all there is one, is to provide a national leadership that will increase the welfare of **Zambians**. Instead, those who were elected to serve have turned politics into a big business. Their concern is to be appointed to a Cabinet position; to secure a highly subsidised vehicle; become a fertiliser agent, and maize buyer, or to access a low interest loan.

Very few politicians visit their constituencies. Some only venture 'home' to supervise the hand over of a cheque from some donor agency or from the Presidential Fund. The daily travails

cate for policies that are detrimental to their country for the sake of keeping a well paying job. It is like selling one's hut and throwing in the mother, the wife and the children as a bonus in the bargain! The common element among all these **Zambians** is the lack of personal professional integrity and old fashioned nationalism.

THE NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

These fifth columnists working together with the agents of international capital have fostered an open door policy for **Zambia** under the guise of liberalisation. And in order to ensure that this comes to pass, the **Zambian** government has established institutions and enacted laws

that are grossly in favour of foreign investors as compared to local investors.

For example, the 1995 Land Act declares all untitled land as vacant land. The implication of this is that investors have the first call on any piece of land in the country. The local villagers, who have no title deeds to their land, could be evicted if an investor wants to use that land for his investment. Further-

more, the other natural resource laws continue to discriminate against local communities by vesting all natural resources in the hands of the State President who can give licenses to any investor he so wishes.

There are a number of national institutions specifically established to welcome foreign investors in **Zambia**. One such institution is the **Zambia Investment Centre**. its functions and its performance, over the years, have shown that it is more concerned with promoting the interest of foreigners over those of local investors. The centre spends a lot of money visiting foreign capitals in order to entice foreign investors. Not much time is spent on assisting local investors. For example, it has assisted foreigners get title to land in record time when **Zambians** have been waiting for

Zambia, as a country, should reject the notion that the development of the country will be done by foreigners. There is no country in the world that has been developed by outsiders. As such, there is a need for establishing institutions and laws that support local investors.

of their constituents are not high on their priority. Some aid and abet the pillage of natural resources in their constituencies. Others connive with investors to robe villagers of their land under the pretext of bringing development to their areas.

INDIVIDUALS

At one public forum, Chief Nalubamba reminded the audience that every bad policy implemented in **Zambia** had the blessing and the support of some educated **Zambian**. Another group comprises **Zambians** who are members of professional associations who do not speak out when bad policies are made in areas of professional competence.

The bane of this groups are those **Zambians** employed by foreign organisations who feel duty bound to advo-

years to have their land applications processed by the Ministry of Lands. Officials from the Centre even travelled to Zimbabwe to entice white farmers, whose farms were designated by the Zimbabwe government, to come to Zambia and get free land.

The Zambia Privatisation Agency is another government institution formed to promote foreign participation in the Zambian economy. Ostensibly, the agency was mandated with the responsibility of divesting state ownership of commercial entities. In practice, and from my personal experiences as one who took an active part in bidding for companies on offer, the agency was very hostile to Zambian bidders especially those that did not have strong political connections. Worse still, foreign bidders were given generous conditions for buying companies contrary to the provisions of the Zambia Privatisation Act.

I personally feel that the government has gone over-board in its efforts to attract foreign investment. Attracting investment is not the same thing as selling off the country to foreigners especially those people who not long ago were planting land mines, killing Zambians and destroying the country's infrastructure.

THE ALTERNATIVE WAY FORWARD

The first step in trying to correct a wrong is to admit that the current route is not taking us anywhere. We need to confess that we have been doing the wrong thing. The admission would be the first act in the right direction. Beyond that, there are other things we need to do as a nation. The most important being: learning from the South Africans; establishing institutions that support local investment; instituting radical reform of our natural resource laws; and to learn to stop listening to wrong advice.

ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONS THAT SUPPORT LOCAL INVESTMENT

Zambia, as a country, should reject the notion that the development of the country will be done by foreigners. There is no country in the world that has been developed by outsiders. As such, there is a need for establishing institutions and

laws that support local investors. This could take the form of a development bank and other funds, which support genuine local businessmen. It is interesting to note that the various private sector support programmes initiated by donors are administered by commercial banks. These are the same banks that do not like to lend to local entrepreneurs. It is also a known fact that the Development BANK of Zambia has internal problems. But instead of addressing the management problem at the Development Bank of Zambia, most development oriented credit schemes eschew having to deal with the DBZ and instead set up these credit schemes in commercial banks which do not have the capacity to carry out development banking operations.

There is need to enact laws that insist on local participation in foreign investment projects especially in the natural resources sector. This is a common practice in some countries. In Zambia, however, the meaning of liberalisation is extended to a point where there is no need to support local participation. In this connection it is important to emulate the humble example of Chief Mukuni, in Livingstone and Victoria Falls area. His solution to empowering local people is to allocate prime tourist sites to his subjects or other Zambians and then directing the prospective investors to strike commercial deals with the Zambians who have title to those sites. Such an approach enables Zambians to have something to offer to a joint venture with a foreign investor.

EFFECTING RADICAL REFORM IN THE COUNTRY'S NATURAL RESOURCE LAWS

The pillage of Zambia's natural resources (land, forests, minerals, fish, wildlife, etc.) is largely due to the fact that these resources have been alienated from the local communities. It is also true to say that the current natural resource laws in the country are essentially anti-local people. This arrangement has failed as a method for administering and protecting the various natural resource estates in the country. Such administrative and management systems are a recipe for the 'tragedy of the com-

mons' syndrome.

Owing to the fact that the central government's control on natural resources has not yielded any substantial benefits to both the resources and the local communities it is suggested that these resources be handed back the original owners: the local communities. Such a proposition suggests a repeal of all natural resource laws in the country in order to make the new laws to be more sensitive to the needs of the local communities. Such legislation would restore the ownership of national natural assets to the people and thereby redress one of the cardinal omissions of the post-colonial state.

STOP LISTENING TO WRONG FOREIGN ADVICE

One of the serious national problems identified is that Zambians (the government, politicians and professionals) are always keen to accept, support and implement the counsel of outsiders.

The point that is being made is that Zambians should begin to reject the advice that is given to them by foreigners posing as experts on Zambia issues. In most cases these so-called experts have not run a viable business of their own. Worse still, the advice they give us on how to run our countries would not be taken seriously or implemented in their own home countries. However, the Zambian fifth columnists embrace this ill thought out advice as gospel truth. It must be the duty of every Zambian to challenge these conspiracies.

SUMMARY

This presentation has argued that Zambia is not a destination of the Second Great Trek. The South African investors are not a settler group. They are largely transitory in spite of the fact that they are invited guests of the Zambian government. They do not constitute the desired impetus for national development. In effect, most of their members are in the country for opportunist gains. The Zambian government is, therefore, advised to encourage and support its local investors. For it is the local investors that will provide greater impetus for genuine national economic development.

Gilbert Mudenda is a SAPES Trust Board Member

Assessing Aid

Trevor Harris

If the dwindling coffers of donor aid to developing nations is targeted at developing countries with sound economic management and government institutions, greater strides can be made against poverty reduction, a new study by the World Bank argues.

The report, "Assessing Aid: What works, what doesn't, and why," looks at the effectiveness of donor aid on development, and argues that donor countries could do a better job if they focus in on poor countries with sound policies.

It finds that if an extra \$10 billion were targeted at poor countries with sound policies, it would help raise 25 million people out of poverty, but if distributed across the board to current aid recipients, only seven million would be lifted out of poverty.

Their definition of "sound" policies include open trading regimes, secure property rights, absence of corruption, respect for the rule of law, social safety nets and sound macroeconomic and financial policies.

It identifies 32 countries with poverty rates above 50 per cent which had the requisite policies and institutions, and found that every foreign dollar of aid attracted two dollars in investment to them.

"Providing significant amounts of money has not made much of a dent in poverty in countries with weak management. It is possible to assist development in countries with weak institutions and policies, but the focus needs to be on supporting reformers rather than disbursing money," the report argues.

The report is very much in line with current Bretton Woods thinking on donor aid.

In the initial spurt of development aid following the Great Depression of the 1930s, the World Wars and markets skewed by colonialism, market forces were seen as failed vehicles for driving development, and governments were seen as the agents for political, social and economic change.

nommic change.

The aid policy consisted of calculating countries' growth "requirements" and then making up the shortfall with foreign aid.

In the second phase, governments were seen as incapable of driving development through command economies, and market forces presented as the means to development. Experience with aid delivery to command economies and import substitution models of the 70s has led to a re-thinking of the paradigm.

The current thinking is therefore that neither markets nor governments alone can solve the situation and that therefore a pragmatic approach that combines the two is the best way forward.

This development approach puts forward a two-pronged approach of putting in place market-oriented policies such as stable macro-economic environments, trade liberalisation, effective law and order, on the one hand, and ensuring the provision of public services such as infrastructure, education and health.


It shifts the focus from simple capital provision to supporting good institutions and policies.

"Money is important, of course, but effective aid should bring a package of finance and ideas - and one of the keys is finding the right combination of the two to address different situations and problems," the report argues.

It proposes five policy reforms to address the situation:

← Firstly, financial assistance be targeted at low income countries with sound economic management as this is the catalyst for faster economic growth;

← Second, there should be policy-based aid to nurture changes in countries where there is a commitment to reform; where there is a credible track record or real basis for optimism about domestically initiated reform. Where this does not exist, the focus



should be on "the more modest and patient role of disseminating ideas, transmitting experiences of other countries, training future policy-makers and leaders, and stimulating capacity for informed policy debate within civil society."

← Third, the mix of aid activities should be tailored to specific conditions in the country or sector. Even the allocation of donor finance to laudable activities such as primary health care or basic education is not in itself a guarantee of effectiveness as it frees up capital for allocation to other sectors in countries where institutions are weak.

← Fourth, projects should be focused on creating and transmitting knowledge and capacity. Thus, development projects will play a key role in supporting changes that improve public service delivery, in many cases involving greater participation by local communities and the decentralisation of decision-making.

← Fifth, development agencies need to find and nurture pockets of reform even in highly distorted countries. Their focus here should be on how development agencies use their resources to stimulate policy changes and institutional reforms that could lead to better outcomes.

The problem confronting us in this scenario is that aid has never been disbursed purely as a means of poverty alleviation or eradication.

On the one hand there has been the motivation of "donors" that if there was economic growth in foreign markets, their own

markets and thus economies would expand.

On the other, political and strategic interests could be served by pumping aid even to despotic and corrupt regimes. Thus billions of dollars could continue to flow into Mobutu Sese Seko's corrupt regime at a time when he sacked some 7,000 school teachers on the ground that there was no money to pay their salaries, while he could own 51 Mercedes Benzes and could fly his favoured friends to Disneyland in a Boeing jet.

Post-Cold War, the strategic importance of aid has lessened, but such interests still play an important role, in especially how bilateral aid is disbursed.

US aid to Middle East nations, because of Saddam Hussein, or to North Africa, because of Gaddafi, will still be skewed in disfavour of poorer nations in sub-Saharan Africa, for example.

The mutually contradictory goals of altruism and expediency, of helping the poor and guarding political and strategic interests, mitigate against simplistic notions of putting the money where it will do the most good - in countries with "sound" policies.

The second problem occurs with the concept that if donor aid is poured into poor countries with sound economic management and sound political and social policies, the greatest benefits would be derived.

If these countries have good management and policies, why have they continued to remain poor? The report attempts to explain this apparent anomaly away by alluding to these countries having embarked on systemic reforms. However, aid has been poured into these self same countries over several decades now, with the Nordic and Canadian donors in particular targeting the poorest nations rather than strategic interests. If such aid has not yet been successful, it would suggest that the relationship between aid and sound management is not as simplistic as portrayed in the report.

The third issue is that the definition of sound management, of currency devaluation, trade liberalisation, tariff reduction, privatisation etc., is straight out of the handbook on structural adjustment. As has been clearly demonstrated in several studies, structural adjustment has re-

sulted in greater hardships for the poor, as food subsidies are curtailed, primary health care and education budgets are slashed and the costs of privatised water, electricity and other services rise. An added consequence is that these developing countries are urged to concentrate on export driven growth. But, as more and more countries seek to export the same goods and commodities to the same markets, prices are driven down, and export earnings diminish.

In essence, then, the report does little more than reaffirm the current strategies of the World Bank, as for example in the case of the International Development Association (the World Bank's soft loan facility for the world's poorest countries) policy of using sound management rankings in the allocation of funds, and of World Bank president, James Wolfensohn's statement that "we must build on the work we have already begun, to move from a project-by-project approach, to an approach that looks at the totality of effort necessary for country development, that takes the long view, that asks of every project - how does this fit into the big picture?"



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
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|--------------------------------------|------|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | |
| | | Consumer Price Index (1990 = 100) | | | | |
| Country | | Quarters | | | | |
| | 1990 | 1997 | 1997 | | 1998 | |
| | | | I | II | I | II |
| Angola | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Botswana | 100 | 218.2 | 210.2 | 216.1 | 225.4 | .. |
| Lesotho | 100 | .. | 211.7 | 217.8 | .. | .. |
| Malawi | 100 | .. | 609.3 | 625.6 | .. | .. |
| Mozambique | 100 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Mauritius | 100 | 160.3 | 158.3 | 159.3 | 165.8 | 169.4 |
| Namibia | 100 | 204.7 | 200.5 | 203.7 | 210.9 | .. |
| Seychelles | 100 | 107.9 | 107.3 | 107.5 | 109.2 | .. |
| South Africa | 100 | 198.7 | 194.33 | 197.7 | 204.8 | 207.7 |
| Swaziland | 100 | .. | 231.8 | .. | .. | .. |
| Tanzania | 100 | 471.4 | 468.1 | 476.4 | 535.6 | .. |
| Zaire | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Zambia | 100 | 5635.4 | 5465.2 | 5520.4 | .. | .. |
| Zimbabwe | 100 | 481.4 | 458.7 | 487.6 | .. | .. |
| Note: .. Means data is not available | | | | | | |
| Source: SARIPS/SAPES Trust Databank | | | | | | |

| SADC Countries - Interest (Lending Rate) %, 1990,1997and 1998 | | | | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
| | | | | | | |
| Interest (Lending Rate), (%) | | | | | | |
| Country | Quar | | | | | |
| | 1990 | 1997 | 1997 | | 1998 | |
| | | | I | II | I | II |
| Angola | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Botswana | 7.88 | 14.08 | 14.33 | 14 | 13.44 | 13.25 |
| Lesotho | 20.42 | 18.03 | 18.5 | 18.1 | 17.1 | .. |
| Malawi | 21 | .. | 39.25 | 39.25 | .. | .. |
| Mozambique | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Mauritius | 18 | 18.2 | 20.5 | 16.83 | 20 | 19.67 |
| Namibia | .. | 20.18 | 20.31 | 20.69 | 19.54 | 18.95 |
| Seychelles | 15.65 | 14.88 | 14.92 | 14.71 | 15.233 | .. |
| South Africa | 21 | 20 | 20.25 | 20.25 | 18.92 | 19.58 |
| Swaziland | 14.5 | 18.75 | 19.75 | 19.75 | 17.75 | 19.75 |
| Tanzania | .. | 29.23 | 31.75 | 30.17 | 26 | 24.67 |
| Zaire | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Zambia | 35.1 | 46.69 | 54.5 | 49.1 | 30.37 | .. |
| Zimbabwe | 11.71 | 32.55 | 32.05 | 32.23 | 37.46 | .. |
| Note: .. Means data is not available | | | | | | |
| Source: SARIPS/SAPES Trust Databank | | | | | | |
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SADC Countries Real Interest Rate Trends, 1990-1995




Source: SARBSTATS Database

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CONTENTS

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

- White Liberals and Black Nationalists *strange bed fellows* 45
Archie Mafeje

SOCIAL POLICY

- Addressing Rural Poverty
A Failed Strategy in Zimbabwe 49
Annie Barbara Chikwanha Dzenga

GENDER ISSUES

- Gender and Democracy in Africa 54
Patricia McFadden

ENVIRONMENT

- Refugees, Migration and Environment 58
Owen Sichone

AFRICA REVIEW OF BOOKS

- Freedom from Debt 61
Patrick Ncube

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

White Liberals and Black Nationalists: *Strange Bedfellows*

Archie Mafeje

Preamble

Both these are very broad characterisations and tend to obscure any differentiation within each category. This is so much so that even the renowned Oxford English dictionary has up to eight different entries under "liberal". Despite this, one thing certain is that however used the term had nothing to do with colour. In current political usage the association with colour is strongest in America and Southern Africa. The counter-position between "white" liberals and "black nationalists". The nearest we got to the latter is "black power" militants in the 1960s, who appear to have been a transient phenomenon unlike "black nationalists" in Southern Africa who are, for all intents and purposes, a lasting category. The difference might be contextual as well as historical because we can think of "black nationalism" in the United States but not necessarily of "black nationalists". Although this might seem strange or inconsistent, it has always been the case since the founding of Pan-Africanism at the turn of the century. Those who espoused black nationalism in the diaspora had to revert to Africa, whereas leaders such as Kwame

Nkrumah and Leopold Senghor only had to stand firm on the ground to earn recognition as African nationalists/black nationalists. If there is any significance in this, only those in the diaspora can judge.

Meantime, we stay with Southern Africa where the counter-position between "white liberals" and "black nationalists" is unambiguous. Our interest is specifically in the three settler-societies in the sub-region, namely, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. As is known, the liberation struggle in all three countries was not so much against a colonial power but primarily against white settler racial oppression. This immediately puts the accent on colour. Yet, not all in either of the two opposing camps represented the same thing. In South Africa while the PAC was opposed to any collaboration with whites, the ANC accepted collaboration with "white liberals" and advocated a "multi-racial democracy" as its ultimate goal. All this would count as liberalism. In contrast, the uncompromising position of the PAC and demand for exclusive black power would count as militant "black nationalism" or as black chauvinism to its opponents. But both the ANC and PAC quali-

fied as "black nationalists" in so far as they were committed to the struggle against white domination. Both saw the Afrikaners as the instigators of the oppression of blacks and even the ANC would not be found dead collaborating with the "Boers" - a term which Afrikaners originally used for themselves but is now used pejoratively by the blacks to pay back the Afrikaners for all the demeaning terms (such as "Kaffir", "Bantoe", "Hotnot", "Boesman", etc.) they have used of them.

In Zimbabwe there were no Afrikaners to speak of but there was as much oppression of the blacks as in South Africa. The perpetrators were the white English-speaking Rhodesians who also had no inhibition in referring to Africans as "Kaffirs". While at first the Africans were content to refer to them simply as "settlers", after UDI they deliberately referred to them as "Rhodies" in exactly the same way the South African blacks referred to Afrikaners as "Boers". Similarly, both ZANU and ZAPU would have nothing to do with the "Rhodies". But of the two movements ZANU represented more militant African nationalism with "socialist" inclinations. This is so much so that Robert Mugabe was often referred to as a "Marxist socialist" in the western press. In contrast, ZAPU was more liberal and akin to the ANC with which it was allied. But luckily for ZAPU the demographic balance between blacks and whites in former Rhodesia was such that "independence" could be taken to mean transfer of power from the white settlers to the Africans. Unlike the ANC, ZAPU made no bones about this. Some white liberals had no immediate objections to this as long as the Westminster type of democracy was the accepted ideal. The significance of the latter point will become apparent later.

In Namibia at first SWAPO was in competition with SWANU. Of the two, SWANU claimed to be more radical and revolutionary. But its black nationalist credentials were greatly compromised when some of its leading members joined the Turnhall Alliance which was a creation of the Afrikaner colonisers in former South West Africa. For this and other reasons it lost credibility, leaving room for SWAPO to become the sole and authentic representative of the Africans in former South West

Africa. It can be said, without prejudice, that, socially and ideologically, SWAPO was less developed than its counterparts in Southern Africa. It is, therefore, not easy to characterise its nationalism. At a pinch it could be said that it was of the same mould as the ANC and ZAPU, if less evolved.

Black Nationalists and White Liberals

Our main concern in this investigation is not so much to classify black nationalist movements in Southern Africa, which might be a sensitive issue, but to expose the uncomprehended fundamental contradiction between the black nationalists' understanding of liberalism and the actually historically-determined white liberalism. In the old Unity Movement we used to be told that the worst enemies of the African revolution were the white liberals. This paradox did not become apparent to me until I

The black nationalists are administering an estate in which hegemony belongs to the white liberals. The latter gave support to the black nationalists in so far as their struggle was aimed at getting rid of an order which had become impossible to regulate. This was no surrender of hegemonic power but a political insurance.

went to Zimbabwe and then to Namibia. In both countries I witnessed the dynamics of white liberalism. While genuinely critical and even opposed to crude white racism such as exhibited by the "Boers" in South Africa and in Namibia (where "Boers" is used as a reference term for all white supremacists), and the "Rhodies" in Zimbabwe, the white liberals are implacably but insidiously opposed to any real change in *power relations* - methods, yes. While they are prepared to be ruled by somebody else, they reserve the right to *reign* i.e. to enjoy general *hegemony*. In Zimbabwe and in Namibia I used to hear crude remarks by some less conscious whites such as: "Agh man, let the Blacks rule, we have the economic power". Needless to say, this is a primitive way of thinking. Through interventionist policies, the Afrikaners achieved economic power. But at no stage could it be said that they reigned or enjoyed general hegemony in society.

Hegemony refers to political predomi-

nance that derives from pervasive social and ideological influence. As Grasci would put it, hegemony belongs to those who "enjoy the greatest ideological resonance in society". It would be foolish to deny the fact that in Southern Africa the English-speakers have the greatest intellectual capital and ideological influence than any other group. They are the undisputed representatives of the international order in the region; they have the greatest and longest influence on the educational system in the region; their political values have universalist pretensions and enjoy supremacy in the region, as is shown by their general acceptance among what is considered to be more creditable black nationalists i.e. those who fit into the liberal mode; and they are the recognised custodians of western culture and civilisation which is seen as the epitome of development globally. Thus, the Southern African English-speakers can afford to look down upon everybody - Afrikaners, Jews (who might be English-speaking) but are not Anglo-Saxon), blacks in their variety, Portuguese and Eastern European immigrants - the whole lot of them.

In spite of this, they feel a great need to patronise blacks in general and to co-opt their leadership, where possible. For demographic reasons in the immediate sense and for geo-political reasons in the

broader sense, blacks matter to any group which wishes to maintain hegemonic power within Africa. The Anglo-Saxons in Southern Africa are acutely aware of this. Instead of thinking of castrating Blacks *en masse* as the Afrikaners did, through well-established channels they seek to win the hearts and minds of potential African clients and to discredit and frustrate those who are opposed to their hegemony. While in Zimbabwe, living in a rich white suburb but mingling former freedom fighters who were now working as houseboys and gardeners, I came to know of frequent house meetings among the white elite where, according to their same menial workers, they hatched their plots against Mugabe. In Namibia my information was more direct. Interestingly enough, two Afrikaner admirers who became friends used to tell me who was being targeted among the blacks by the German and English-speaking elite, especially at the University of Namibia. But being numerically weak, the local white

liberals relied very heavily on international allies from America and northwestern Europe. I was shocked by the latter because I had supposed that American and western European liberals would be opposed to the virulent racism of white Namibians. As I discovered to my chagrin, this was not the main issue. From a "broader perspective", *hegemony* was the primary issue. Any kind of radicalism among black intellectuals and nationalists had to be contained, preferably, with the help of more compliant black nationalists.

Although in general South Africa is looked upon as the metropolis in the sub-region, the English-speaking liberals at the University of Namibia looked up specially to the University of Cape Town and Wits. They phoned endlessly their counterparts there, reporting on the opposition to them and informing on those individuals they sought to discredit and marginalise. In exchange the metropolitan would advise them on how they were dealing with the situation. One of the most revealing pieces of information came from the University of Cape Town where, according to one of my informants at the University of Namibia, the unannounced strategy was to make it difficult for black South African academics who had lived abroad (and therefore could not be trusted) to enter the university. There is evidence for this ploy. But what is more important, however, is that it puts into context the events surrounding the African Studies Centre at the University of Cape Town and the Mamdani debacle as well as the Makgoba affair at Wits. It is clear that, whether it be in independent Namibia and Zimbabwe, or post-Apartheid South Africa, it is white liberals who through guile and deceit make sure that ultimately they regulate and reign. Even when exposed, they often get away with it because they enjoy certain immunity by virtue of the halo-effect surrounding them and the resonance they receive from black nationalist liberals. Herein lies a big political contradiction.

The Uncomprehended Contradiction

The black nationalists in Southern Africa regarded themselves as victims of "white oppression" and, therefore, saw the whites in general as their enemies unless they proved otherwise. Yet, in practice it was the cruder white zealots such as the Afrikaners and Rhodesian "red necks" who were their persecutors and hence they gave the special labels such as "Boers" and "Rhodies". In South Africa the Truth Commission succeeded only in confirming what the blacks already knew and hated,

namely, the brutality, bestiality, and callousness of the Afrikaners. This is proof of the fact that the Afrikaners, in spite of their control of state power, remained a myopic African tribe with no sense of hegemony whatsoever. By indulging in such things as state terrorism, murdering prisoners, blowing off detainees' teeth and testicles with electric shocks, or ripping open women's vaginas and other horrors, they destroyed every possibility of drawing any resonance from the blacks. The English-speaking liberals in Southern Africa, who have a wider field of reference, disdain such behaviour not because they believe in equality with blacks but because it is puerile and ultimately self-destructive. Indeed, the Afrikaners are the least likely white group to be beneficiaries of the moral injunction of "forgive and forget" which is being touted by the ANC government.

Yet, ironically enough, there is every chance that the Afrikaners will adjust more quickly to social change in Southern Africa than the Anglo-Saxons and their Teutonic counterparts in Namibia. There are certain predisposing factors which account for this. First, despite their notorious racial bigotry, the Afrikaners are sociologically more akin to Africans (including the so-called Coloureds and Basters) than the English-speakers or Germans. Second, they have nowhere to go, and they know it. Third, as was hinted earlier, they have no hegemonic power, nationally and internationally, to fall back upon. In the absence of the racial restrictions imposed by Apartheid, these predispositions manifest themselves in interesting personal social reflexes. In Namibia my two strongest allies at the university were Afrikaner gunsmith who, in offering this protection, said: "I do not like what these people (meaning the English and Germans) say behind your back. They are hypocrites. I do not trust them". Kwesi Prah, an African friend and comrade, expressed the same misgiving when he was my guest in Namibia. Even more telling was a statement by one of my Afrikaner supporters who, in an inspired discussion about "indigenisation of knowledge of Africa", exclaimed: "*God man*, if I was a black, I would have been black consciousness". Only people who have nothing to defend can afford such spontaneous outbursts. To those who hold themselves responsible for the imperial order, this is sacrilege or a sign of "insanity", as they insinuated.

We often think of fieldwork as going out to the "field" and yet, as self-confessed "organic intellectuals", we ought to learn more from everyday social encounters. If

it had not been for my personal encounters in Zimbabwe and Namibia, especially, I would not have been able to fathom the fine distinctions I am trying to make with as much certainty as I do now. From observation, I am convinced that in the post-Apartheid era Afrikaners matter far less than English-speaking liberals (including Anglicised Afrikaners). It was absolutely imperative that the blacks fought the "Boers" as perpetrators of injustice and unspeakable cruelty against them but not necessarily as an incarnation of all evil. There were other forces at work such as British and American imperialists who have always been allied with white liberals in Southern Africa not only because they are their kith and kin but primarily because they are an extension of their hegemonic power in the sub-region. Whether or not it would have been a good strategy to fight on too many fronts at the same time, it was a dangerous misconception on the part of black nationalist liberals to suppose that they had found genuine allies in the white liberals and that after "independence" they would become equal partners. In reality they were not fighting for the same thing. The black nationalists were fighting against colonialism and Apartheid or "white minority rule". Although necessary, this is not sufficient because it did not say what they were fighting for precisely. Whereas during the struggle there were frequent references to "majority rule", "freedom", and "democracy", as everybody knows now, after independence these slogans did not suffice. This is so much so that in South Africa Thabo Mbeki, to the irritation of white liberals, began to make allusions to what he called the "African Renaissance" and pointed remarks about the revolution that "has not been completed". What is it that is missing, it may be asked.

It is my basic contention here that what is missing is *hegemony*. The black nationalists are administering an estate in which hegemony belongs to the white liberals. The latter gave support to the black nationalists in so far as their struggle was aimed at getting rid of an order which had become impossible to regulate. This was no surrender of hegemonic power but a political insurance. The white liberals (including the white communists in South Africa) reserved the right to exercise hegemonic power after independence. It is when this self-assigned prerogative is questioned or threatened that the white liberals rear their backs and their nasty praxis is exposed. We have already referred to some episodes in academia where, apart from the ritual argument about "maintaining standards",

moral arguments by individuals turn on the fact that they supported the liberation movement and, therefore, have a right to a privileged position. These are an unconscious form of self-condemnation and an unmistakable political insurance claim, as we suggested. However, as would be agreed, this is not a matter of individuals but of a self-motivated political community.

In Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe the liberal press is so ever vigilant in protecting the hegemonic power of the class by censoring militant black nationalists and by promoting more compliant ones. In South Africa Mandela made enough concessions not be viewed with suspicion or hostility. In contrast, the President-elect, Thabo Mbeki, who has been making threatening utterances has drawn a steady stream of preemptive strikes from the liberal press while at the same time evoking some resonance from the black masses who are eagerly waiting for something tangible. In Zimbabwe Mugabe who has always been treated with suspicion by the liberal press never had any respite from them. The indications are that in response to his supposed "socialist policies" he was bludgeoned by hegemonic powers into accepting the Structural Adjustment Programmes, which signalled his downfall. His rear-guard action of forcing land redistribution 18 years after independence only added fuel to the fire and the whole nationalist project went up in a smoke. Zimbabwe now is in dire straits and the white liberals might be celebrating in anticipation of better things to come or shedding crocodile's tears to appease their future junior black partners.

In Namibia the white liberals press reigns supreme and is free to put on trial any black who dares to challenge white hegemony or put on a pedestal any black nationalist who facilitates the reproduction of white hegemony. While Nojuma seemed not to matter either way, his Prime Minister, Geingob, received maximum encouragement from the white press and enjoyed great popularity among white liberals. White hegemony seemed to be guaranteed, despite the fact that Namibia has the worst income differential in the world (0.7 Gini co-efficient followed by South Africa with 0.65). A 6.8 percent white minority still controls about 80 percent of the wealth of the country while more than 50 per cent of the blacks live in poverty. With the economy growing at an average rate of 3.8% p.a., notwithstanding a chronic rate of unemployment, the white liberals have definitely had it both ways.

The African Dilemma

For those on the left or espoused "socialism", it had been understood that liberals in general were anti-revolutionary. This derived from classical Marxism which was largely Eurocentric. In addition, within the same tradition the common belief was that nationalism was a bourgeois ideological reflex and, therefore, reactionary by its very nature. These "theories" could not have anticipated the complexities of nationalist struggles against colonialism and white racism in an age of imperialism. Whether successful or not, nationalist struggles in the Third World have varied both in content and in orientation over the last 50 years. Unlike in metropolitan countries, the bourgeoisie (where it exists) in the Third World is capable of being anti-imperialist and, therefore, committed to the struggle for national liberation. In black Africa where there is no national bourgeoisie to talk of but a self-imposing struggle against colonialism and white domination in Southern Africa, the struggle for national liberation was initiated and led by the petit-bourgeoisie.

While the classical supposition that the petit-bourgeoisie is the only class that is capable of casting its lot either way in the struggle for social democracy is demonstrably untrue, it is true that the petit-bourgeois-led nationalist movements have shown more than one tendency. Reference has already been made to the differences among Southern African black nationalist movements. Going back in history a similar distinction can be made between what came to be known as the Monrovia and the Casablanca Group in the heydays of the Pan-Africanist Movement. Interestingly enough, at that point in time there was a vague sense of hegemony. Nkrumah's inspired and inspiring slogan, "Africa Must Unite", was a recognition of a certain lack in Africa. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the call itself was ideologically deficient because it advocated supra-state power, without saying what was going to be its social foundation. If this is asking too much of the founding African nationalists, then it is a question which the new generation of Pan-Africanists cannot escape.

Given the above historical antecedents, it is difficult to understand why latter-day black nationalists such as the Southern African ones failed to realise that state power by itself does not give the incumbents hegemony and that those who have no sense of hegemony are likely to be usurped by

those who have. The fact that the revolution in Southern Africa has been hijacked by white liberals with the collaboration of black nationalists has nothing to do with the traditional contradistinction between the "socialist path" and the "capitalist path". It has to do with the National Question. As was emphasized earlier, even the bourgeoisie in Third World countries is capable of leading an anti-imperialist national democratic revolution; and so can liberal black nationalist movements, if they enjoy hegemony within their society i.e. they receive the greatest resonance from the subjects of their revolution. Although those movements which have socialist pretensions often assume otherwise, the same equally applies to them. Otherwise, how else could they guarantee the acceptance of their programmes and defend themselves against opposing social forces? If President Mugabe and his allies in Zimbabwe had gained hegemony after independence, they would not have been so easy to frustrate when it mattered, despite state power. Similarly, PAC, which depreciated its social capital in so many ways, by the time its leadership returned to South Africa it had become dispensable.

Second and related to the issue of hegemony and the National Question, with regard to would-be socialists in colonial countries and settle-societies in Southern Africa, could they hope to gain hegemony and to resolve the National Question i.e. elimination of oppression and exploitation of the indigenous people, without adopting nationalism of any sort? In the stage of a national democratic revolution what is the antidote to white racism and white liberal hegemony? The two logical answers would be black nationalism and African hegemony, respectively. The supposition underlying the latter notion is that in the African context anyone who rejects racism and accepts genuine equality has a right to belong. Those who seek to regularise and reign in an established but inequitable order should be looked upon as objects of the African revolution. Unfortunately, the African revolution is highly compromised under the present circumstances because its leaders have no sense of hegemony but a limited and impoverished sense of state power which breeds petty dictators, "ethnicity", and political dwarfs, as is revealed by the present generation of African leaders compared to an earlier generation. They have no hegemony nationally and continentally. All they can do is to make belief by using state power to trample on the people's political and human rights.

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ADDRESSING RURAL POVERTY IN ZIMBABWE

A failed strategy?

Annie Barbara Chikwanha Dzenga

The majority of Zimbabwe's population (70%) resides in harsh subsistence economic conditions in the communal rural areas. Their main preoccupation is basic survival and their efforts are concentrated at producing food for consumption. All the determinant factors; access to land, water, credit and energy are largely absent yet they are critical for one to meet the basic needs of survival. In the immediate post independence period, the government assumed wrongly that its local government institutions would deliver development to the rural areas but due to a lack of strategic planning and foresight, development has not taken place. The task to cater for the welfare of the rural poor was thus shifted to the Non-Governmental Organisations. The government's neglect of the rural poor can be attributed to its failure to perceive poverty as a national problem as evidenced by the absence of poverty eradication strategies in the national development plans.

Background of the rural poor

Before independence there were some legal formal restrictions which inhibited the growth of income generating activities in the communal lands for groups and co-operative based enterprises. The system of racial exclusion practised by the previous government ensured that the majority of the country's population had little opportunity to participate in entrepreneurial activity (Robinson 1995:27). Such activities were only allowed after independence and in communities where the party was strong and organised, decentralised government institutions, Non

Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and churches committed themselves to assisting such groups.

Proposals to redress the historical rural-urban imbalances were first introduced in 1978 in the Integrated Plan for Rural Development through the development of growth centres. In 1988 the Intensive Rural Development Areas' policy called for the establishment of growth points, rural service centres and business centres. The strategy intended to establish twenty five new towns in rural areas which would serve a large rural community with the aim of concentrating economic growth in the centre. The assumption was that the provision of infrastructure would successfully link the rural folk and encourage growth of these centres and that the benefits of the urbanisation process would ultimately filter to the poor. This meant that urbanising and industrialising selected areas in the rural communities continued as the main strategy for alleviating the plight of the poor.

The Intensive Rural Development Areas policy emphasized heavy capital expenditure on infrastructure in order to promote rural industries development within selected areas (Reynolds 1988). It maintained the growth points, and introduced district service centres. The 'district service centre' concept was eventually implemented and the centres were tasked with the administration of each district and promoting light industrial and commercial activities. Growth points would then provide the institutional and structural support for the development of the district centres into market towns.

These growth points and district service centres developed into a bottomless

pit that consumed national resources without generating any benefit for their communities. Politics determined the location of some centres and growth points and this did not augur well with the rural folk who simply shunned some of these white elephants that were established to benefit them. The rural people perceived these points as serving different segments of society and so they remained alienated from participating in their economic growth. Most importantly, the rural folk were largely divorced from what was going on and they felt there was no need to comply with these new developments which bore little resemblance to their aspirations. They viewed these developments as not being for them but for the already affluent. The few retail outlets sprang up at these centres and growth points were owned by indigenous businessman who already own grinding mills or bottle stores elsewhere and emergent businessmen of the current era, politicians and bureaucrats.

The failure of this economic growth strategy led to the adoption of a welfare approach to rural development. The need to preserve the party electorate intact in the rural areas also contributed to this strategy. Although local government institutions existed throughout the country, central government made frantic efforts to distribute seed packs, food handouts and in some cases establish clinics and schools in sometimes not very strategic locations. This could have led to the development of a fatalistic culture amongst the rural folk who came to believe that government would see it that they did not starve and it also fostered dependence on handouts.

The task to cater for the well being of Zimbabwe's poor in the rural areas has thus been left largely to the NGOs with the government frequently alleviating immediate suffering through seed packs and drought relief food. This has made government's assistance in the communal drought prone areas non-sustainable because it lacks consistency even though it clears the government's conscience. Development can only be sustainable if it is geared to the entire living and working conditions of the people concerned; if it takes account of their spiritual, social and economic needs; if it is addressed to all actors at all levels and in particular to the women as they contribute up to 80% of all work done in the developing countries in the rural households (Munkner, 1996:7)

More than 70% of Zimbabwe's population lives in harsh subsistence economic conditions in the communal areas. Their main concern is basic survival and their efforts are all directed at producing food for consumption. The little surplus sold is immediately ploughed back into the food production process and the left over is then spent on other needs only if it is absolutely necessary. All the determinant factors; access to land, water, and energy are largely absent yet they are essential for one to meet the basic survival needs. Other aggravating factors are the prevailing socioeconomic and political structures especially the inequitable distribution of wealth and power.

A critical issue in any socioeconomic development process is the substantial accumulation of capital by the majority of the citizens, but for Zimbabwe's rural folk, the majority have not been given the capacity to improve their living conditions. Most reside in drought prone areas and farming is a permanent nightmare. The government has not paid attention to the removal of barriers to food production in the rural areas. Issues such as rural financing, food processing and inputs are largely absent.

Access to the previously white agricultural extension, input, credit and marketing system initially led to dramatic gains for about 70% of peasant farmers who had adequate land to utilise comple-

mentary inputs but this advance drew to a halt in the absence of a rapid break through on land reform (le Roux, 1992:191). The costs of failing to transform the rural areas is felt at the national, regional and continental level as urban bound migration continues to increase at an alarming rate. Zimbabwe has also largely failed to shift to a labour intensive, modern productive informal sector.

In the immediate post independence period, the government assumed wrongly that its local government institutions would deliver development to the rural areas. The government aimed to transform rural areas economically and socially by resettling the landless and those with insufficient or economically unviable land, establishing and extending a variety of irrigation schemes, carrying out several policy and strategy studies, guiding the development and growth of the cooperative movement and replacing capital equipment of the estates run by the government agencies (Transitional National Development Plan 1982-1985:3)

The objective was to achieve growth with equity and transformation but the approach utilised did not incorporate a *modus operandi* for alleviating poverty in the communal lands. Combining growth with equity proved to be an insurmountable task and those at the bottom lost absolutely. Adelman and Morrison (1993) observed that the absolute position of the poor tends to deteriorate as a consequence of economic growth. The government clearly lacked the political will and commitment to transform the backward rural areas and bureaucratic inertia contributed to the stagnation of positive developments.

The rural folk were all lumped into one group which resulted in the intended strategy benefiting a few 'articulate' persons who knew how to manipulate the system to their advantage. Eighteen years later, resettlement and the essential land reform programme are yet to be effected. Modest adjustments have been made with regard to resettlement but it remains to be seen whether any targets will be set for the programme and if they will be met. This is complicated by the fact that arable land is getting scarce in the rural

areas and this scarcity goes hand in hand with the changing concept of land. Land is increasingly being viewed as a commercial asset and a major factor of production.

The benefits of the resettlement exercise have been captured by top government officials and influential politically connected elites. Another new group of beneficiaries is composed of persons with agricultural expertise. Their productivity is not a critical and determinant factor for what matters most to the government is the paper qualification a clear misconception of what empowering the people means. On the other hand, the rural folk genuinely need the assistance to organise and develop a sustainable way of living and yet empowering the rural folk has negative consequences for the politicians as it deprives them of the strong grip they have over the hero worshipping party electorate. The issue is complicated by opponents of land redistribution who are against allocating land to peasants whom they consider to be unproductive (Moyo, 1994:37)

The rural folk in Zimbabwe have largely remained outside of the legal framework that sustains the market and democratic system. These people do not acquire and own property in the way that the affluent do which implies that unless the government can democratically give the rural poor the means, 'land', there will not be much progress in terms of economic development. The poor will remain poor because they do not have the capacity to cope with the socioeconomic and political environment. There is no mechanism for them to make an input into the policy making process that determines their economic empowerment. Economic imbalances in Zimbabwe will probably deteriorate as they will be aggravated by the globalization of the world economies as the country continues to open up to foreign investors.

Defining Poverty in Zimbabwe

All the three development plans formulated and 'partly' implemented in Zimbabwe did not pay attention to poverty alleviation in rural areas. The assumption was that the benefits of any national

Table 1 Present Land Distribution by Sector and Natural Region

| National Region | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|---------|-----|------|------|-------|------|-------|
| Sector | Unit | I | II | III | IV | V | TOTAL |
| Large Scale commercial | (000HA) | 200 | 3690 | 2410 | 2430 | 2490 | 11220 |
| | % | 1.8 | 32.8 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 22.2 | 100 |
| State | (000HA) | 10 | 10 | 160 | 60 | 260 | 500 |
| | % | 2 | 2 | 32 | 12 | 52 | 100 |
| Small Scale commercial | (000HA) | 10 | 240 | 530 | 500 | 100 | 1380 |
| | % | 0.7 | 17.4 | 38.4 | 36.2 | 7.3 | 100 |
| Communal | (000HA) | 140 | 1270 | 2820 | 7340 | 4780 | 16350 |
| | % | 0.9 | 7.8 | 17.2 | 44.87 | 29.3 | 100 |
| Resettlement | (000HA) | 30 | 590 | 1240 | 810 | 620 | 3290 |
| | % | 0.9 | 17.9 | 37.7 | 24.6 | 18.9 | 100 |

Source: Mukora CM., 1994, "The Significance of Current Farm Designations in Zimbabwe" in Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, Vol. 7 no. 1 p42.

development strategy embarked on would inevitably trickle down to the poor in the periphery. This oversight could have occurred because of the concern with correcting the racial imbalances in all segments of the society. Poverty was thus not perceived as a national problem.

The definition of poverty varies according to one's social class but the World Social Summit for Social Development 1995 provided a definition that embraces all the dimensions of human life:

'Poverty has various manifestations including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihood, hunger and malnutrition, ill health, limited or lack of access to education and other basic services, increased morbidity and mortality from illness, homelessness and inadequate housing, unsafe environments and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterised by lack of participation in decision making and in civil, social and cultural life'.

The government of Zimbabwe defines poverty as "the inability to afford a defined basket of consumption items (food and non-food) which are necessary to sustain life." (Poverty Assessment Study Survey, 1996:iii) This definition restricts poverty to a quantitative concept as it does not stretch to capture the social and political issues of poverty. This narrow definition ultimately affects the policy prescriptions set forth to alleviate poverty in the rural areas. Poverty, being a relative concept, is rather elusive hence the definitions vary but for the purposes of

this paper, people can be defined as poor when most of their time and efforts are devoted to issues concerning basic survival. Tied to this is also the lack of knowledge on how to organise for better resource mobilisation.

The Quality of Life in the Rural Areas

Zimbabwe is divided into five natural regions on the basis of soil type, rainfall and other climatic factors. The first three regions are suitable for intensive crop and livestock production whilst the remaining two regions offer limited scope for agricultural development. The majority of the rural poor live as subsistence farmers in the two lower regions. (See table 1)

Seventy two percent of the rural households in Zimbabwe are poor and the rural folk have come to believe that their poor status is a result of the drought, unemployment and retrenchment. A 1996 national survey of a total of 11 479 rural households in the country's five provinces revealed that 57% are very poor, 15% are poor and 28% are in the non poor category. Those in the poor category have incomes that are below the National Food Poverty Line of Z\$1 511.77 per person per annum and they cannot afford to purchase a basket of basic food needs; and non-food items and they live below the Total Consumption Poverty Line of Z\$2 213.28 per person per annum.

The rural folk are further divided into communal land dwellers, small-scale commercial farm dwellers and resettlement area dwellers and large-scale com-

mercial farm dwellers. In the communal lands, out of a total of 7 528 households, 68 % are very poor, 13% are poor and 19% non poor. In the small scale commercial farms and resettlement areas, 54% are very poor, 13% poor and 32% non poor out of a total of 1 048 households.

In the very poor category, only 1% from a national survey of 8 620 households attribute their poverty to the shortage of land (Table 2). This automatically implies that policy prescriptions arising from this observation would not result in structural reforms because land is not recognised as a basic necessity by the rural poor in Zimbabwe. The rural folk give more priority to shortages of food, clothes and lack of draught power and this of course implies the prescription of a continued welfare approach to alleviating the plight of the poor.

Attributing poverty mainly to environmental factors and unemployment (See Table 2) overlooks the fact that some families have lived in poverty for generations and their forthcoming generations may also be locked into a cycle of perpetual poverty. Whereas unemployment is a problem in rural areas, the absence of inputs, adequate land and organisational ability exacerbates the issue. The problem is that 40% blame the drought for their poverty but it is unlikely that a favourable climate would improve their living standard and successfully shift them from subsistence farming.

Entrepreneurship is apparently low amongst the rural folk because of the op-

Table 2 Main Causes of Poverty by Poverty Categories at National Level, 1995 Poverty Assessment Study Survey

| Main Causes | Poor Categories | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|------|----------|-------|---------------------|
| | Very Poor | Poor | Non Poor | Total | Total Household No. |
| Unemployed/retrenched | 25 | 31 | 36 | 30 | 5685 |
| Low paid jobs | 8 | 16 | 16 | 12 | 2289 |
| Large families with low wages | 4 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 920 |
| Poor parents | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 484 |
| Drought | 40 | 23 | 17 | 29 | 5391 |
| Laziness | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 1289 |
| Prices too high | 5 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 1490 |
| Rural urban migration | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| Lack of education | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 340 |
| Ill health | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 104 |
| poor land quality | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 114 |
| Shortage of land | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 190 |
| Other | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 433 |
| Not stated | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 51 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| Total household no. | 8620 | 3096 | 7082 | 18798 | 18798 |

tions they prefer to alleviate their poverty status. Nine percent of 8 620 households would rather get finance for self help projects, 19% would prefer affordable agricultural loans and the majority 21% prefer that efforts to create employment be intensified. The rest do not seem to be able to put their finger on the root causes of their poor status. The continued preference for employment implies the continuation of an industrial development strategy which will lead to another problem of urban poverty. It also indicates that the rural folk have come to rely on welfarism as a solution to their economic crisis.

This analysis is restricted to a few variables that militate against economic empowerment of the rural folk only partly because the National Poverty Assessment Study did not analyse its findings on the causes and solutions for alleviating poverty according to the various communities that were part of the survey. It is

therefore assumed that 61% of the respondents are rural dwellers.

Alleviating Poverty in the Rural Areas

Rural poverty is to a large extent an outcome of a number of interrelated forces which limit the success of any single action programme. This implies the use of a multi-dimensional approach to address the causal factors. Since new resources are scarce, such an approach would need to work out new means of reallocating the already existing resources.

A strategy for alleviating poverty in Zimbabwe's rural areas would therefore have to include a long term action plan that outlines a package of interrelated programmes to improve agricultural productivity and opportunities for increased incomes and employment as well as to strengthen infrastructure, basic services and popular participation in the planning process (Maeda, 1983:124). Land has become a limiting factor for any proposed

agricultural production and so the ever increasing rural labour force has to generate income and seek for employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector. This implies that "appropriate" industrialisation might be a possible solution to the problem of rural unemployment.

A household income and expenditure survey in 1993 (Muzari, 1993:39) revealed that small scale farmers or peasant farmers share a preference for manufactured commodities as opposed to goods produced by traditional handicrafts. This bears testimony to the fact that modernisation cannot be escaped. At the same time, products of the cottage industries have to be encouraged because they are labour intensive and they are consistent with the poverty levels in developing countries. In any case raising the level of household incomes among peasant farmers pushes up the demand for factory products.

Hence part of the solution to improving rural incomes would be to establish manufacturing industries that produce essential goods for a ready market in the same location (Muzari 1993:47). For example timber industries could also provide footwear; metalwork industries could manufacture household utensils; the food industry would provide basic foods and other household goods like soap, detergents and cosmetics. However, this kind of an approach would only work if the necessary supporting infrastructure and social amenities like clinics, shell factories and navigable roads are present.

Since communication problems are a major constraint in most rural areas, the strategy would only work if service centres were established in designated locations that can be accessed by a network of feeder roads. This enables the development of linkages with other villages and consequently it broadens the market.

Poverty can also be reduced by income distribution even though some voices of dissent argue that assisting the poor through income redistribution is self defeating. The assumption is that narrowing income differences curtails incentives to reduce outputs and therefore leads to an exacerbation of poverty (See Bauer 1981). But with a combination of asset redistribution, human capital accumulation, appropriate economic incentives and suitable supporting institutions, growth can be attained (Streeten 1976:403).

The main asset for redistribution in Zimbabwe would be land and consequently, water. The very few peasants resettled since 1980 have experienced deteriorated living standards because of the lack of basic social amenities and lack of water in particular. Since resettlement schemes very often fall within commercial farms, the resettled peasants were denied access to water stored on the commercial farms and worse still, the Water Act of 1974 sanctioned the rich mainly white, commercial farmers' behaviour. The poor peasants could not even capture some of the natural water flowing into private dams.

Redistributing both assets would go a long way towards empowering the rural folk but such a programme would need

to be supported by credit institutions that give a reasonable grace period and low interest on repayments. Farming implements could also be provided in the same way. The main recurrent cost to government would therefore be the provision of agricultural extension officers to provide the much needed technical guidance in production.

The rural folk in Zimbabwe would definitely benefit from an attitudinal change that emphasises entrepreneurial activity as a way of life. Whilst such attitudes are harboured by those who produce surplus agricultural commodities, the majority leave everything to divine intervention to decide their everyday fate. The long months between harvesting and planting are spent doing absolutely nothing as the rural folk rely on food savings from the previous harvest to sustain them until the next harvest. Whilst this is plausible, there is need to invest this profit into more income generating projects.

The most effective and efficient way would be of pooling their resources as a group or unofficial club, then use the pooled funds to start a home based production process like knitting jerseys or crocheting doilies. Labour intensive technologies would naturally be more appropriate as they occupy a large number of people. Clubs or societies like these have catapulted some individuals with business acumen into a different class altogether as they are usually designed to benefit individuals on a monthly rotational basis. Such financial activities can be used to at least keep the rural folk occupied constructively even if the profits are marginal and cannot lead to a tremendous change in their lifestyles. It also frees them from a poverty of the mind syndrome that has apparently entrenched its roots amongst the rural folk who have come to accept poverty as a way of life.

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Gender and Democracy in Africa

Patricia McFadden

Iwould like to begin this article by interrogating the nature and character of the concept of democracy, as a universally assumed desirable state of political and social being within the human narrative, by raising a few critical questions which relate to where democracy is embedded in terms of its traditions and epistemic foundations. What are the assumptions about knowledge and its production and social validity which are made when we consider the concept of democracy, particularly in relation to Africa as a formerly colonised space.

Secondly, where does the concept or notion of democracy draw its authenticity from in terms of the references and political narratives which are used, especially with regard to what is considered political and democratic. How does this manifest itself in political and social discourses about governance, parties and elections in terms of the control and utilisation of material and social resources in any society.

Finally, a critical question which emerges as a consequence of the foregoing is how effective is democracy in relation to transformation as a process which is effected through policy and the instruments of policy making and implementation.

All the above questions, of necessity, must preface a discussion about democracy if the issues of gender as a political and social differentiator are to become central to that discourse.

The centrality of exclusion in the notion of democracy

When one approaches the issue of democracy from a feminist perspective, exclusion becomes obviously the most salient epistemological feature of this notion of human interaction. Whilst at the conventional level, claims to democracy in both philosophical and practical terms assume that all humans are encompassed by the notion, in reality, throughout the narrative about what democracy is and how it might be achieved, as been the explicit exclusion of women as crafters of the notion and its practical implementation. At its

very heart, as a conceptual framework through which human existence aspires to reach its highest qualities in terms of fairness, equality and solidarity, the notion of democracy as presently constituted and practiced, is fundamentally androcentric and exclusionary in gendered terms.

'Most of the knowledge produced in our society has been produced by men; they have usually generated the explanations and the schemata and have then checked with each other and vouched for the accuracy and adequacy of their view of the world. They have created men's studies (the academic curriculum), for, by not acknowledging that they are presenting only the explanations of men, they have "passed off" this knowledge as human knowledge' (Franzway, Court and Connell, Staking a Claim, 33 in V.Spike Petersen, Intro.p.6)

It is because human knowledge has been treated as ungendered that the experiences and demands of women as a social category and an integral part of the human story have remained largely outside the scope of what makes up the claims for democracy and justice, especially in Africa. Exclusion as a privileging mechanism in terms of the definition of what is knowledge and what is known lies at the centre of women's marginalisation from the discourse on democracy and what it should entail.

I want to use the dichotomous concepts of exclusion and inclusion to critique the formulations of what is aspired to in terms of the experience of democracy in the African context; to probe new thinking about the notion of democracy viz-a-viz struggles against forms of national oppression, and to try and highlight the consequences - theoretically and practically - of a construct which is differentiated by gender and unchallenged inequality, particularly with regard to issues of identity, citizenship and ethnicity. In the African discourse about democracy, some attempts have begun to be made to incorporate the impacts of women's struggles against patriarchy at the national continental and global levels. Nevertheless, these efforts remain largely patronising in character,

and more importantly, have not begun to touch the meanings and definition of democracy in epistemological and policy terms.

In discussing democracy from a gendered perspective, I will also make a conceptual distinction between patriarchy as a hegemonic ideology which underpins notions of democracy, civil society and policy by structuring the ways in which women and men access and experience this political form; and gender on the other hand as a social construct through which women and men derive a social identity which serves to either exclude or include them from sites of democratic praxis and governance in political, social legal and economic terms.


'Feminist scholarship, both deconstructive and reconstructive, takes seriously the following two insights: first, that gender is socially constructed, producing subjective identities through which we see and know the world; and, second, that the world is pervasively shaped by gendered meanings'. (V.Spike Peterson, p.9)

I also want to make reference to the persistence of a conceptual misnomer which re-creates the dichotomy between male/female; excursions/inclusion through the definition of gender as a 'women's concern'. It is due to the resistance, especially by male African scholars, to the use and incorporation of gender as a heuristic tool, capable of changing the contours and contents of political analysis about the continent, that the discourse about democracy has tended to remain ungendered and fundamentally exclusionary of women's knowledge and aspirations.

To quote V.Spike Peterson again '...while not always the most salient form of domination, gender is rarely lacking as a dimension of oppressive relations. Thus, "taking it seriously" improves our critical understanding and possibilities for change.'

Challenging notions of democracy in pre-colonial African society

Often in the discourse about pre-colonial African societies, the argument is made



that these were collectively democratic and gender-neutral, if not gender-fair societies, which were corrupted by the imposition of a western patriarchal system through colonisation. This claim is usually made in the face of demands by African women that challenge notions of African tradition and custom which are fundamentally patriarchal and openly sexist.

First of all; such claims are methodologically flawed by the very fact of homogenising African societies as similar just because they belonged to a time period which preceeded colonisation. No claim to fairness and gender neutrality can be based on the simple existence of societies which were in any case known to have been widely diverse in language, geographic location and socio-economic and political development. Uneven development has always been a salient factor of human existence, and to superimpose gender fairness or neutrality because this was 'the past' is historically dishonest, to say the least. In any event, of what relevance is such a claim to the demand for equal rights and the recognition of personhood by African women?

It is common knowledge that those African societies which had reached the level of feudalism and had subsequently consolidated their states either through war or the negotiated incorporation of smaller and weaker groups/communities, exhibited the typical characteristics of classed and gendered societies globally. That is, the poor were often slaves without a personhood or rights of any sort, and the poorest in such communities tended to be women/wives. The enslavement of women and use of women as labourers in the expansion of state systems, as well as the exclusion of women from the most critical sites of power and civil spaces, is central to the patriarchal narrative of all soci-

eties - African not withstanding. Although V.Spike Peterson is referring to the emergence of states in Europe, the following assertion can appropriately be applied to African societies of the pre-colonial period, in my opinion.

'Understood in historical context and in relation to what they are formed 'against', early states mark a transition from corporate, kin-based communities to the institutionalisation of centralised authority, gender and class stratification, organised warfare and justificatory ideologies. The concentration of resources made possible by appropriating the labour of women (and subsequently of war captives and slaves) was crucial for accumulation processes.' (p.34)

When African historians assert that the continent can boast of some of the oldest and most complex of human societies, it often goes unmentioned that these were very oppressive and classed societies as well, where gendered identity played a central role in the construction of power, the distribution of wealth and the ability to enjoy the right to personhood and bodily integrity.

This claim to gender fairness because African societies were 'different' from those of the European or Arab coloniser is often accompanied by the assertion that pre-colonial Africa recognised the dignity of African women as mothers and wives. The claim that being a mother and wife is/was an honoured status, is easily displaced by the horrendous statistics on gendered violation and sexual abuse of females (wives and daughters) in both the public and private spheres of African societies (past and present). One need only refer to the right of African men to inherit women from their male kin; to 'discipline' them (in societies such as those of Swaziland women are still considered to

be perpetual minors, especially women whose lives are determined by customary/ social status laws and conventions); to purchase females through the payment of bride-wealth; and the accumulation of multiple spouses either through war pillage or polygamy, - to realise that the claim to fairness and 'dignity' is severely undermined by the facts of being an African women then and presently.

The process through which women are systematically excluded from community rights and entitlements until they are securely hidden behind the domestic walls where they are treated as objects of private property and sexual privilege, is one which is common to all patriarchal societies, albeit occurring at different paces and shaped by the specific conditions of each society within a particular time and space.

Nevertheless, the emergence of patriarchy as an ideology which privileges males in political, economic, cultural, social and sexual terms - through the institutionalisation of male supremacy and sexism - is common to all the major civilisations known in the human story. And the African narrative is replete with well entrenched examples of an old and resilient patriarchy, which has effectively disempowered women and young females for centuries, and whose persistent anti-democratic manifestations are euphemistically called 'African traditions and culture'.

In my opinion, it is only when we scan the African landscape for expressions of patriarchal oppression that we find the most lasting similarities which could be called 'African' in the often in-correctly used generalisation about the continent as homogeneous and similar. If one is searching for similarities and commonesses, then the prevalence of patriarchal privileged systems are easy to find.

CONSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE IN GENDERED TERMS

If one accepts the general validity of V.Spike Peterson's arguments about the consequences of early state displacement of autonomous kin communities for women, then the following assertions also apply to what happened in many African societies prior to colonial conquest:

'In the process, women lose kin claims to property, become transmitters of property, and are treated as property themselves. Moreover, the establishment of individual household units renders women more vulnerable to and dependent upon fathers and husbands, while weakening their access to countervailing power and support from larger kin networks; women's status/identity shifts from "sisters"

(a relation of autonomy and potential gender equality) to lifelong dependency as daughters and wives' (p.34)

The persistence of cultural and traditional practices which ensure that women continue to be constructed as property by males through the heterosexual marriage ritual in particular (which is very authentically African), and the continued use of social status laws which are couched as customary law and practice and where serve to locate women outside the sphere of modern systems of rights and jurisprudence, are clear expressions of an archaic patriarchy which in many instances was preserved by the colonial state and jealously guarded by the patriarchs of African society.

Almost without exception, all historical narratives about African women pose them as wives/daughters or mothers. It is rare to locate a history about Africa before colonisation which posits women as autonomous beings, having an agency of their own and exercising their rights as citizens and crafters of the African reality - except maybe as queen mothers and rulers who were constantly shadowed by 'wise and knowing' males.

Therefore, the claims that African societies were gender-fair and cognisant of women in their right as citizens and persons are fraught with historical contradictions and are really images of romantic notions about the past. This is not to say that all African women were slaves without any kind of mobility or social recognition. However, there is little if any countervailing evidence to show that women existed in communities which granted them their rights as thinking and knowing beings - outside of the very narrow confines of their domestic/reproductive roles

THE DOMESTIC ARENA AS A FUNDAMENTALLY UNDEMOCRATIC SPACE

The domestic arena, which is not an invention of the colonial state, has remained essentially the same because it is enshrined in a culture of patriarchal privilege. The African home in general reflects a fossilised, gendered division of labour which is fundamentally undemocratic and easily transposed from the rural (authentic) into the urban spaces of all African societies (women work unpaid as wives/mothers and sisters in the home and men assume this to be natural and given). Girls are expected, on pain of severe sanction, to provide services to both adult and young males within the household either through support of their mothers in the performance of domestic tasks, or through being available for manual and other forms of labour which men need and use. There is a per-

sistence of unfair eating practices which favour male nutrition and underpin the poor health status of most African women.

One of the most astounding patriarchal practices, which speaks loudest to the violation of women's personhood and human rights is the vicious practice of Female Genital Mutilation. This fundamentally undemocratic practice is not a colonial invention (in fact in certain parts of the continent the colonial state attempted to eradicate the practice - but that served to drive it underground where it became even more resilient), yet none of the anti-colonial movements explicitly defined it as a matter which required political and ideological attention. It was and still largely is treated as a 'domestic and private' matter - something that women did to each other (rightly or wrongly), but as long as it remained culturalised, it was not political and therefore did not speak to the question of democracy and rights.

However, seen from a feminist perspective, the sexual mutilation of females is very critical to the character of heterosexuality as a male-owned sexual form; it plays a central role in the control and definition of female sexuality as dangerous and in need of 'purification' viz males within those societies which practice it. This practice brings together issues of violation, sexuality, silencing and domestication (with its productive and reproductive implications), and fundamentally impinges upon women's physical, human and sexual identities in the most profound manner. Yet it remains outside the scope of the discourse on democracy in Africa.

It is through the exclusion of issues of sexual violation, which also incorporate the more blatant forms of gendered violence like rape, incest, sexual and physical abuse and marital rape from the core issues which construct democracy as an ideal and a practice, and the definition of democracy as a public matter - outside the domestic/private sphere - which has resulted in the persistence of backward and violent (anti-democratic practices) against women and young females on the one hand, and the positing of a notion of democracy which is partial and manifestly exclusionary on the other. If democratic principles are founded on the recognition of personhood and human dignity, then clearly in the African context, the absence of personhood and personal integrity for women, who form the larger part of the African population, speaks urgently to a fundamental flaw which can no longer be ignored or erased.

Central to the claim that such issues are not political or that they do not compromise the notion of democracy which

we strive for, is the epistemic nature of the notion of democracy itself which is embedded in patriarchal definitions of who counts in our societies; who creates knowledge and what that knowledge is used for; who and what constitutes the political and what relationships people have with power. The exclusion of women from the public through its definition as a male space and the locking away of gendered forms of violation in the 'private' as a 'women's issues', has translated into truncated expressions of democracy and governance which are obviously inadequate and unable to support wholistic human progress.

On the other hand, the post-colonial state has uncritically taken upon itself the supposedly 'colonial' practice of defining and regulating female sexuality in legal and moral terms. Women who express a public sexuality are inscribed with the 'whore status' and defined as immoral, whilst those who conform to the requirements of legal marriage and limited mobility are celebrated as 'decent women' who deserve to be called 'mothers of the nation'. The post-colonial state still uses colonial statutes which defined Black women as sexually promiscuous, especially in the public. The arrest and criminalisation of Black women as 'prostitutes' because they are in the public at night, continues in countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa persists.

During the colonial period, African women's democratic right to mobility was constrained not only by the surveillance mechanisms formulated by the colonial state, but also by the collusion between the colonial administration and African patriarchal authorities who openly declared women who left the rural patriarchally controlled spaces as whores and 'unAfrican'. This was a clear expression of the assertion of the public/private divide, which serves to push women into confined and undemocratic spaces, where they have limited or no rights - and this is often done in the name of preserving African 'culture'. The attempts by both the colonial and traditional patriarchal forces to exclude women from the urban space, where new sources of sexual and class identity were a real possibility, reflect the interesting assumption of 'natural' ownership of women which African and white males have sought to exercise for centuries. The state, both pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial serves as an instrument of exclusion and control over African women - and this is still treated as unpolitical and unproblematic by most African scholars.

ETHNICITY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE MATTER OF WHO COUNTS IN AFRICAN SOCIETIES

In the discourse about democratisation in Africa, only feminist scholarship raises the critical issues of the right to mobility; the ownership of an ethnic identity and citizenship in their gendered connotations for women. Yet these issues are central to any genuine attempts to craft new notions and meanings of democracy, governance and human rights in any present day society.

The recent publication of a seminal work on democracy and issues of citizenship in Africa by a leading African intellectual - Mahmoud Mamdani (1996), once again underscores the absence of women as persons and citizens in the intellectual geography of African male thinking. In a beautifully articulated analysis of the nature of the state - through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial modes of its existence, Mamdani raises fundamental issues about the civil society, power, identity and crisis as they have shaped the African narrative. However, he has no conceptualisation of women except maybe as part of a conflated notion of subjects without a gendered identity.

Throughout the analysis of colonial and anti-colonial interaction, and into the post-colonial period in both Uganda and South Africa, his notions of 'citizen' and 'subject' are intersected by identities of race, class and ethnicity, but never of gender. He mentions in passing 'the patriarchal family' (p.14) and 'patriarchal notion of the customary' as mirroring 'colonial practice' (p.22), but the analysis of what the consequences were of patriarchy as a system of power and a hegemonic relation which determined the very existence of millions of women in pre-dominantly rural Africa does not happen.

When, at the end of page 24, he positions himself (in the plural) to answer the question 'what should democratisation have entailed in the African context', the response is characteristically without any recognition of gender as a critical component of that new vision for the continent. Having added the vexed issues of race and ethnicity to the framework which is underpinned by a dynamic concept of the state, identity and power, Mamdani would have us (women readers) accept that the ingredients for a different notion of democratisation is ready for consideration. He proceeds:

'It would have entailed the deracialisation of civil power and the detribalisation of customary power, as starting points of an overall democratisation that would transcend the legacy of a bifurcated power.' (p24-25). Not even the

slightest mention of patriarchal relations of control and suppression which survived both the racial and class re-configurations of African societies, and which were actively used in the colonial construction of the native as 'other' not only in racial and ethnic terms, but very fundamentally in terms of gender.

The very notion of ethnicity is embedded in gendered definitions of ownership which swivel around the constructs of inclusion and exclusion, yet Mamdani writes eloquently about custom and customary practice; about the individual and the community - and all the time these constructs and categories are androcentric, masculinist and male in the most exclusionary manner. He argues that: 'More than anywhere else, there was in the African colonial experience one-sided opposition between the individual and the group, civil society and community, rights and tradition' (p22), and he does not see the conceptual one-sidedness of his own analysis about who this African was and is.

The implementation of coercive state legislation was so gendered, it is not funny, and yet Mamdani, with all the advantages of one who is possessed with a great intellect and almost unfettered access to historical and archival data, did not see women throughout three centuries of colonial rule. It is truly amazing. Compounding this gender-blindness, is the fact that not a single one of the published reviews, most of which were encompassed in the latest volume of 'The African Sociological Review', Vol 1, No2. 1997, even mentioned the absence of a gendered being in Mamdani's analysis. Could it be that the refusal to acknowledge the existence of African women at any time in the historical narrative of this continent is something which both Black and white male scholars, have reached a consensus on? Is this what universal patriarchal male privileging is about.

This paper was not meant to serve as a review of Mamdani's recent work, although I did think it necessary to indicate, albeit in a very general sense, how conceptually and methodologically partial even the most recent treatise on Africa, by an African scholar, is. It was one thing to read a raced analysis on Africa by colonial voices, which simply did not perceive African women as worthy of mention (a clear reflection of how the hierarchy of raced thinking erases those at the very bottom of the ladder); and it was also another thing to have to suffer the invisibility of African women's voices and experiences in the writings of Black men

who did not have the benefit of African Feminist scholarship three decades ago. But to have to face such blatant exclusion and erasure from the work of one who is widely acknowledged as a champion of democratic thinking, aspiration (and living - as he says himself in the preface to 'Citizen and Subject'), is totally unacceptable and inexcusable.

One can only agree even more with Harding and Hintikka (1983) that:

'Women's experience systematically differs from the male experience upon which knowledge claims have been grounded. Thus the experience on which the prevailing claims to social and natural knowledge are founded is, first of all, only partial human experience only partially understood: namely, masculine experience as understood by men. However, when this experience is taken to be the human experience - the resulting theories, concepts, methodologies, inquiry goals and knowledge-claims distort human social life and human thought.'

In a future paper I will try to raise critical concerns about the prevailing concepts of civil society, ethnicity, and citizenship in relation to the notion of democracy as it is currently understood and articulated in the discourse, and show some of the consequences for the formulation of a more inclusive definition of the construct. The impact of women's struggles for women's rights as human rights, and for a recognition of the woman as an autonomous self, with a dignity and personhood which is not dependent upon relationships with males in or outside the state or those occupying any of the dominant patriarchal institutions (organised religion, economic/financial, legal, familial or social structures), will be discussed and brought into the proposition for a new notion of democracy and the democratisation process in Africa.

Post-script: The first part of this paper was presented at a meeting on 'Democracy, Civil Society and Governance' hosted by the UNCC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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Refugees, Migration and Environment¹

Owen Sichone

The problem and its root causes

As a general rule, individual and mass migrations are movements of people from resource deficit to resource surplus areas. Throughout Southern Africa, people know their history as a history of migration, of interacting with nature and with other people sometimes peacefully other times involving war. The impact of populations upon the environment and vice versa has always been a major problem for human societies. With the enforced balkanization and boundarization of Africa by European colonial powers, it became illegal to leave a village in order to escape witchcraft, take live stock across national game reserve, disease control and numerous other boundaries, borders and fences with much disruption of people's lives.

Western scholars have become obsessed with the study of the present as if the past does not exist. They have created in their minds communities of the imagination 'historical fragility and contingency of links between people and places, histories and nation-states, "identities" and "cultures"'.² The problem lies in the incompatibility between the make believe modern neo-colonial state and the lives of the great majority of the people. There can be no solution to the current problems as long as neo-colonial structures remain the means. We must refer to the past and see how the problem was resolved by previous generations of African leaders.

Refugee status should not be made

permanent nor should colonial boundaries be considered sacrosanct. The national state has no value to today's global capitalism, it never had value for the people colonized by Europe and there is no reason why African leaders should persist in hounding people back into drought stricken or war ravaged parts of the continent. People should be allowed to be continental citizens. Pan-Africanist slogans have been promising for ages.

Iron Age Migrations

Archaeologists tell us that Bantu civilization begun in the Cameroon and spread southwards absorbing Khoisan and Batwa along the way. This has been dated as having started in the first millennium BC and is recorded in our oral traditions as the transition from hunting and gathering to iron, smelting and agriculture. Great prosperity resulted from this technological advance and it is believed that Early Iron Age societies in the area of what is today Katanga or Shaba experienced both prosperity and a population explosion. Even more important is that this is the area where Sudan belt pastoralists and iron age agriculturists meet.³

Many people in Zambia, Congo and Angola trace their roots to the Lunda-Luba empire. It has been noted that African society did not have prisons we can add that it never had refugee camps either.

The migrations that followed the contact between farmers and livestock keepers, the prolonged periods of chaotic war-

fare and slave raiding and even the state-people relations were significantly different from those of today in that they were negotiable, permeable and did not create rigid castes. Outsiders could be integrated just as siblings could be sent packing but the power of a kingdom depended on the number of followers more than on the land, rivers or livestock. What after all is land without the labour to work it? An so when wealth started coming out of gold, ivory and even people sold as commodities political leaders could rule without the support of their people. Whereas we say a king is king because of the people this does not apply in capitalist economy as numerous corrupt leaders have shown. The environment, natural resources became more important than people during the mercantile period. Least we romanticize the past too much, the society-environment equation frequently degenerated into violence.

Mfecane and the Environment

When Shaka, (like Museveni some would say) was uniting the Zulu clans there were many who fled from his war mongering and it can be argued that the departure of the Sebitwane's Kololo, Mzilikazi's Ndebele, Zwangendaba's Ngoni and others from the Southern part of the continent eased the environmental pressures caused by both human and livestock populations. After Shaka launched the Mfecane, a war of extermination that disrupted life in most of the Northern half of the present day South Africa in the 1820s, he initiated large scale migrations

of what today be known as refugees. They did not return to Kwazulu, however, and went off to begin a new life elsewhere spreading the mayhem that had begun in Kwazulu all the way into East and Central Africa where the war machine ran out of steam and where new lands were available for settlement. This did not last long however, for other refugees appeared on the scene.

At about the same time, European colonists were staking their claims to the land and expanding markets for slaves, ivory other tropical goods and completing the process of colonization which would see the African population trapped in homelands while their country was taken over by plantations, ranches and game reserves.

Population displacements in the Great Lakes region of Africa¹

Forced population displacements have been a central characteristic of the political crisis which gripped the Great Lakes region of Africa since elements of the Ugandan army made war against the Rwandese state in 1991.

In many instances, moreover, such displacements have been deliberately

provoked by the warring parties, employed as a means of securing or reinforcing their control of territory, resources and people.

While the crisis in the Great Lakes has a long and complex history, international attention began to focus on Rwanda in the second quarter of 1994, when at least 5000,000 people, usually described as Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were killed in the space of six weeks. In fact, the question of ethnic and national identity in the region is far more subtle than these categorizations might suggest.

The genocide stopped only temporarily when the government was ousted by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel movement composed primarily of exiled Tutsis, whose repatriation from

Uganda had for many years been blocked by the regime of Kigali.

As the RPF drove south, the organizers of the genocide recognized their imminent defeat and organized a mass evacuation of the Hutu population. Around 1.75 million moved to the neighbouring countries of Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi, where they were accommodated in camps and provided with international assistance. This is now standard procedure but is it right? The institution of the refugee camp, the subjectification that is implied in the term imposes the identity and status of refugee upon people who would otherwise be members of clans, churches, or guilds thereby finding a new place for themselves in society. What is a refugee? It is someone who must be given food aid, unpalatable egg powders and high protein biscuits. It is someone who must be repatriated when the politicians have signed an agreement.

As the Hutus were leaving, approxi-

the then Zaire, he could not help thinking that thirty years ago the same thing had happened to him. So when will it end?

The size of the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania, their proximity to the border, as well as their political and military character, posed a serious security threat to the new Rwandese government. UNHCR soon recognized the extent of the problem and repeatedly called upon the international community to separate the armed elements and intimidators from the civilian refugee population. The political will required for such action to be taken, however, was simply not in evidence. And so the RPF decided to ensure that they were responsible for the defence of the Tutsi of the region and that the international community could not be relied upon to provide any security. As we know this militarist approach is not without problems. First and foremost it has not stopped the killing of in-

nocent Tutsi villagers in the rural areas by bandits of the Intarahamwe, secondly, it has turned the RPF into genocidal killers themselves for in their drive to create a security corridor in Zaire and topple the moribund Mobutu regime, AFDL forces had committed atrocities against the Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire, in re-

venge for the 1994 genocide of Rwanda's Tutsi population. By June 1997, some 215,000 displaced refugees remained unaccounted for, either because they had been killed or because they were hiding in the dense Zairian forest. While UNHCR did not have access to many of the areas where the Rwandese had fled, by that date, the organization had been able to organize the return of more than 54,000 refugees by air and 180,000 by land. They congratulate themselves for a job well done even though they have not solved the problem. Of course in Tutsi mythology, genocide can only happen to Tutsis and can only be carried out by Intarahamwe and Laurent Kabila. Even this victim complex has contributed to the suffering of the people of the re-

Will peace ever return to the region? Thousands of Rwandese and Burundian refugees have disappeared in eastern Congo, there are refugees in all the countries covering the area from Somalia to South Africa and they carry with them the mark of people who must be repatriated.

mately 700,000 Tutsi refugees - including children who had been born in exile - returned to Rwanda, the largest number of them from Uganda. Soon after the primarily Hutu camps were established in 1994, approximately 160,000 of the refugees returned voluntarily to Rwanda. But as members of the former Rwandese government, army and militia forces tightened their grip on the refugee population, the repatriation came to a halt. UNHCR's efforts to promote return had only a limited impact. In fact, the number of people repatriating was almost exactly matched by the number of babies born in the refugee camps. As a result, the total refugee population remained stable. Indeed a Tutsi friend of mine remarked that when he saw Hutu children crossing into

gion for after all it is but a small group of political and military entrepreneurs, militia men posing as nationalist and Pan-Africanist leaders who are to blame for the endless bloodshed.

Conflict in Burundi

Burundi, whose ethnic composition is almost identical to that of Rwanda, has been ravaged by internal armed conflict since 1993, when the democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated. His murder was followed by ethnically motivated killings of both Tutsis and Hutus, and a more general descent into chaos.

As a result of the violence, some 160,000 Burundian refugees (mostly Hutus) fled to Tanzania and Zaire. Many thousands more were internally displaced. The camps for Burundian refugees, like those of their Rwandese counterparts, were also used as bases for Hutu rebels engaged in cross-border attacks on their country of origin.

The influx of 270,000 Rwandese (primarily Hutu) refugees into Burundi in 1994, came at a time when the situation in that country was already spinning out of control. As the crisis in Burundi deepened and the violence around the camps increased, the exiled Hutus came under growing pressure to repatriate from the country's Tutsi-dominated government. Eventually, in July 1996, up to 90,000 refugees were forced back into Rwanda while some 30,000 others fled to Tanzania.

Throughout the period described above, tension and violence were mounting in eastern Zaire. Hutu refugees who wished to return to Rwanda were intimidated or eliminated by armed elements in the camps. North Kivu became the

scene of a three-way war between Hutu, Tutsi and local peoples such as the Hunde, entailing the killing and mass expulsion of many Tutsi. In South Kivu, people of Rwandese origin, primarily Tutsis known as the Banyamulenge, also started to be harassed and displaced by local Zairians, supported from Kinshasa.

Having witnessed with great concern the fate of the Tutsis in North Kivu, the Banyamulenge, some of whom had assisted in the RPF victory in July 1994, began to resist. Well armed and highly motivated, they became a central component of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Led by Laurent Kabila, a lifelong opponent of President Mobutu, wished to see a change of government in Kinshasa.

As the AFDL advanced, Rwandese refugees were scattered in all directions from the camps in eastern Zaire. Some 70,000 Burundian refugees, who were mostly living in camps around Uvira and Bukavu, returned to their country of origin. Half a million Rwandese refugees regrouped at Mugunga, near Goma, and were finally encircled by AFDL soldiers, who obliged them to repatriate. Most of these refugees crossed the border into Rwanda between 15 and 19 November 1996, with tens of thousands of stragglers returning in the following days.

By the end of the year, around 685,000 Rwandese refugees had returned from Zaire. At the same time, large numbers of Rwandese and Burundian refugees (more than 400,000 according to UNHCR estimates) fled into Zairian interior, some of them under the influence of military and militia forces associated with the former regime.

Large numbers of local Zairians were

also displaced by these events.

Conclusion

Will peace ever return to the region? Thousands of Rwandese and Burundian refugees have disappeared in eastern Congo, there are refugees in all the countries covering the area from Somalia to South Africa and they carry with them the mark of people who must be repatriated. Why? Repatriation is not the answer. Sharing of the natural resources of the continent, freedom to settle where people choose and an end to the fictive sovereignty of the neocolonial states and their inherited borders will make a big difference to the lives of the African people.

The wealth of the continent must be used for the people, only then can the place of human beings in the environment be paramount again.

¹This paper is a summary of many different ideas emanating from the anthropological literature on refugees, historical debates on African pre-colonial state formation and the current upheavals on the continent. It is a call for abolishing both refugee status and colonial borders for the sake of both the environment and African society.

²Liisa H. Malkki, 'News and Culture: Transitory Phenomena and the Fieldwork Tradition' in A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds) *Anthropological Locations, boundaries and grounds of a field science*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) p.86

³Robin Derricourt 'The Copper and Iron Ages' in R. Oliver and M. Crowder (eds) *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa* (Cambridge, 1981) p.99

⁴"The State of The World's Refugees 1997-98, A Humanitarian Agenda" UNHCR

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The Chief Editor and Staff of SAPEM
Wish all our Readers a Merry Christmas
and Happy New Year

Freedom From Debt

By Jacques B. Gelinias

Reviewed by Patrick Ncube

Although the book is a presentation of familiar issues about development aid, yet the manner of treating the subject is lively and insightful. After summarising the major milestones of the origins of development aid, J.B. Gelinias points out that, emphasis on external financing of accumulation is a post war idea. Prior to world war two, the traditional view of accumulation, was traceable to Adam Smith, in his inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). In that work, Adam Smith singled out domestic savings as the source of accumulation and development.

To support the view of externally financed development, institutions such as the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, World Bank was established in July, 1944. Together with two other sister institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT), focused on the reconstruction of Western economies destroyed by war. Massive inflows of, particularly American capital, went into Europe either as short-term balance of payment support (IMF) or as long-term reconstruction and development capital (World Bank). The need for Europe to open up to American goods was championed by GATT, whose name has recently changed to World Trade Organisation (WTO).

During the 1950s, when the role of the IMF and the World Bank seemed to diminish in Europe, attention was paid to the Third World countries. At a theoretical level, the writings of Nurkse (1953), Hirschman (1958) and Rostow (1960) suggested that local savings were low and needed to be compensated for by large inflows of foreign savings for development to be accelerated. Rich countries, bilaterally and multilaterally should transfer capital and technology to the poor countries. In his, *Stages of Growth*, W.W. Rostow suggested that, for changes to take place from a traditional ones. Implicit was that, Third World societies were at the tradi-

tional stage and needed foreign capital inflows to modernise.

Combining these developments, i.e. the institutional establishment of the Fund, Bank and trading agreement GATT, a world order was defined and underpinned by the theoretical work of academicians. A system of development which downplayed domestic savings and investment was put forward as the correct path to go. The rulers of "developing" countries were won over. The result is that instead of national savings mobilisation policies being developed, faith is put on foreign aid. Banks have become overseas oriented to tap into the apparently generous flows of funds from international aid and financial systems. The foreign aid based development model has turned out to be a source of wealth for the Third World elite. It is a development model defined as aid, credit and dependence.

Socio-political power arising out of the foreign credit based development has been called aidocracy. J.B. Gelinias explains that at the beginning of the development crusade, aid was organised through the state. This was considered advantageous since the lenders, insisted on guarantees that only the state can offer. The state was considered the distributor of external assistance and became the developer, as it assumed the role usually reserved for the private sector in developed countries.

Besides the need for solid financial guarantees for loan repayments, the state was a convenient channel for political and diplomatic requirements. The diplomatic concern related to notions about respecting sovereignty in co-operation activities where aid giving and receiving governments are the main actors. Basic infrastructure was identified as the main cause of underdevelopment. The state was seen as providing the necessary lead in infrastructure development. Development is urgent and necessary shortcuts required can be provided through the state. It is in this manner that the bureaucrats of the Third World became millionaires. In the

poorest countries, somebody had to hold a position in the bureaucracy and they became rich.

J.B. Gelinias contrasts the views of Ghandi and Nehru. Ghandi envisaged self-reliant villages; able to produce their own food, cloth, milk, fruit, vegetables, educate their young and nurse the sick. He was averse to a machine dominated industrial society which would destroy the villages and suck them into the slums of urban society. Ghandi, considered the village as the social unit and natural environment that preserved family ties and religion and the industrial society as a faceless complex spewing out goods that people really did not need.

On the other hand, Nehru believed in imported technologies and industries. To attract foreign capital from the West and East was his major pre-occupation. He built huge dams, inaugurated mills that would replace weavers' looms, tailor's scissors and the shoemaker's hammer. Nehru argued that India had to catch up with Europe and America. His view was echoed by Truman in 1949, who called for modernisation of underdeveloped countries of the world. Gelinias demonstrates that India has not achieved much progress since 1947. Although the IMF and World Bank call it a Newly Industrialised Country (NIC), India remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita GNP of US\$340. According to the UNDP's Human Development Index, India is ranked 138 in 1997 on a scale where only a few countries are poorer. It is heavily indebted to the IMF and World Bank. Despite the green revolution, India has been on the verge of famine twice since 1947. India's path has been one followed by almost all developing countries, against Ghandi's advice.

Perhaps, with the staggering foreign debt being experienced in the whole Third World, the topic of domestic savings should be put back on the agenda. Promoting domestic savings has the advantage that a solid domestic capital network

is created which supports development. it fosters the integration of financial and economic networks within a country. This integration allows for sustained growth. Self-financed development through self managed domestic savings allows countries to have technological creativity and are thereby empowered.

Massive foreign investment brings with it complicated technology which may not be easily absorbed into a Third World country. This may create technological disorder and negative development. In this sense, self-financing and not external financing is the key to development in all its aspects and domestic savings should be reaffirmed as the source of accumulation.

Gelinas tells us that in sub-saharan Af-

Patrick Ncube is a Professor in Economics

rica, the informal sector grew at a rate of 6.7% between 1980-82, employing about 60% of the urban work force. He also informs us that in India, the informal manufacturing sector created twice as many jobs as in the structured sector. He also reports that in Lima, 42.6% of the housing, sheltering 47% of the population fell under the informal sector in 1984. This represented an investment of US\$8.3 billion. This amount was equivalent to 69% of Peru's long-term debt of that year. During the same year "the state investment into housing amounted to US\$173.6 million, a mere 2.1% of the informal investment". Many have argued that the differences between official and potential savings statistics are considerable. The difference accounts for the rapid growth

of the small and microbusinesses, a sector financed by the informal financial system.

It is unfortunate, that no proper institutional framework is in place to mobilise this type of domestic savings. The official banking system has failed to be such an institutional mechanism to tap informal domestic savings. It is in this sense that domestic savings have remained informal or at best has been organised in clubs such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. These associations are common throughout the Third World and act as financial intermediaries. It seems there is an issue to be explored further by researchers. The book presents an excellent discussion and should be the bible of those involved in development.



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Explaining South Africa' Foreign Policy

continued from page 15

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THE STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Edited by Owen Sichone

The development of society is linked in fundamental and intrinsic ways to a democratic constitution. This is a constitution that ensures and guarantees peace, stability and the legitimacy of those who govern in ways which promote integrated development.

This collection of papers seeks to examine critically, the prospects of constitutionalism in some Southern African states. Are constitutions able to translate into proper exercise of power by the state according to constitutional principles? To what extent are the constitutional principles influenced by political, economic and social factors?

Attempts by the incumbent leaders to get a new constitution, have been fuelled by the desire to sustain their continued stay in power.

It is the conclusion of these papers that the constitution is an important tool for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, as we have seen in the countries studied, a Bill of Rights is no guarantee for respect of and enforcement of human rights. Having a constitution does not necessarily lead to constitutionalism. Societies have to look at other structures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of rights and advancement of democracy.

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Patricia McFadden (ed.)

This is a collection of articles ranging from perspectives on household relations of power and contestation over scarce social and material resources, to the ever-critical issues affecting young people in a region which has witnessed tremendous changes structurally, politically and culturally during the past decade.

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Recommendations are made on how communities and national structures (Activists, NGOs, and Government Ministries) can begin to respond to an agenda which sets out urgent human rights issues within the context of a different understanding of development as a holistic and gender-inclusive process.

This text, which encompasses the excellent work of a group of Southern African scholars, constitutes an important contribution to the existing body of literature which documents the long-awaited changes taking place within Southern Africa, as the people of the region head into the 21st century.

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SPECIAL FLIGHTS: THE GDR AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Hans Georg & Ilona Schleicher

This book is intended as a reflection of the Germany Democratic Republic, East Germany's past, notably its links with the national liberation movements in Southern Africa.

Liberation movements had neither time nor the resources to keep records and documents because of the business of waging a war against colonial rule. This book provides those interested in understanding facts and relationships to help them appreciate the history of both sides.

This applies to the conflict ridden evolution of the liberation movements. Similarly, the GDR's specific interests, the interplay between the leading powers of East and West as a major factor in the GDR's foreign policy on its association with the liberation movements is described in great detail.

The authors have attempted to present this relationship within the context of, evolutions and on the other of internal developments within the liberation movements themselves against the background of overall conditions in the southern African region and the Cold War confrontation of that era.

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LANDMINES IN ZIMBABWE - A DEADLY LEGACY

Martin Rupiya

In an era when anti-personnel mines (APs) have been recognised as inhuman weapons of war, 1997 will go down in history as the year when the man in the street successfully removed this aspect from the repertoire of weaponry available. Anti-personnel mines have continued to maim and inflict fatalities in Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe amongst others, long after the conflicts have been settled. The mined areas, now abandoned, are inhabited by mostly poor communities who continue to bear the brunt of post-war casualties.

The cost of removing each mine is astronomical and of the countries cited above, none has the capability of clearing the deserted mine fields.

This book highlights Zimbabwe's anti-personnel mines problem within the world context. It traces the history of when, why and how mines were introduced into the country.

The study reveals the futile attempts at mine clearance since 1980, in which only 10% of the two million mines planted have been removed. The conclusion therefore is that mine clearance programmes need to come up with a solution which provides jobs and remunerated participation by the burdened and impoverished communities in the affected areas.

The next task is for a broad-based, multi-disciplinary study of Zimbabwe's landmines problems and its impact on several aspects.


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MOVE YOUR GOODS COUNTRY-WIDE
NRZ KEEPING YOU ON TRACK



*While he's keeping
an eye on the ball
Dairibord keeps
an eye on him*



*Dairibord
A part of every body's health*